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Abstract
This dissertation comprises three papers on wage and health returns to education, and spatial
wage curve in Turkey. The second and third chapters make use of the exogenous variations
generated by the 1997 Eight-Year Compulsory Schooling Law and the accompanying middle-
school class openings to estimate economic and health returns to education. The findings
suggest that the reform and the intensity of the reform substantially increased the educa-
tional attainment. The second chapter investigates the wage returns to education. Results
show that one additional year of schooling increases individual wages by around 9 percent.
The third chapter examines the causal impact of education on health outcomes and health
behavior. The estimates indicate that there is no statistically significant e↵ect of education
on health outcomes. The final chapter focuses on the spatial wage curve in Turkey. Results
show that individual real wages are more responsive to the adjacent regions’ unemployment
rates than the local unemployment rates. Further investigation reveals that the wage curve
estimates are sensitive to the use of group-specific regional unemployment rates.
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Chapter 1
Three Essays on Returns to Education, Health and the Spatial
Wage Curve in Turkey
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on health and earning e ects of education
and the spatial wage curve in Turkey. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 analyzes the causal impact
of education on individual hourly wages and health outcomes using compulsory schooling
change in 1997. Chapter 4 investigates the spatial wage curve in Turkey.
The compulsory schooling increased from five to eight years in Turkey in 1997. The law
change is accompanied by a massive investment in the construction of schools/classrooms
and recruitment of teachers to accommodate the expected increase in the middle-school
enrollment. These investments varied substantially across regions based on the pre-reform
enrollment profiles. The timing and implementation of the 1997 reform provide a plausibly
exogenous variation in educational attainment that can be used to identify the causal e ect
of education on the labor market and non-market outcomes. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 make
use of these changes to identify the e ect of education on individual hourly wages, and health
outcomes such as weight problems, smoking behavior, self-rated health, infant’s birth weight,
etc.
Chapter 2 first examines the e ect of the 1997 eight-year compulsory schooling law and
the accompanying middle-school class openings per 1000 children on educational attainment
in Turkey. This chapter uses the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey (THLFS) data.
The results indicate that the 1997 reform increased the educational attainment by 0.77
years and the probability of completing eight years or more of schooling by 19 percent. In
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addition, one additional middle-school class opening per 1000 children raises the treated
cohort’s schooling by 0.19 years and the probability of completing middle school or high
education levels by 4 percent. The results based on the gender disaggregation suggest that the
reform and the accompanying middle-school class openings were more e ective in increasing
educational attainment of females than males. Further analyses show that one additional
year of schooling is associated with a 5-percent increase in individual wages. Using the
variation generated by the 1997 reform as an instrument for schooling, results indicate that
one-year education increases wages by 10 percent for individuals who were born in 1988-
1990. Besides, using the regional and cohort variation generated by the middle-school class
openings associated with the reform as an instrument, the results suggest economic returns
to education ranging from 5.8 percent to 9 percent for the first three treated cohorts.
Chapter 3 reconsiders the impact of the 1997 reform and the accompanying middle-school
classes on educational attainment using two di erent data sets, the Turkish Health Survey
and the Turkey Demography and Health Survey. The results corroborate the e ects of the
reform and the intensity of the reform on schooling. The results suggest that completing
middle school or higher education levels is associated with a 2-percent decrease in the body
mass index (BMI) or in the probability of being obese/overweight, a 5-percent increase in the
probability of quitting smoking, a 10-percent increase in the probability of reporting good
health. Examining the e ect of maternal education on infants’ birth outcomes, the findings
show that one additional year of maternal education increases birth weight of infants by
0.4 percent, and decreases the probability of giving birth to a low-birth-weighted baby by
1 percent. Using the variations created by the 1997 reform and the accompanying middle-
school classes as an instrument for schooling, the results suggest that there is no significant
impact of education on health outcomes of individuals who were born in 1988-1991, except
for a weak positive e ect on BMI.
Chapter 4 studies the spatial wage curve in Turkey. This chapter uses the THLFS data for
the years between 2004-2013. First, the Turkish wage curve is revisited with a longer period.
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Using a fixed e ects two stage least squares ( FE-2SLS) estimation method and instrumenting
regional unemployment rates with its one-year lagged values, the results indicate that the
unemployment elasticity of real wages is -0.07. Second, the spatially weighted regional
unemployment rate is included in the model besides the regional unemployment rate. The
spatial FE-2SLS results show that the own-region unemployment elasticity of real wage is
-0.056, and the spatial spillover unemployment elasticity of pay is -0.087. Lastly, using
group-specific unemployment rates for the disaggregated subsamples based on gender, skill
level and age groups, results indicate that there is neither wage curve nor spatial spillover
for females. In addition, there is own-region of unemployment rate elasticity of -0.05 and
the spatial spillovers unemployment elasticity of -0.06 for males.
3
Chapter 2
Returns to Education in Turkey: Evidence from the 1997 Basic
Education Law and New Class Openings
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between education and earnings is one of the most studied topics in labor
economics since the seminal works of Gary Becker, and Jacob Mincer’s specification. A
vast literature is devoted to the estimation of economic returns to education for di erent
samples and di erent time periods. It is well documented that education is one of the most
important components determining individual earnings. Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994), and
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) review estimated returns to education for more than 90
countries. They conclude that the average rate of return is around 10%, women have higher
returns to education than men, and low/middle-income countries experience higher returns
than high-income countries.
Despite the popularity of the basic Mincerian wage equation, potential endogeneity of
schooling cast doubt on the causal link between educational attainment and individual wages.
The instrumental variables (IV) method, in which schooling is instrumented by plausibly
exogenous variable(s), has been commonly used to draw inference on the causal relation-
ship between education and income. Since Angrist and Krueger (1991), numerous studies
have employed interventions on the supply side of the education market such as compulsory
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schooling laws, availability of the schools in a given area as an instrument for schooling. In
general, the IV estimates are found to be at least as high as the OLS estimates of returns to
education.
The compulsory schooling has been increased twice in Turkey, which is an OECD-member
country with low level of average schooling in the last two decades. In 1997, compulsory
schooling raised from five to eight years, followed by a further increase from eight to twelve
years in 2012. Despite the significance of the research on the causal relationship between
education and earnings in developing countries which can serve as a guideline to government
policies (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004), the literature on returns to education in Turkey
is somewhat limited. The existing literature on the returns to education in Turkey is mostly
based on the OLS estimations. To our best knowledge, there is no published paper on the
causal relationship between education and wages, although several attempts have been made.
The compulsory schooling changes in 1997 and 2012 provide exogenous variations in
schooling that can be used in estimating the causal impact of education on individual wages.
However, it is too soon to observe the e ect of the 2012 law. Thus, we focus on the 1997
Basic Education Law which came into e ect during a highly unstable political and economic
era. The 1997 law increased the compulsory education from 5 to 8 years and abolished the
primary school diploma. It was followed by a massive investment in the construction of new
classrooms and recruitment of teachers to meet the expected increase in enrollment in the
6th, 7th, and 8th grades in a di erential rate across regions. This change, which was mostly
driven by political concerns rather than economic incentives, had a large e ect on the years
of education attained in Turkey. This plausibly exogenous shock on schooling, along with
the regional variation in new middle school class openings creates an opportunity to lift the
veil on the causal relationship between education and individual wages.
In this study, we analyzed the e ect of the 1997 Basic Education Law and accompanying
middle-school class openings on educational attainment. Then, we used these exogenous
variations to estimate the causal relationship between education and individual wages. We
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estimate the returns to education in Turkey using Turkish Household Labor Force Survey
(THLFS) for the years 2009-2014. We found that the reform increased the educational
attainment of the individuals who were born between 1988-1990 by 0.77 years. Moreover,
one additional middle-school class per 1000 children increased the schooling attainment of
the first three treated cohorts by 0.19 years. We find evidence that the reform and the
accompanying class openings were more e ective in increasing women’s schooling than men’s.
Furthermore, instrumenting the schooling variable by new middle-school classes per 1000
children, we found that the return to one year of education in Turkey is around 9 percent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present previous literature.
In Section 3, we introduce the Turkish education system and the 1997 Basic Education Law.
The data set and samples that are used in our analyses are presented in Section 4. In Section
5, we discuss the model and the identification strategy. In Section 6, we estimate the e ect
of the 1997 Law and the accompanying class openings on educational attainment. In Section
7, we present the returns to education estimates. We provide closing remarks in section 8.
2.2 Previous Literature
It has been long realized that education is endogenous in Mincerian wage equation, such
that the estimated coe cient of education in the OLS estimation does not show the causal
relationship between education and earnings. The sources of bias in the estimated rate of
return include ability bias, discount rate bias, measurement error bias, and heterogeneity
in the rate of returns to education. These biases were addressed by di erent methods,
such as the instrumental variables and fixed e ects estimation with twins’/siblings’ data
or longitudinal data over the same individuals. Most of the literature find evidence of a
downward bias in the OLS estimates, which indicates that the actual rate of return would
be higher than those estimates obtained by using the OLS. Griliches (1977) surveys the
early returns to education studies and the concerns related to the reported estimates. He
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introduces the ability variable explicitly in the earnings equation, and points out that the
bias attributable to ability is indeed small. In fact, it may even be dominated by other
sources of bias which results in a downward bias in the OLS estimation.
Since the pioneering study of Angrist and Krueger (1991), using supply side variables to
instrument the endogenous variable is one amongst the most popular approaches to draw a
causal e ect of education on individual earnings. Angrist and Krueger (1991) use the quarter
of birth as an instrument for education, observing that people born in the early period of a
year, leave school with less education because of minimum school-leaving-age laws. They find
that the OLS and IV are close to each other, except in some cases in which the OLS estimates
are smaller than IV estimates. Their findings corroborate the conclusion of Griliches (1977).
However, a recent study by Stephens and Yang (2014) tests the possibility of the di erent
trends across states, which could a ect di erent birth cohorts, including cohort-state fixed
e ects. They show that the IV estimates become insignificant or wrong-signed. Moreover,
the instruments that are used in Angrist and Krueger (1991) have been criticized for being
weak (e.g. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997).
However, the idea of using compulsory schooling law has attracted many researchers to
implement similar strategies. The studies using the compulsory schooling laws in other de-
veloped countries as an instrument corroborate the findings that the IV estimates exceed
OLS estimates. For a detailed review see Card (2001). It is also noted that the estimates of
returns to education based on schooling reforms, reflect the marginal rate of return for the
group that is a ected by the reform. The group typically consists of individuals who have
a higher marginal cost of education. Thus, the OLS estimates of the returns to education,
which provide an estimate of the average returns, and the IV estimates are not necessarily
comparable. The IV estimates based on institutional changes that a ect a group of individ-
uals are labeled as local average treatment e ect (LATE) (e.g. Imbens and Angrist, 1994;
Angrist and Imbens, 1995; Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996).
7
Harmon and Walker (1995) use the changes on the minimum school-leaving-age law in
Britain, taking place in 1947 and 1973, as an instrument for the schooling variable. They
find that the IV estimates of the returns to education, 15%, considerably higher than the
corresponding the OLS estimates, 6%. Later, Harmon and Walker (1999) reconsider the
returns to education using only the 1973 law change as an instrument along with some
other instruments considering the criticism of Card (1999) and find similar results with their
earlier study. Moreover, Oreopoulos (2006) uses the minimum school-leaving age laws of the
United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States in a regression discontinuity framework. He
assumes that the local average treatment e ect (LATE) approaches to the average treatment
e ect (ATE) since the influenced population approaches the whole population. He concludes
that the causal e ect of education on earnings is high, around 14-15%, for the UK. On the
other hand, Devereux and Hart (2010) use the same approach with more accurate data on
earnings for the UK and find no evidence of a downward bias of the OLS estimates. Pischke
and von Wachter (2008) utilize the compulsory schooling changes in West German states
and find zero returns to the compulsory schooling changes. More recently, Fang et al. (2012)
use the compulsory schooling law enacted in 1986 in China. They find that the IV estimates
of the rate of return are around 20%, a rate considerably higher than the OLS estimate of
9%.
Another strand of literature exploits the exogenous changes in the cost of education that,
in turn, a ect marginal returns to education of some groups. These include the number
of universities available in the municipality of the individual (Card, 1993), distance to a
nearby college (Kane and Rouse, 1995), or living in a university city (Conneely and Uusitalo,
1998). The instruments based on the availability of schools mostly consider higher education
institutions in developed countries. The school expansions targeting lower levels of education
in developing countries started to be used in the literature, recently. Duflo (2001) uses a boost
in primary-school construction between 1973 and 1978 in Indonesia, to evaluate the e ect of
the increase in the number of primary schools on years of education attained. Consequently,
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she estimates the e ect of the education on individual wages. She uses the number of the
primary schools that are constructed between 1973 and 1978 per 1000 children to measure the
intensity of the reform. Duflo (2001) points out that exposure of an individual to the program
is jointly determined by the birth year and birth region. Exploiting variation in the number of
schools by region and birth cohort, she finds that, one additional school constructed per 1000
children increased completed years of education by 0.12 to 0.19 years. Furthermore, using the
number of constructed primary schools interacted by the birth cohorts as an instrument, she
finds that returns to education in Indonesia are between 6.8% and 10.6%. She concludes that
the IV estimates of returns to education in Indonesia are either close to the OLS estimates
or not significantly di erent than each other. Clark and Hsieh (2000) use an increase in the
compulsory schooling from 6 to 9 years in Taiwan in 1968, along with the regional variation
in new junior high schools as an instrument for schooling to examine the impact of education
on individual wages. They find that one new school per 1000 children aged 12-14, increased
years of education of children aged 6-11, in 1968, by 0.6 years. Moreover, they use these
exogenous variations in schooling to estimate the causal relationship between education and
wages. They find that either the IV estimates are smaller than or not statistically di erent
from OLS estimates. They use region of residence in their analysis because of unavailability
of the individuals’ region of education which may introduce some degree of bias.
There are two other papers that are closely related to our identification strategy. They
use compulsory schooling and school construction as instruments for analyzing the causal re-
lationship between education and non-pecuniary outcomes in developing countries. Breierova
and Duflo (2004) use the same instrument as Duflo (2001) for education in analyzing the
e ect of education on fertility and child mortality. Chou, Grossman, and Joyce (2010) use
the compulsory schooling law and regional variation in junior high school construction in
Taiwan in 1968 to study the e ect of parental education on child health. They construct
their instrument, the program intensity, as the number of junior high school per 1000 chil-
dren aged 12-14 in the year that a cohort enters junior high school. They find that an
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increase in the number of junior high schools increased female and male education around
the same amount. Using program intensity as an instrument for parents’ education, they find
that parental education e ects infant’s well-being, but the IV estimates are not statistically
di erent than OLS estimates.
Previous studies on Turkey
The estimates of schooling returns in Turkey, mostly obtained by employing OLS and us-
ing cross-sectional surveys provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), are
somewhat mixed. Some studies deal with the selectivity problem while most of them provide
the OLS and the MLE estimates for di erent levels of education for several disaggregated
samples. Some papers compare the returns to education at di erent points of time. Other
papers provide some evidence on the e ects of education on wage inequality. Most of the pa-
pers employ the basic human capital model using education and a quadratic in the potential
experience in their estimation and find high returns to education. However, the endogeneity
of the schooling and the bias in the OLS estimations are mentioned in the literature, to our
best knowledge, there is no published paper dealing with this problem in the case of Turkey.
The very first study on returns to education in Turkey is done by Anne Krueger (1972).
She uses two surveys which are conducted in 1968 by the Turkish Association of Metal
Manufacturers and the US Military, and 1965 Census, on the number of students at each
level of education and the average income by occupation and schooling level in her study.
She provides some descriptive evidence that the private returns increase by the school-level
and emphasizes that the private returns to the college education are quite high, around 25%.
She concludes that these high private returns might be result of the very low cost of higher
education.
On the other hand, Tansel (1994) is the first study that uses a Mincerian wage equation
to estimate the returns to education. She also use Heckman’s selection model to estimate the
e ect of education on the probability of participation in wage employment in Turkey using
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the 1987 Household Income and Consumption Expenditure Survey (HICES). She finds that
the probability of participation in employment increases by education level for both urban
men and women. This e ect is higher for women than men. She also finds that returns
to one additional year of schooling increases with the level of education for men with the
magnitudes, 1.8%, 8.8%, 8.2%, and 16% for primary school, middle school, high school and
university levels, respectively. Female workers with middle school or university levels have
higher returns to one-year education, 19%, and 13.4%, respectively. Moreover, she finds that
the return to one year of education in vocational high school is higher than general-curricula
high schools. This contrast to the findings in developed countries. Tansel (2010) re-examine
returns to schooling and compares for di erent years by using the Household Budget Survey
(HBS) for the years 1994, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. She estimates OLS and Heckman
two-step corrected rate of returns for each year separately. She finds that selectivity bias
is not a problem for men, but the Heckman two-step estimates are higher than the OLS
estimates for women. However, it is unclear what are the selection variables that are used in
the Heckman two-step model. Furthermore, she concludes that returns are declining between
1994 and 2004 for men and women. Further evidence on the relationship between education
and wages shows that the rate of return is in the range of 4%-15%, returns are increased from
1980’s to 2000’s, and returns to education are higher for female workers than male workers
(Vural and Gu¨lcan, 2008; Gu¨ris¸ and C¸ag˘layan, 2012; Filiztekin, 2011).
There are a couple working papers addressing the endogeneity of education in the wage
equation in the case of Turkey. Using the THLFS for the years 2011 and 2012, Mocan (2014)
employs the 1997 Basic Education Law as an instrument in estimating returns to education
in Turkey. She finds that the 1997 law has a significant e ect on increasing educational
attainment in Turkey and IV estimates of the returns to middle school completion exceed
OLS estimates. Mocan (2014) finds that return to one-year education for women is 14
percent. There is no significant e ect of education on wages for men. She considers only
full-time workers. Her findings based on a sample in which the highest completed degree is
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high school. However, she excludes the vocational high school graduates which is equivalent
to the general curriculum high schools. She argues that the compulsory education reform
has a spillover e ect on general curricula high schools excluding vocational high school and
college graduates. However, this conclusion should be taken with caution because the Higher
Education Council (YO¨K) put some restrictions on vocational high school graduates in
the university entrance exam since 1999 (OSYM, 1999), making vocational high schools
undesirable to attend. We discuss these restrictions in further detail in section 3. These
restrictions more likely shifted high school enrollments toward general-curricula high schools
from vocational high schools. Therefore, the variation in the treated and control groups in
their high school enrollments might have been resulted from the new policy of YO¨K rather
than the 1997 compulsory schooling law. Consequently, an analysis excluding vocational high
school graduates would find a spurious increase in general-curricula high school graduates,
a finding mistakenly attributed to the 1997 compulsory schooling law.
Aydemir and Kirdar (2015) estimate the causal e ect of years of schooling on wages
using THLFS for the years 2002-2013. They instrument years of schooling by a treatment
dummy variable indicating exposure to the 1997 compulsory schooling reform. They restrict
their sample to full-time workers aged 18-26 in the survey year and find that the reform
significantly increased the completed years of schooling of Turkish men and women. Their
2SLS estimates show that there is no statistically significant e ect of education on wages of
men, while there is a significant e ect of education on female wages by 3.8%. This might
be driven by the fact that their identification is based on the comparison of 10 birth cohorts
on each side of the treatment and their sample is restricted based on age rather than birth
cohorts.
Furthermore, there are two papers related to our identification in which non-monetary
returns to education are examined. Gunes (2015) estimates the e ect of female education
on teenage fertility and infant outcomes using 1997 compulsory schooling law exposure and
regional variation in the additional classrooms constructed. She uses additional classrooms
12
built between the 1996/1997 and 1997/1998 school years to construct an intensity measure
for the exposure to the reform. She claims that 58,726 additional classrooms were built
between the 1996/1997 and 1997/1998 school years. However, the source of the data is not
given clearly in the paper. She finds that the compulsory schooling reform increased mothers’
probability of completing 8-year primary school by around 15%. Furthermore, she finds that
mothers’ completion of 8 years of schooling improves infants’ health, reduces teenage fertility
and increases the age at first birth. However, it should be noted that the identification of the
model is based on the additional classrooms constructed between 1996/1997 and 1997/1998
school years, and the 1997 Basic Education Law (No:4306), enacted in August 1997. The
reform became e ective on those who started 6th grade in September 1998. It does not
seem reasonable that many classrooms were constructed in less than one month. Also, the
relevant intensity measure should account for the 1998/1999 school year, the year in which
the first a ected group enrolled in the 6th grade.
Lastly, Dincer, Kaushal and Grossman (2014) use the 1997 Basic Education Law and the
regional variation in the additional primary-school (1st-8th grade) teacher recruitments as an
intensity measure of the exposure to the reform to examine the causal e ect of education on
women’s fertility and their children’s health. They find evidence that the reform increased
the ever-married women’s probability of completing middle school or higher degrees by 11%.
Using the intensity measure as an instrument, they find some evidence that schooling reduces
teenage fertility, but there is no significant e ect of female education on child mortality.
2.3 The Turkish Education System and the 1997 Basic
Education Law
In August 1997, the Turkish Parliament enacted the Eight-Year Compulsory Education
Enforcement Law (No:4306) 1 which increased compulsory schooling from five to eight
1Resmi Gazete, No: 23084; August 18,1997
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years.This law combined 5-year compulsory primary schools and 3-year non-compulsory mid-
dle schools into a single level of uninterrupted eight-year basic education, complemented by
a secular national core curriculum.
Prior to 1997, the Turkish education system was comprised of a 5-year compulsory pri-
mary school, a 3-year non-mandatory middle school, a 3 or 4-year high school, 2- to 4-year
college and graduate studies. Five years of primary school were compulsory since the es-
tablishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Upon completion of five years of education,
students used to receive a primary school diploma. After primary school, students were free
to choose whether or not to continue with their education. Although all middle schools were
o ering general secular education, some of them were specialized in vocational, technical,
or religious studies. Students in vocational and technical schools also had the opportu-
nity to complete industry internships during their studies. After completing middle school,
students could continue to 3-year high schools in which general, vocational, technical, and
religious electives were available. All three levels of education were governed by the Min-
istry of National Education (MONE) and were free of charge public schools. Those students
who attained a high school diploma had the right to take a highly competitive university
entrance exam in order to pursue a college degree. For the most part, tuition-free public
universities provided a university education, with private universities established only after
1984. The government continues to be the main “educator”, with large public universities
still dominating higher education.
Increasing compulsory basic education from five to eight years was not a new thought,
but, interestingly, its implementation was achieved at a time of unstable political and eco-
nomic conditions in 1997. The National Education Council had been suggesting compulsory
middle school since 1946. There were several attempts to implement this change, but the
lack of buildings and teachers left these attempts unrealized. In 1961, the state mandated
three-year middle school education, but deferred realizing these ambitions until physical
requirements had been met. In 1973, an edict to increase compulsory basic education re-
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quirements to 8 years was issued, but the mandate was not enforced because of an insu cient
number of buildings and teachers (Dulger, 2004). The 1990s was an era of Turkey’s struggle
with political instability and economic crises, denoted by the fact that 11 governments were
formed during just that period of the young Republic’s history. Primary school enrollment
was high at around 96%, but middle school enrollment was only around 64% in 1996 (Dulger,
2004). However, the main motivation of the 1997 reform law was political, using education
as a tool to achieve certain political aims. Wielding school reform as a tool, the secular
government and military o cials sought to restrict religious studies in middle schools. The
original electives scheme at the middle school level permitted students to obtain religious,
vocational, or technical education in addition to their secular education in vocational middle
schools. Students attending these schools were able to get into any college program de-
pending on their performance in the nation-wide university entrance exam. The increasing
number of university students with a religious high school (imam-hatip) background raised
secular concerns among military o cials and secular bureaucrats. On February 28, 1997,
the National Security Council (NSC) released a set of so-called “eighteen recommendations”
to the government after a nine-hour meeting on the matter. While the memo was rolled
out under the guise of a “recommendation”, the military wing of the NSC made it clear
that government was required to implement them (Gu¨nay, 2001). This was regarded as
“post-modern military coup” (Candar, 1999). One of the “eighteen recommendations” was a
mandate for continuous, secular compulsory schooling of eight years. The main motivation
was to restrict religious education. The NSC meeting and subsequent actions taken by the
state agencies based on the decisions of the meeting led to the resignation of the government.
The subsequent three-party coalition government, along with executive and judiciary, took a
series of strong actions to implement the NSC’s “eighteen recommendations” and to ensure
that religion in schools was restricted (For a good review of the “eighteen recommendations”
and actions that had been taken by state agencies to implement those measures, see (Gu¨nay,
2001)).
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The secular three-party coalition government, formed right after the military interven-
tion to the religious-oriented government, took a revolutionary approach to replace the then
current system of a five-year primary school and three-year middle school by eight-year
uninterrupted basic education, with almost no public discussion. Beside the dictated “rec-
ommendations” of NSC, it was declared that the motivation for the law was to pull the
hardest-to-reach students into middle school education (Dulger, 2004). Passed on August
16, 1997 in the Turkish Parliament, the Eight-Year Compulsory Education Law required all
students who were enrolled in 1st-5th grades in the 1997-1998 school year, and those who
would enroll in the future, to complete eight years of basic education. Although there were
no penalties on families who did not enroll their children to 6th grade, the government abol-
ished the primary school (5-year) diploma and replaced it with a primary basic education
diploma, to be earned only by completing eight years of schooling. This was done to create
a strong incentive for students to complete eight years of primary education.
The 1997 Eight-Year Compulsory Education Law also introduced temporary earmarked
taxes in order to finance the physical needs to meet the expected increase in enrollments
for grades six through eight. The Turkish Ministry of National Education (MONE) was
responsible for the implementation of the law. MONE took a series of measures to meet
the expected enrollment boom such as construction of new schools/classrooms, hiring new
teachers, expanding the bussing system and boarding schools. The share of MONE in the
public investment budget increased from 15 percent prior to 1997 to 37.3 percent in 1998,
leveling out at 30 percent until 2000 (Kırdar, Dayıog˘lu, and Koc, 2016). The Ministry of
National Education (MONE) aimed to increase the capacity of eight-year primary education
by around 3 million individuals by constructing around 100,000 new classrooms for basic
education between 1997 and 2001 (Dulger, 2004). Moreover, the number of students bussed
to nearby schools increased from 127,683 to 621,986 between 1996 and 2000, and the number
of students in boarding schools rose dramatically from 34,465 to 281,069 between the 1996
and 2001 school years (Kırdar et al., 2016). The legislation was supported financially by
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several international organizations as well as by donations from the private sector. By 2001,
the government spent about 3 billion dollars annually for the implementation of eight-year
basic education, bolstered by financing from the World Bank, the European Union, the
private sector in Turkey and the Turkish Government (Dulger, 2004).
The Higher Education Council (YO¨K) took further action relating to the ”recommenda-
tions” of the NSC that a ected the composition of high-school enrollments. YO¨K redefined
the conditions of the nationwide university entrance and placement exam by discriminating
against vocational high school graduates. YO¨K initiated a di erential multiplier for the
high school GPA of students from di erent kinds of high schools for university placement.
Vocational and technical high school graduates were restricted to continue only to programs
related to the type of their vocational education. If they wanted to continue their univer-
sity education in another major, they were evaluated with a negative multiplier, making it
di cult to get into university from those schools (OSYM,1999). These restrictions shifted
many students from vocational high schools to the general curricula high schools. National
Education Statistics show that the share of students in vocational high schools decreased
from 45% in 1997 to 34.8% in 2003.
2.4 Data
The data used in this paper is the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey (THLFS) for the
years 2009-2014 and National Education Statistics for the years 1992-2003, obtained from
the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). Our primary dataset, the THLFS, is similar
to the US’s CPS data in terms of design and coverage. TURKSTAT started to conduct these
surveys in 1988 and has had two significant methodological changes in 2000 and 2004. The
survey is a cross-section individual level survey hence providing individual characteristics
with a large sample coverage (around 500,000 observations in each year). The THLFS cov-
ers the whole population except for non-residents, those who are living in institutions and
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conscripts in the territory of Turkey. Moreover, TURKSTAT, in collaboration with MONE,
publishes National Education Statistics which shows the statistics on various variables in-
cluding the number of students, teachers, classrooms, and classes (branches) in each grade
for each level of education in detail.
The THLFS provides demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, marital status,
education, and region of residence (NUTS-2 level2) for each individual, as well as labor force
related information such as employment status, occupation, industry, hours of work, monthly
income, etc., for individuals who are 15 years old or older.
Schooling is given as the highest completed degree in the THLFS. Moreover, individuals
are also asked if they were currently continue education at the time of the survey. Those
who continue their education were asked their level of education and current grade level. We
use this information to construct two schooling variables; a continuous, years of schooling
variable, and a dummy variable which indicates whether a person completed at least middle
school (8 years) or not. Aydemir and Kirdar (2015) use the information on the highest degree
and years of schooling completed in Turkey Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS-2008)
and conclude that the years required to complete a degree is a good approximation to the
years of schooling completed 3. Following Aydemir and Kirdar (2015), we imputed years of
schooling by assigning each completed level of education with the minimum required years of
education to complete the given level of education. We further, refined this variable for those
who continued their education by adding the completed years in the degree they currently
pursue to the years to complete the degree they completed. Note that those individuals
who are “literate but do not hold a degree” are considered to complete 2 years of education.
This might be valid imputation for the those who are not a ected by the law. However,
it is problematic for those individuals in the treatment group because those who are in the
treatment group and have finished 5 years of schooling but did not complete the 8th grade
2Turkey is divided into three levels of NUTS regions. NUTS-1 consists of 12 regions, NUTS-2 consists of
26 regions, and NUTS-3 consists of 81 provinces of Turkey.
3They impute years of schooling as follows: “illiterate”, 0; “literate but don’t hold a degree”, 2; “primary
school”, 5; “middle school”, 8; “high school (general or vocational)”, 11; “any college degree or above”,15.
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are also coded as “literate but do not hold a diploma”. Thus, assigning them by 2 year of
schooling would underrepresent the actual schooling of these people in the treated group.
There is no way to distinguish between those who completed 5th grade in the treatment
group. Thus, to avoid this problem we assigned 5 years of schooling for all individuals in the
“literate but don’t hold a diploma” group.
We restrict our analyses to individuals who were born between 1983 and 1990 4 to obtain
relatively similar individuals except for their exposure status to the compulsory schooling
law5. Furthermore, we excluded those individuals born in 1986 or 1987 because of the
uncertainty of their treatment status. This will be discussed in the next section in detail.
The resulting sample contains 258,131 individuals of which 135,097 are women, and 123,034
are men. This sample is used to analyze the e ect of the reform and new class openings
on the educational attainment. Summary statistics of selected variables for treatment and
control groups corresponding to this sample is shown in Panel A of Table 2.1.
The THLFS provides labor related information for individuals who are 15 years old and
above as well as demographic information of all individuals observed. Moreover, earning is
reported as monthly income which is recorded only for regular and casual workers; therefore,
employer, self-employed, and unpaid family workers are excluded from the sample. Further-
more, individuals who started to work in the survey month or did not report their monthly
income are also excluded from the sample. The reported income is monthly take-home pay,
that is, income after deduction of taxes, compulsory social security, and other life insurance
premiums 6. Working hours are reported as usual hours of work per week and the actual
hours worked during the reference week. If an individual had a job but was not at work dur-
ing the reference week, the actual hours worked is coded as 0. Thus, there are missing values
4All students who started high school in 2005/2006 school year or later are required to attain 4 years
of high school education (MONE Board of Education, Decree No: 184, June 7, 2005). Thus, high-school
graduates who were born after 1990 attained 12 years of education. This is another reason to restrict our
sample to 1983-1990 birth cohorts
5We used 1981-1992 birth cohorts to show the trends in the middle school completion rate in Figure 2.1.
6Monthly income includes bonuses except in 2011,2012, and 2013 surveys. Bonuses are recorded separately
for those years, so we added bonuses on monthly income.
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for the actual hours worked. Also, there is a slight di erence between these two measures of
hours worked. Hence, we used usual hours of work per week in our analyses.
We used monthly income and usual hours of work per week to calculate hourly wages. All
wages are deflated to 2003 liras using the consumer price index (CPI) for each NUTS-2 level
region provided by TURKSTAT. The upper and lower 1% of the distribution of the wages
for each year are trimmed in order to exclude the influential observations. The resulting
sample includes 89,413 workers of which 26,488 are female, and 62,925 are male workers.
This sample is used to estimate the returns to education. Summary statistics of selected
variables for treatment and control groups corresponding to this sample are presented in
Panel B of Table 2.1.
The THLFS provides the region of residence at the NUTS-2 level. The region of residence
is used to match the individual level data with region-level data. The regional data on the
number of middle school classes (6th-8th grades) is extracted from the National Education
Statistics books for years 1991-2003. TURKSTAT, in collaboration with MONE, releases
data on the number of students, the number of teachers, the number of classes in each grade,
and the number of schools at each level of education at the province level for each school
year in the National Education Statistics books. We extracted the province-level number of
classes and number of students in 6th, 7th, and 8th grades for years 1991-2003. Furthermore,
we aggregated the province-level data into 26 NUTS-2 level. Moreover, we used 1990 and
2000 Population Censuses and the 2007 Address Based Population Registration System in
order to obtain the population estimates of children aged 11-13 by province and year. The
population for the inter-census years is interpolated assuming a linear trend 7.
7The boundaries of provinces have changed several times since 1990. Eight districts have broken o  from
the provinces that they were in and became separate provinces ( Bartın, Ardahan, Ig˘dır, Yalova, Karabu¨k,
Kilis, Osmaniye, Du¨zce) from 1990 to 2001. The regional level data on the population, the number of classes
and the number of students are adjusted to the boundaries in 2001 in each year.
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2.5 The Model and Identification Strategy
2.5.1 The Model
Following the previous literature (Card, 1995; Harmon and Walker, 1995), we consider a
two-equation system of wage and schooling that we estimate using ordinary least squares
(OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS).
log(wi) = —1Si+—2Xi+ui (2.1)
Si = “1Ti+“2Xi+ ‘i (2.2)
where log of hourly wage rate, log(wi), is determined by schooling, Si, a vector of observed
individual characteristics, Xi, and an unobserved error component ui. The coe cient of in-
terest in this paper is —1 which represents the returns to education. Estimation of equation
(2.1) by OLS results in bias estimates of —1 because of the endogeneity of schooling arising
from unobserved ability, discount rate, heterogeneous marginal returns or measurement er-
rors (e.g. Card, 1995; Harmon and Walker, 1995; Duflo, 2001). One can account for this
endogeneity by employing an instrumental variables (IV) method if there is a variable, Ti,
that can be legitimately excluded from equation (2.1). That is, schooling can be predicted
by equation (2.2) then the predicted schooling can be used in equation (2.1) to estimate the
causal e ect of education on wage rate.
The use of plausibly exogenous variations in schooling such as compulsory schooling
laws, availability of schools in a region, regional variations in school construction, etc., as an
instrument for education has gained popularity in the literature due to Angrist and Krueger
(1991). Returns to education estimates using an instrumental variables method in which
schooling is instrumented by an exogenous shock reflect the average returns of a group of
people who attained more years of schooling as a result of the shock rather than average
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returns to education of the whole population (Card, 1995). In other words, the IV estimate
of —1 represents local treatment e ect (LATE) rather than average treatment e ect (ATE).
2.5.2 The Identification Strategy
The identification of our model is based on the 1997 Basic Education Law and the vari-
ation in new middle school classes (6th-8th grade) openings. The birth year of children
randomly assigns individuals into treatment and control groups. The compulsory schooling
law mandates individuals to complete at least eight years of education. Thus, individuals
in the treatment group are induced to attain more years of education than individuals in
the control group. Therefore, the reform creates an exogenous variation in schooling across
di erent cohorts. We use this exogenous variation as an instrument for the schooling in our
analyses.
Furthermore, note that the new mandate changes schooling behavior of those who would
have been dropped right after the 5th grade in the absence of the reform. The dropout rate
after the compulsory years of schooling varies across regions of Turkey, possibly because of
the insu cient schools or teachers. This group was the target of the reform. The Turkish
government took an immediate action to construct new schools/classrooms and recruit new
teachers in order to meet the expected increase in the enrollment, which varied across regions
(see Figure 2.2). These investments are meant to serve as a means to reduce the marginal
cost of schooling of individuals and to induce them to complete eight years of schooling.
Therefore, the exposure to the reform is determined by the number of classes available
in the region to attain a middle school education and the year in which a student decides
whether or not to enroll in the 6th grade. If there are more new middle-school classes opened
thus increasing the stock of classes in a region, it is expected that the number of students
enrolled in the 6th will be increased. In short, there is a variation in schooling across birth
cohorts that is created by the schooling mandate. Also, there is a regional variation in the
intensity of the exposure to the reform that is resulted from the new schools/classrooms and
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teachers. We use this exogenous variation to construct another instrument for the schooling.
2.5.3 The Treatment Dummy Variable
The Eight-Year Compulsory Basic Education Law (No: 4306) was enacted on August 16,
1997 and a ected the individuals in the 5th or lower grades in the 1997/1998 school year.
Thus, the first group who are mandated to complete eight years of formal schooling was 5th
graders in that school year. In other words, students enrolled in first grade in the 1993/1994
school year or later were a ected by the 1997 eight-year compulsory education law. Here, we
need to refer to the primary school-entry age regulations in Turkey to be able to determine
the treatment status of individuals in the data. The school entry age is determined based
on the calendar year rather than the school year in Turkey. A regulation of Ministry of
National Education in 1992 states, “...children who complete 72 months of age at the end
of the calendar year will enroll in first grade in that school year. Upon written request of
the family, the children who meet the age criteria but are physically underdeveloped can
continue in the kindergarten for one more year”8 (Resmi Gazete, August 7,1992). Thus,
individuals born in 1987 or later could have enrolled in the first grade in 1993/1994 and thus
would be mandated to complete eight years of education. Note that, individuals born in
1986 that deferred enrollment for one year due to the exception in the regulation would also
have enrolled in first grade in 1993. Moreover, there might be “repeaters” among individuals
born in 1986 and enrolled in primary school in 1992. These individuals were also mandated
to complete eight years of schooling. In the light of these arguments, there is no way that
we can distinguish a ected individuals from those who are not a ected among children born
in 1986.
Given, the ambiguity of the treatment status of the 1986 birth cohort explained in the
previous paragraph, one can construct a dummy variable indicating the treatment status of
an individual excluding the 1986 birth cohort. It can be used as an instrument only if the
8Authors’ translation from Turkish.
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exact birth year is known. However, the THLFS provides the completed age of an individual
rather than birth year. Thus, we calculated the birth year by subtracting the completed age
of individuals from the survey year. Note that the THLFS has been conducted throughout
the year, and the completed age of individuals at the time of the survey is recorded. Thus,
the derived birth year will consist of people who were born in the year that is derived or one
year before. The derived birth year and actual birth year is the same for individuals who
are surveyed after their birthday. However, the actual birth year will be one-year before the
derived birth year for individuals who are surveyed before their birthday. For example, the
group of people who report 23-years of completed age in the 2010 survey consists of some
individuals who were born in 1986 but surveyed before their birthday and some individuals
who were born in 1987 but surveyed after their birthday. Therefore, the derived 1987 birth
cohort includes individuals who were born in 1986 and thus were not a ected by the reform,
hence introducing an ambiguity in the treatment status of this cohort, as well.
Alternatively, we provide graphical evidence on our identification strategy in Figure 2.1.
The figure depicts the rate of completion of eight years of schooling by birth cohorts (here-
after, birth cohort or birth year refer to the derived birth year). Figure 2.1 demonstrates
several aspects of the reform on birth cohorts. First, the middle school completion rate in-
creased sharply from around 60 percent in the 1985 cohort to around 83 percent in the 1988
birth cohort. Secondly, the ambiguity in the treatment status of 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts
is somewhat revealed in Figure 2.1. Lastly, the rate of middle school completion reached the
90-percent level for the 1992 birth cohort. That is, the reform substantially increased the
percentage of children who completed eight years or more of schooling, however, some still
dropped out before finishing the mandated eight years.
Building upon our discussion on the treatment status from the previous paragraphs, we
can now define a dummy variable to indicate the treatment status of an individual. We
exclude both 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts in our analyses because of the ambiguity in their
treatment status. Furthermore, we restrict our sample to 1983-1990 birth cohorts in order to
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have relatively comparable individuals since the identification relies on the assumption that
control and treatment groups are otherwise identical. Consequently, we create a dummy
variable, Ti , which is equal to 1 if individual i was born in 1988-1990 and 0 if individual
i was born in 1983-1985. The summary statistics in Panel A of Table 2.1 show that the
control group has an average of 8.77 years of schooling, whereas treatment group has 9.92
years. Moreover, the rate of completion of at least middle school is 58 percent for 1983-1985
cohorts, while it jumps to 85 percent for the 1988-1990 cohorts.
2.5.4 The Intensity of the Reform
The 1997 compulsory schooling law was universal for all regions across the country and
mandated all students to complete eight years of schooling. Thus, we can deduce that the
treated cohorts should have attained more schooling than the control cohorts. Moreover, the
enrollment rate in the middle-school level (6th-8th grade) was around 65 percent before the
reform. However, the enrollment rate was low among girls, children who live in urban slums or
rural areas, especially in the Eastern and Southeastern provinces, due to the negative public
perception on the benefits of education and the lack of teachers and/or schools/classrooms
(Dulger, 2004). We show the middle-school enrollment rate in 1996 by regions in Figure
2.2. Figure 2.2 illustrates that enrollment rates varied dramatically among regions in the
range of 30-percent (TRB2-Van Region) and 96-percent (TR51- Ankara Region) just before
the reform. Also, it reveals the fact that the enrollment rate was quite low in the Eastern
and Southern regions. One of the objectives of the reform was pulling the 35-percent of
non-enrolled children into 6th-8th grades. Based on the aforementioned characteristics of
the target group, government e orts varied across regions (Dulger, 2004).
Subsequently, the Turkish government, in collaboration with international organizations
and the private sector, immediately began to construct new classrooms/schools, to repair
existing ones and to recruit new teachers at a di erential rate across regions. This was
in response to the expected increase in 6th-8th grades based on pre-reform endowments of
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regions. The regional variation in the intensity of investments should have created a variation
in the number of students who are induced to attain more schooling by lowering the marginal
cost of education at a di erential rate. In other words, one might expect that the higher the
intensity of the reform, the larger the expected e ect of the reform. These regional di erences
in classroom construction and teacher recruitment provide another source of variation along
with the variation between cohorts, a facet that we exploit in analyzing the causal e ect
of education on individual wages. This is a similar identification strategy to Duflo (2001),
Clark and Hsieh (2000), Chou et al.(2010) and Dincer et al.(2014).
Having discussed regional and temporal variations in the number of classrooms con-
structed and the number of teachers recruited associated with the reform, we use the num-
ber of new class openings to construct an intensity measure for the 1997 reform. In the
literature, the intensity of the reform is proxied by the number of new schools/classrooms
(e.g. Duflo, 2001; Clark and Hsieh, 2000; Chou et al., 2010), or number of teachers (1st-8th
grades) (Dinc¸er et al., 2014). Unfortunately, the regional level disaggregated data on the
number of teachers and the number of classrooms exclusively for the 6th-8th grades is not
available. However, the number of classes in each grade, which is disaggregated by provinces
and school year, is given in the National Education Statistics. We argue that use of the num-
ber of classes would be a better measure for investments because one additional class in any
grade would require an additional classroom and at least one additional teacher. Note that
the expected increase is accommodated by adopting double-shift schooling in some regions
(Dulger, 2004). Thus, the additional resources might have been used to recruit new teachers
without constructing new classrooms in those schools. Therefore, the number of new classes
in the 6th through 8th grades in each region and the school year is used to measure the
variation in the intensity of the reform.
Before discussing the construction of the intensity measure in detail, it is useful to show
the pre- and post-reform trends in the number of middle school classes per 1000 children
aged 11-13, a rate that we call the class-to-child ratio. We present the disaggregated class-
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to-child ratio by region (NUTS-2 level) and school year between 1992 and 2003 in Table
2.2. It shows that the number of middle-school classes per 1000 children varies substantially
across regions over each school year. Moreover, Figure 2.3 depicts the temporal and regional
trends in the class-to-child ratio. Figure 2.3 (a) shows the average class-to-child ratio in
Turkey for the school years of 1992-2003. It is clear that there is a dramatic increase in the
number of middle school classes per 1000 children after 1997. The average increase in the
class-to-child ratio is around 20% from 1992 to 1997 in the whole country. However, the
rate of increase in 1997-2003 is three times higher than the pre-reform rate. Alternatively,
we divided 26 regions into two groups - TR-Low and TR-High - based on their class-to-child
ratio in 1997. The TR-Low (TR-High) consists of those regions of which class-to-child ratio
is lower (higher) than the average ratio of the whole country. The average class-to-child ratio
for TR-Low and TR-High are also shown in Figure 2.3 (a). The average rate of increase in
the class-to-child ratio is slightly higher in the “TR-High” regions in the pre-reform period.
However, the average increase in the “TR-Low” regions is steeper in the post-reform period.
Additionally, Figure 2.3 (b) shows the regional variation of the percentage increase in the
class-to-child ratio for pre-reform (from 1992 to 1997) and post-reform (from 1997 to 2003)
periods. It is clear that the percentage increase in the class-to-child ratio from 1992 to 1997
was similar across regions, around 20%, while the percentage increase from 1997 to 2003
varies dramatically in the range of 30% (TR51- Ankara) and 169% (TRC3- Mardin) across
regions. Note that the regional variation in the post-reform period in Figure 2.3 (b) shows
an opposite pattern to the variation in the middle school enrollment rate in 1996 in Figure
2.2.
From the regional and yearly variations in the number of middle-school classes per 1000
children aged 11-13, clearly visible after 1997, we create an intensity measure. As we dis-
cussed above, we expect that the more the new classrooms/teachers at the middle-school
level, the higher the e ect will be of the reform in attainment of eight years or more of
schooling. Because of the data restrictions, we assume that the increase in the number of
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the middle-school classes over the 1997-level are characterized by the number of new middle-
school classes opened as a result of the reform. Specifically, we take the di erence in the
number of classes in the 6th-8th grades at a given year from 1997 for each region and assume
that these di erences are the cumulative number of the new middle school classes. Also,
note that the number of new middle-school classes in and prior to 1997 is assumed to be
zero since the reform was not e ective in those years. From there, this cumulative number of
the new classes is expressed as per 1000 children aged 11-13 for each region (NUTS-2 level).
This measure is termed as the intensity of the reform. Note that intensity of the reform
di ers from the class-to-child ratio such that the former considers only the number of new
middle-school class openings associated with the 1997 reform, while the latter deals with the
total number of classes in 6th-8th grades. Following Chou et al. (2010), we matched the
resulting intensity of the reform for each region in a given year with the cohort who began
6th grade in that year. For example, the 1988 birth cohort started 6th grade in 1999, so they
are assigned with the intensity measure of the reform in 1999; and the 1989 birth cohort is
assigned with intensity in the year 2000 and so on.
2.6 The E ect of the 1997 Reform and New Middle-
School Class Openings on Education
As discussed in the previous section, the exposure to the reform varied substantially across
regions based on the level of pre-reform enrollment rates. Thus, it is crucial to know where
exactly, that is, in what region, an individual attained his/her middle-school education. This
will allow us to be able to determine the intensity of exposure. Unfortunately, the THLFS
does not provide any information on the region in which an individual received middle-school
education (hereafter termed as the region of education). In fact, the THLFS provides only
the region of residence of individuals. If there were migration among regions, then the use of
region of residence as a proxy for the region of education would introduce some bias in our
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estimation. Migration statistics in Turkey show that inter-regional migration has taken place
from historically less-developed Eastern and Southeastern regions to the more-developed
Western regions, and that the probability of migration increases by the level of education
(Gokhan and Filiztekin, 2008). Thus, if individuals induced to attain more schooling due to
the high intensity of the reform in their region of education move to a low-intensity region,
the estimated e ect of intensity on schooling would be biased downward.
Although the THLFS provides information only on the region of residence, there are two
other questions that can be used to partially determine the migration history of individuals.
The survey asks individuals whether or not they have been living in their region of residence
since birth. Subsequently, those who migrated to the residence region are asked the year in
which they moved. Based on this information, we deduce that if an individual has been living
in their city of birth, the region of residence is then the region of education. Subsequently,
individuals who moved to the region of residence before the age of eleven would have received
their middle school education in the region that they currently reside. However, we cannot
determine the region of education for those individuals who moved to the residence region
after the age of eleven. Thus, in our analyses, we restrict our attention to the sample
individuals who attained middle school in the region of residence, representing 73 percent
of the whole sample. Given that people with more education are more likely to migrate
between regions, thus disallowing us from being able to identify their region of education,
the estimated e ects of the intensity of reform with our restricted sample will also be biased
downwards.
2.6.1 The Impact of the 1997 Reform on Educational Attainment
The descriptive evidence in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1, discussed above, shows that the 1997
compulsory education law created a substantial increase in the educational attainment of
individuals who are a ected by the reform. Moreover, we can assess the e ectiveness of the
reform and middle-school openings on the educational attainment in Turkey controlling for
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the e ect of age, region, gender, etc. Re-writing the equation (2.2), we estimate the following
equation by OLS.
Sijt = “1Ti+“2Xijt+µj+⁄t+vijt (2.3)
where Sijt is schooling of individual i in region j at time t. Ti is the treatment dummy
variable which takes a value of 1 if an individual belongs to the 1988-1990 birth cohort and
thus is a ected by the law, and 0, otherwise. Xijt vector includes a quadratic in age, female
dummy, and a dummy for ongoing schooling. The region dummies, µj , are included to
control for the time-invariant regional characteristics. Moreover, ⁄t represents dummies for
the survey year, which captures the time fixed e ects in educational attainment. Equation
(2.3) is estimated using either years of schooling or a dummy variable which indicates whether
an individual completed at least 8 years of schooling (hereafter, middle school completion
refers to the dummy variable that indicates the completion of middle school or higher levels)
or not as dependent variables. Table 2.3 presents the OLS estimates of “1 in equation (2.3)
for the completed years of schooling in the first three columns. Moreover, we estimate a
linear probability model (LPM) for the probability of completion of at least middle school
in the last three columns of Table 2.3. Panel A shows results for the restricted sample in
which region of residence and region of education is the same while Panel B of Table 2.3
presents results for all-resident sample using region of residence as a proxy for the region of
education. All standard errors are clustered by region and year of birth.
Columns 1 and 4 of Table 2.3 (Panel A) indicate that the 1997 reform increased the
completed years of education by 0.77 years and the probability of completing middle school
or a higher level of education by 19 percent, respectively. Women attain significantly less
schooling in terms of both years of schooling and middle school completion 9. Thus, we
present estimated coe cients for men and women separately. We find that the e ect of the
reform is more pronounced for women than men with an increase of 1.07 years of education
9The estimated coe cients of the controls including female dummy are not presented here for space
reasons. However, they are available upon request
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among women and around 0.48 years among men. A similar pattern is also found in the
e ect of the reform on the probability of completing eight years or more of schooling, with
a probability of 22 percent for women, and 16 percent for men. Moreover, the results of
estimation in the Panel B, obtained by using the all-resident sample, suggest very similar
e ects in terms of both years of schooling and the middle school completion. This is in line
with our expectations because estimation of equation (2.3) is based on the comparison of
the educational attainment of cohorts in the whole country, rather than on a comparison of
cohorts in di erent regions.
2.6.2 The Impact of the Intensity of the 1997 Reform on Educa-
tional Attainment
Having shown that the Eight-Year Compulsory Schooling Law increased the educational
attainment substantially in Turkey, we now turn our attention to the impact of middle-
school class openings on educational attainment. We use the following equation, which is a
slightly modified version of equation (2.3), to estimate the e ect of new classes on schooling.
Sijkt = “1(Pjk úTi)+“2Xijkt+µj+ ◊k+⁄t+vijkt (2.4)
where Ti is the treatment dummy variable that is used in equation (2.3). Here, Pjk is
the intensity of the reform for cohort k in region j, which represents the number of new
middle school class openings in region j at the time cohort k starts 6th grade. Xijkt vector
includes a female dummy variable, a dummy for ongoing schooling. We also controlled for
unrestricted birth cohort fixed e ects, ◊k, instead of a quadratic in age in equation (2.3). µj
and ⁄t are the region and year of survey dummies. Furthermore, we include an interaction
term between the treatment dummy and the middle school enrollment rate in 1996 in order
to control for pre-reform trends. The first three columns of Table 2.4 show the OLS estimates
of “1 in equation (2.4) using the years of schooling as a dependent variable. Also, we use
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LPM to estimate the e ect of the intensity of the reform on the probability of completing
middle school or a higher education level. In Panel A, we use the restricted sample which
includes individuals who are educated in the region in which they reside. In Panel B, on the
other hand, we use all-residents sample using region of residence as a proxy for the region of
education.
Column 1 of Panel A suggests that one additional new middle-school class per 1000
children aged 11-13 increased the completed years of education of children born in 1988-
1990 by 0.19 years. Moreover, the e ect of the intensity of the reform is higher for females
(column 2) than males (column 3). One additional class opening for 1000 children leads to
a 0.23-year increase in the education of females, and to a 0.15-year increase in the education
of males in the treatment cohorts. Furthermore, using a dummy variable for middle school
or higher-level completion as a dependent variable (column 4), we find that one additional
class increases the probability of completing at least eight years of schooling by 4 percent.
Again, we find that new middle-school classes are more e ective in increasing the treated
women’s probability of completing middle school or higher levels (column 5) more than the
probability of completion for treated men (column 6), with magnitudes of 5.3 percent and 3
percent, respectively.
Additionally, we present the estimation results for all-residents sample in which the region
of residence is used as a proxy for the region of education. Overall, the estimations are in
line with our expectations, such that ignoring migration and assuming all individuals are
educated in their region of residence results in smaller estimated coe cients for the e ect of
intensity of the reform on schooling. However, the e ects are found to be higher for females
than males. Therefore, the bias is more pronounced in the estimation of the impact of new
middle-school classes on the treated women’s education than the treated men’s education.
This might be explained by the slightly lower percentage of women who received education
in the region of residence in our sample.
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In short, we have shown that the eight-year compulsory schooling law and the openings of
new middle-school classes were e ective in increasing the overall educational level in Turkey.
We found that the reform and the accompanying class openings increased the schooling of
females more than that of males. However, resulting from the limitations of our dataset, it
appears that migration does introduce some bias to our estimates. It is important to note
that in this section we evaluated the e ect of the reform and the intensity on the education
of people without considering whether they are wage earners or not. Thus, these results are
not the first stage estimates of the 2SLS estimations for returns to education because it is
based on a sample of individuals for which a positive wage is observed.
2.6.3 Spillover E ects of the 1997 Reform and the Intensity on
Levels of Education
We further examine the levels of education at which the Eight-Year Compulsory Schooling
Law and the accompanying class openings were e ective. Following Duflo (2001), and Clark
and Hsieh (2000), we estimate a set of linear probability models (LPM) for the probability
of completing at least m years of schooling using the following equation:
Sijtm = “1mTi+“2Xijt+µj+⁄t+vijt (2.5)
where Sijtm is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i in region j at time t
completed at least m years of schooling or not, for m = 1 to 17. The covariates are the
same as in equation (2.3). “1m shows the impact of the reform on completing m or more
years of schooling. The LPM for each level of education is estimated for male and female
samples separately using the restricted sample (individuals who are educated in the region of
residence). The estimated coe cients, “1m, and the associated 95% confidence intervals are
plotted in Figure 2.4 (a) and (b) for females and males, respectively. The shape of the figures
indicates the level at which the reform was e ective. Figure 2.4 (a) shows that the reform
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was mainly e ective in increasing women’s completion of 6th-8th grades with a probability
of around 20 percent. Even though the e ect becomes smaller beyond the 8th grade, the
figure shows that there are spillover e ects of the program on the probability of completing
education levels beyond middle school for females. Moreover, Figure 2.4 (b) shows that
the program was e ective on men’s probability of completing middle school by around 15
percent. The e ect becomes insignificant beyond 8th grade for males. Overall, Figure 2.4
(a) and (b) show that the compulsory schooling law was more e ective in increasing female
education in and beyond middle school than male education.
Alternatively, we perform the same procedure in examining the impact of the intensity
of the reform on the levels of education using the following linear probability models.
Sijktm = “1m(Pjk úTi)+“2Xijkt+µj+ ◊k+⁄t+vijkt (2.6)
where Sijktm is a dummy variable which indicates whether individual i in region j in birth
cohort k and observed in year t completed m years or more of schooling. The regressors are
the same as in equation (2.4). The point estimates along with 95% confidence intervals are
plotted for females in Figure 2.4 (c) and for males in Figure 2.4 (d). Figure 2.4 (c) suggests
that one additional middle-school class per 1000 children was e ective in increasing the
treated women’s probability of completing middle school grades (6th-8th grade) by around 5
percent. The e ect beyond 8th grade is significant and decreasing with the level of education.
Moreover, Figure 2.4 (d) shows that the middle-school class openings were also e ective in
increasing the treated men’s probability of completing 6th grade or more. The e ect was the
highest in the middle-school level with a probability of around 3 percent. There is also some
significant spillover on the probability of completing high school and college education.
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2.7 Returns to Education
Having shown that the eight-year compulsory schooling change and the intensity of the
reform considerably increased the educational attainment of the treated individuals, we turn
our attention to estimating the causal e ect of education on wages. We estimate the following
equation using the OLS and 2SLS.
log(wijkt) = —1Sijkt+—2Xijkt+µj+“k+⁄t+uijkt (2.7)
where log(wijkt) is the natural logarithm of hourly wage of an individual i, in region j, in
cohort k, and at time t. The OLS estimates of the equation (2.7) will lead bias estimates if the
schooling is endogenous in this model. Using plausibly exogenous variation in the schooling
created by the 1997 reform and the new middle-school classes opened to accommodate the
expected increase in the enrollment, equation (2.7) can be estimated employing 2SLS. Here,
we assume that the 1997 reform and the accompanying middle-school class openings have
an e ect on hourly wages only through an increase in education. We also assume that the
systematic change in the wages across cohorts is attributable to the reform and the intensity
of the reform.
Equation (2.7) is estimated for a sample of individuals who report a positive wage and
are educated in the region of residence per our discussion in the previous section. Note that
this sample is di erent than the sample that we used in the estimation of the e ect of the
reform on education in the section prior. The sample size is small for females due to the low
labor force participation rate of women in Turkey. Therefore, we present the corresponding
first stage estimates for both instruments in Table 2.5.
The first three columns of Table 2.5 show that the e ect of the reform and the intensity
of the reform on the years of education are higher for the sample of wage earners than for
the whole sample. On the other hand, the last three columns show that the reform and the
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middle-school class openings were more e ective in increasing the probability of completion
of 8 years or more of schooling for all workers as well as the male workers. However, it
reveals an interesting result for the female wage-earners. In the fifth column, we find that
the reform leads an increase in the treated female workers’ probability of completing middle
school or higher levels of education by 14 percent. This is smaller than the e ect on treated
male workers’ and the e ect on all treated women’s (in the Panel A of Table 2.3). Also, we
find that one additional middle-school class per 1000 children increased the probability of
the treated women’s completion of middle school or higher levels of education by 3.5 percent
which is smaller than that found in Table 2.3.
Comparison of Table 2.5 with Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 shows that the reform and the
intensity of the reform were more e ective in increasing the schooling of women than that
of men. However, this improvement in female education could not be converted into labor
market gains as much. Furthermore, comparison of columns 2 and 5 of Table 2.5 suggest
that female workers who completed middle school or higher as a result of the reform or the
intensity, also continued to attain more years of schooling beyond 8th grade. We test this
conjecture by providing graphical evidence in Figure 2.5 replicating Figure 2.4 for the wage
earner sample. Figure 2.5 (b) and (d) depict very similar patterns to their counterparts in
Figure 2.4. This suggests that the impact of the reform and the intensity of the reform are
similar for both wage-earner men and all men. On the other hand, Figure 2.5 (a) and (c) has
di erent shapes from their counterparts in Figure 2.4. Figure 2.5 (a) and (b) indicate that
the reform and the accompanying middle school class openings were e ective in increasing
the probability of completing high school and college as well as middle school for working
women. In fact, Figure 2.5 (c) indicates that one additional middle-school class per 1000
children increased the working-women’s probability of completing university more than high
school and middle school.
These findings are in line with the literature that the female labor participation rate is
low and increases with education level in Turkey (Dayıog˘lu and Kırdar, 2009). However,
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this raises some concerns about the validity of our instrument in the estimation of returns to
education for women. Note that our identification is based on the assumption that the reform
and the intensity of the reform increase individual wages through an impact on education.
The findings in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.5 show that the probability of wage employment of
females might be a ected by the reform and the accompanying middle-school class openings.
Hence, the estimated returns to education for women using 2SLS should be taken with
caution.
Next, we present the OLS and 2SLS estimation results of equation (2.7) for the completed
years of education in Table 2.6 and for middle school completion in Table 2.7. We use
the treatment dummy (IV-1) and the intensity of the reform (IV-2) as instruments for the
schooling variable in the 2SLS estimations. All standard errors are clustered by the region
and birth cohort. F-statistics of the excluded instruments in the first stage are shown in
brackets. We use the rule of thumb critical value of 10, which is proposed by Staiger and
Stock (1997), to test weakness of instruments.
Table 2.6 presents the estimates of the coe cient, —1 in equation (2.7) in which schooling
variable is the completed years of education. The results are presented for a sample of all
wage earners in Panel A, for females in Panel B, and for males in Panel C.
The first column of Table 2.6 shows the OLS estimates of equation (2.7). We find that
one additional year of education increases hourly wages by 5 percent. Moreover, the female
workers experience higher returns to one additional year of education than the male workers
with magnitudes of 6.4 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively. The second column of Table
2.6 shows the 2SLS estimates of —1 instrumenting schooling by the treatment dummy. The
results suggest that one additional year of schooling leads to an 11-percent increase in the
hourly wages of the individuals in the cohort 1988-1990. The corresponding F-statistics of
the excluded instruments in the first stage do not exceed the critical value while remaining
close to 10. This indicates that the treatment dummy is relatively weak. The estimated
coe cients for females is higher than for males, 14 percent, and 7 percent, respectively.
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The corresponding F-statistics of the first stage show that the treatment dummy is a weak
instrument. Furthermore, the third column of Table 2.6 presents the returns to education
using the 2SLS in which schooling is instrumented by the intensity of the reform. We find
that one additional year of education increases wages of individuals who were born in 1988-
1990 by around 9 percent. The returns to one additional year of schooling for the treated
women and men are found to be very similar with a magnitude of 8.5 percent. The F-
statistics of the first stages, which are around 30, indicate that the intensity of the reform is
not a weak instrument.
Note that our identification strategy is based on the assumption that the reform and the
intensity of the reform a ects wages only through increasing the educational attainment,
controlling for cohort and region fixed e ects. If the regional trends in the enrollments are
correlated to the regional trends in the future earnings, our identification could be jeopar-
dized. We address this possibility by including the interactions of the region and survey year
fixed e ects in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.6. Comparing columns 2 and 3 with columns 4
and 5, respectively, we find that controlling for di erential regional trends hardly changes
the estimated returns to education.
Furthermore, Table 2.7 presents the estimated coe cient, —1, of equation (2.7) in which
schooling is measured by a dummy variable which indicates whether or not an individual
completed at a minimum middle school education. The first column of Table 2.7 shows the
OLS estimation results. It suggests that having at least middle school education increases
the hourly wages by 24 percent (2.4 percent per year) for all workers. Again, the returns to
middle school completion are higher for the female workers than for male workers, 38 percent
(3.8 percent per year) and 20 percent (2 percent per year), respectively. The second column
presents the estimated returns to middle school completion using the treatment dummy as
an instrument. The results show that middle school completion leads to a 44-percent increase
in the hourly wages of the treated cohort. It is also found that middle school completion
raises the treated women’s wages by 157 percent. This looks implausibly high. However,
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it should be noted that those who completed at least middle school could have attained
schooling between 8 and 17 years. Thus, assuming linear returns for each year of schooling,
this might indicate a 15-percent returns to one additional year of education. As we discussed
above, these high returns to education might be a result of the selection-into-employment of
women. In other words, the probability of wage employment of women might also be a ected
by the reform and thus inflates the returns to education. On the other hand, having at least
middle school education increases the treated men’s wages by 19 percent. However, this is
estimated less precisely as it is significant at the 10 percent level. The estimated coe cients
in the fourth column of Table 2.7 controls for the di erential region trends. The results are
quite similar to their counterparts in the second column.
The third and fifth columns show the returns to the middle school completion using
the intensity of the reform as an instrument for schooling. Unlike the treatment dummy,
F-statistics indicate that the intensity of the reform is a strong instrument for middle school
completion for all-worker sample as well as for female and male sub-samples. It is found
that completion of middle school or higher education levels increases the hourly wages of
the individuals who were born in 1988-1990 by 56 percent. Assuming linear returns for each
year of education, this implies a 5.6-percent increase for an additional year of education.
Furthermore, it is found that having completed at least middle school education leads an
increase in the treated women’s wage by 82 percent (8.2 percent per additional year). Also,
the estimated coe cient for males indicates that completion of middle school or higher levels
of education raises the treated men’s wages by 43 percent (4.3 percent per additional year ).
Again, including region-survey year fixed e ects hardly changes the estimated coe cients.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show that the 2SLS estimates exceed their OLS counterparts. How-
ever, these two estimates are not necessarily comparable as the first one represents local
average treatment e ect (LATE) for those who are a ected by the reform and the accompa-
nying middle-school class openings. Moreover, we find that the treatment dummy is a weak
instrument for years of education and for women’s completion of middle school or higher
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levels of education. However, the intensity of the reform is a strong instrument for both
specification and all subsamples considered in the tables. The 2SLS coe cients are hardly
di er when we control for the region-survey year fixed e ects.
Furthermore, a special attention is required to compare the estimated coe cients in the
third columns of both Table 2.6 and Table 2.7. We found that returns to one additional
year of schooling for the treated group is around 9 percent and it is very similar for females
and males in Table 2.6. On the other hand, using a dummy variable for the completion
of middle school or higher levels of education as the schooling variable, we found that one
additional year of education leads a 5.6-percent increase in the treated individuals’ hourly
wages. The di erence between the two estimates might be resulting from the di erential
returns in the di erent educational levels. For example, one-year college education might
have higher returns than one-year high-school education. Moreover, the returns to education
are found to be similar for females in both tables. However, return to one-year education
for males in the Table 2.7 is considerably smaller than that in Table 2.6. Recall that, Figure
2.5 shows that the intensity of the reform was mainly e ective in increasing treated male
workers’ middle school education while it was e ective in increasing treated female workers’
middle school education as well as their college education. Thus, the di erences between the
returns to one-year education in both tables might be indicative that the return to one-year
education is higher for the college education than high school or middle school.
Additionally, we replicate Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 restricting the sample to the individ-
uals whose highest attained education level is high-school (either general or vocational high
school). Table 2.8 replicates Table 2.6 where the schooling variable is the years of education.
The first column of Table 2.8 shows that the OLS estimates are smaller than that found
in Table 2.6. The second column, in which the treatment dummy instruments education,
shows similar results to the corresponding results in Table 2.6. Furthermore, the third col-
umn of Table 2.8, where we use the intensity of the reform as an instrument, shows some
interesting findings. First, we find that one additional year of education in middle school
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or high school levels increases the hourly wages of individuals born between 1988-1990 by
5.6 percent. This is significant at the 10 percent significance level. The F-statistics of the
excluded instruments in the first stage indicates that the instrument is not weak. Second,
we find that there is no statistically significant e ect of middle or high school education on
the treated female workers’ wages. The F-statistics of the first stage, which is lower than 10,
indicates that the intensity of the reform is a weak instrument for female education when
we exclude college goers. This is not surprising, as we have shown that the intensity of the
reform was more e ective in the college education of the female wage earners. Lastly, we
find that the return to one year of education is 5.4 percent for the treated male workers who
do not have a college education. Controlling for region-survey year fixed e ects hardly alters
the estimated coe cients, except for the female sample in the fifth column. The F-statistics
of the first stage got closer to the critical value of 10. The estimated coe cient becomes
higher, but it still remains insignificant.
Table 2.9 replicates Table 2.7 considering high school as the highest attained education
level. Note that the schooling variable is the dummy variable which indicates that whether
an individual completed middle school or higher levels of education. The first column of
Table 2.9 suggests that the OLS estimates of the per-year rate of return are close to the
corresponding estimates in Table 2.7. Moreover, instrumenting schooling by the treatment
dummy, the second column shows that the completion of middle school or high school in-
creases wages of the treated workers by 31 percent. Similar to Table 2.7, we find that the
treatment dummy is a weak instrument for the female sample. Moreover, the returns to
middle school completion are found to be considerably high with a magnitude of 80 percent.
As has been discussed, this might be driven by the selection-into-employment which is more
problematic for women. Furthermore, we found that the middle school or high school com-
pletion increases the treated male workers’ hourly wages by 26 percent. The results are very
similar in column 4 in which the region-year fixed e ects are included. Finally, the third
column, in which middle school completion is instrumented by the intensity of the reform,
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shows that the per-year returns to middle school or high school graduation are quite similar
in Table 2.7 and Table 2.9 for all workers sample (5.2 percent per year) as well as for the
male sample (4.5 percent per year). However, there is no statistically significant e ect for
female workers, even though the instrument is strong. Controlling for the region-survey year
fixed e ects results in slightly higher estimates.
The findings in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 confirm our explanations on the discrepancies
between the estimated returns to one-year schooling in Table 2.6 and 2.7. The returns to
one-year education in college level seems to be higher than at the middle school or high
school level, is more pronounced for female workers.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the e ect of the Eight-Year Compulsory Education Law and
the accompanying middle-school class openings on educational attainment in Turkey. Sub-
sequently, we used these exogenous variations to estimate the causal e ect of education on
individual wages.
The estimations suggest that the 1997 law increased the completed years of schooling of
the people born between 1988-1990 by 0.77 years and the probability of completing middle
school or higher education levels by 19 percent. The e ect of the program is higher on
women’s education than on men’s. Moreover, we find that one additional middle-school
class per 1000 children aged 11-13 increases the years of completed schooling by 0.19 years.
It also increases the probability of completion of at least middle school by 4 percent for the
first three treated cohorts. Again, the e ect of middle school class openings was higher on
educational attainment of women than that of men.
Further evidence suggests that the intensity of the reform was mainly e ective in increas-
ing men’s probability of completion of middle school (6th-8th grades) education. However, it
was more e ective in increasing the women’s probability of completing middle school as well
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as education levels beyond the 8th grade. Furthermore, we find that despite the fact that
women attained more schooling as a result of the reform and the accompanying middle-school
class openings; they were unable to convert these gains into the labor market outcomes to
the same degree as men. There is some descriptive evidence that the reform and the intensity
of the reform might increase the probability of wage employment for women.
Having shown that the reform and the intensity of the reform increased educational
attainment significantly, we used the treatment dummy and the intensity of the reform as
instruments for schooling. The treatment dummy is found to be a weak instrument in some
of our specifications, especially for female education. On the other hand, the intensity of
the reform, which accounts for the regional and yearly variations, is a strong instrument
in most of the specifications. Our 2SLS estimations suggest that one additional year of
schooling increases the treated group’s hourly wages by 5.6 to 9 percent. However, there is
some evidence that the returns to one-year education may be di erent at di erent education
levels.
The rate of return is found to be higher for females than for males. We find that returns
to education for the female workers are in the range of 8 to 15 percent. Further investiga-
tion shows some evidence that the higher returns to education for females are mainly driven
by considerably high returns to college education. When we exclude the college goers, the
instruments become weak for females. We were unable to find any statistically significant
returns to education for females using the intensity of the reform. However, there are im-
plausibly high returns to education when we instrument schooling by the reform. We note
that the returns to education estimates for females should be taken with caution because of
a severe sample selection bias for females.
On the other hand, we showed that the intensity of the reform is a quite strong instrument
for men’s schooling in all cases. We find that returns to one-year education are in the range
of 4.3 to 8.5 percent. When we exclude college goers, the returns to education are found to
be around 5 percent for male workers.
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Furthermore, the estimated coe cients hardly changed when we include region-year fixed
e ects in order to control for the di erential e ect of the regional trends in the factors that
potentially a ect the wages.
Note that our 2SLS estimations reflect the local average treatment e ects of people who
are induced to attain more schooling due to the compulsory schooling and the accompanying
middle-school class openings. However, these findings are important for the policy purposes
in Turkey. In 2012, the Turkish government further increased years of compulsory schooling
and has been implementing several policies to decrease the gaps in educational attainment
and income across regions. Thus, our results indicate that policies targeting to increase the
educational level of individuals might be a good tool for improving individuals’ welfare. In
a broader context, the e ectiveness of the reform and the middle-school class openings on
educational attainment and wages in Turkey also have important policy implications for the
developing countries. Our estimates show that increasing compulsory schooling and investing
those regions which are lagging behind in the enrollment rates would be a good policy for
the developing countries to increase overall educational attainment and individual wages.
Another limitation in this study is that we were forced to estimate returns to education
with a sample of non-movers because of the design of the dataset. If those individuals who
attained more years of schooling as a result of the reform and the accompanying middle-
class openings migrated from their region of education, our estimates can be seen as a lower
bound. This limitation can be addressed in a future study using another data set that
provides information on the region of education.
Overall, we provide evidence on the causal e ect of education on hourly wages exploiting
the exogenous variation in educational attainment in Turkey. The estimated returns to
education range from 5.6 to 9 percent. We provide somewhat robust estimates for males.
However, there are potential problems in the estimation of the women’s returns to education
resulting from the selection-into-employment bias. Further research is warranted to address
the selection bias in the returns to education for females.
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Figure 2.1: At Least Middle School Completion Rate by Birth Year
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Figure 2.2: Middle School Enrollment Rate by NUTS-2 Regions
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Figure 2.3: Trends in the Number of Middle School Classes per 1000 Children
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Figure 2.4: The E ect of the Instrument on The Probability of Completing at Least ‘m’
Years of Education-Whole Sample
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Figure 2.5: The E ect of the Instrument on The Probability of Completing at Least ‘m’
Years of Education-Wage Earners Sample
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Control Treated
VARIABLES # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Whole Sample
Female* 133,142 0.519 0.500 124,989 0.528 0.499
Married* 133,142 0.647 0.478 124,989 0.309 0.462
Age 133,142 27.43 1.899 124,989 22.52 1.888
Living in the Same City* 133,142 0.699 0.459 124,989 0.765 0.424
Currently in School* 133,142 0.089 0.285 124,989 0.239 0.426
Years of Education 133,142 8.771 4.241 124,989 9.916 3.678
At least Middle School Completion* 133,142 0.580 0.494 124,989 0.847 0.360
Illiterate* 133,142 0.040 0.195 124,989 0.041 0.199
No Diploma* 133,142 0.083 0.276 124,989 0.142 0.349
Primary School* 133,142 0.337 0.473 124,989 0.011 0.105
Middle School* 133,142 0.135 0.342 124,989 0.300 0.458
High School* 133,142 0.124 0.330 124,989 0.251 0.434
Vocational High School* 133,142 0.119 0.324 124,989 0.128 0.335
College* 133,142 0.202 0.401 124,989 0.168 0.373
Panel B: Sample of Wage Earners
Female* 52,458 0.274 0.446 36,955 0.328 0.470
Married* 52,458 0.571 0.495 36,955 0.220 0.414
Age 52,458 27.58 1.852 36,955 23.07 1.756
Living in the Same City* 52,458 0.649 0.477 36,955 0.759 0.428
Currently in School* 52,458 0.109 0.312 36,955 0.203 0.402
Years of Education 52,458 10.55 3.920 36,955 10.87 3.151
At least Middle School Completion 52,458 0.762 0.426 36,955 0.934 0.248
Illiterate* 52,458 0.005 0.0704 36,955 0.008 0.0870
No Schooling* 52,458 0.022 0.148 36,955 0.058 0.234
Primary School* 52,458 0.215 0.411 36,955 0.007 0.0850
Middle School* 52,458 0.138 0.345 36,955 0.297 0.457
High School* 52,458 0.130 0.336 36,955 0.197 0.397
Vocational High School* 52,458 0.163 0.369 36,955 0.182 0.386
College* 52,458 0.331 0.471 36,955 0.259 0.438
Tenure in the Current Job 52,458 3.090 2.909 36,955 1.619 1.842
Part-time* 52,458 0.023 0.150 36,955 0.027 0.162
Work Hours per Week 52,458 51.07 12.44 36,955 52.46 12.44
Hourly Wage 52,458 2.683 1.807 36,955 2.095 1.367
Log of Hourly Wage 52,458 0.809 0.572 36,955 0.595 0.502
Notes: Treated: 1988-1990 birth cohorts, Control : 1983-1985 birth cohorts. * Dichotomous variables.
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Table 2.2: Number of Middle School Classes(6th-8th) per 1000 Children Aged 11-13 by
NUTS-2 Regions and School Year
NUTS2 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
TR10 15.53 16.59 17.29 17.63 17.77 18.58 19.85 21.80 23.82 24.29 24.73 25.06
TR21 21.11 22.34 23.00 23.49 23.85 25.01 26.87 28.88 31.38 32.05 32.73 33.61
TR22 21.27 22.34 23.31 23.97 24.41 25.88 27.13 30.70 33.85 34.19 36.38 37.54
TR31 18.10 19.06 19.87 20.36 20.81 21.96 23.70 26.29 28.16 29.09 30.87 31.41
TR32 15.84 16.78 17.90 18.43 18.76 20.31 23.72 26.24 29.19 30.31 32.77 36.36
TR33 14.57 15.67 16.74 17.28 17.78 18.98 22.21 25.50 29.19 30.25 35.72 35.84
TR41 17.83 19.45 20.18 21.07 21.85 22.30 24.20 25.94 28.32 29.07 31.42 34.06
TR42 15.98 17.32 18.70 19.57 19.21 21.49 23.37 25.03 28.07 29.97 31.26 34.31
TR51 20.92 21.77 22.55 23.37 23.61 24.44 25.53 26.47 27.94 28.20 29.87 31.82
TR52 12.87 13.36 14.15 14.24 14.69 15.34 18.33 20.83 24.14 24.00 28.30 30.16
TR61 16.63 17.85 18.45 18.99 19.29 19.80 21.54 24.34 27.43 28.17 30.97 34.69
TR62 13.41 14.11 14.86 15.42 16.17 16.89 19.28 21.67 23.73 25.15 26.43 28.14
TR63 11.68 12.65 13.60 14.22 14.78 16.28 19.46 22.19 24.93 26.03 28.25 29.59
TR71 15.11 15.96 16.70 17.08 17.75 18.21 20.49 23.62 26.61 28.52 30.77 32.61
TR72 14.19 14.84 15.37 15.82 16.18 17.32 19.60 22.11 25.65 27.61 30.41 30.75
TR81 14.45 15.79 17.23 16.98 19.50 21.46 24.44 28.71 31.52 33.71 34.70 38.08
TR82 14.01 15.09 16.01 16.05 16.66 17.78 19.71 22.79 26.28 28.36 30.94 34.33
TR83 13.42 14.06 14.75 15.14 15.81 16.37 20.04 22.57 26.17 27.82 32.13 32.74
TR90 14.93 15.76 16.27 16.57 17.05 17.70 19.99 21.75 24.36 26.42 29.11 30.07
TRA1 11.56 11.89 12.06 12.76 12.94 13.81 15.66 18.22 21.10 20.16 26.00 32.17
TRA2 9.21 9.60 9.78 9.82 9.80 10.69 12.82 13.53 15.46 17.15 18.89 20.31
TRB1 14.96 15.60 15.83 15.43 16.32 16.87 18.78 20.00 22.49 24.04 26.07 27.71
TRB2 7.65 7.64 7.58 7.53 7.40 8.06 9.09 9.83 12.14 13.95 17.29 18.59
TRC1 10.18 11.00 11.77 12.34 12.48 13.33 15.21 17.59 19.83 20.75 23.45 26.15
TRC2 7.27 7.59 7.38 7.40 7.32 7.93 9.88 10.18 11.63 12.81 14.87 16.91
TRC3 6.94 7.28 7.17 7.42 7.33 7.87 9.41 11.50 14.08 18.60 19.82 21.17
Turkey 14.24 15.07 15.71 16.09 16.44 17.34 19.41 21.47 23.97 25.13 27.35 28.91
TR-Low 11.11 11.64 12.02 12.30 12.60 13.40 15.63 17.52 20.11 21.51 24.32 26.20
TR-High 16.88 17.98 18.87 19.35 19.88 20.99 23.05 25.57 28.30 29.47 31.59 33.56
Source: MONE’s National Education Statistics (Formal Education) for years 1992-2003.
Notes: 1- “Turkey” row shows the number of middle classes per 1000 children for the whole country.
2- “TR-Low” row shows the average number of middle school classes for those regions whose average was lower than
that for the whole country in 1997(base year in construction of intensity measure).
3- “TR-High” row shows the average number of middle school classes for those regions whose average was higher than
that for the whole country in 1997(base year in construction of intensity measure).
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Table 2.3: E ect of the 1997 Reform on Education-OLS
Years of Education Middle School Completion
VARIABLES All Female Male All Female Male
Panel A: Restricted Sample (Educated in the Region of Residence)
Treated 0.772*** 1.067*** 0.476*** 0.189*** 0.219*** 0.158***
(0.173) (0.232) (0.171) (0.0299) (0.0402) (0.0252)
Observations 188,634 96,147 92,487 188,634 96,147 92,487
R-squared 0.221 0.274 0.156 0.230 0.270 0.151
Panel B: Whole Sample ( All Residents)
Treated 0.815*** 1.136*** 0.489*** 0.184*** 0.227*** 0.140***
(0.113) (0.165) (0.114) (0.0186) (0.0263) (0.0166)
Observations 258,131 135,097 123,034 258,131 135,097 123,034
R-squared 0.185 0.207 0.145 0.198 0.216 0.135
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2- Treatment group 1988-1990 birth cohorts vs Control group 1983-1985.
3- All regressions control for age, age square, a dummy for ongoing education as well as 26 NUTS-2
region, and year fixed e ects. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights provided in the data
set.
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Table 2.4: E ect of the Intensity of the 1997 Reform on Education-OLS
Years of Education Middle School Completion
VARIABLES All Female Male All Female Male
Panel A: Restricted Sample (Educated in the Region of Residence)
Intensity 0.191*** 0.229*** 0.148*** 0.0411*** 0.0527*** 0.0288***
(0.0296) (0.0378) (0.0268) (0.00629) (0.00866) (0.00455)
Observations 188,634 96,147 92,487 188,634 96,147 92,487
R-squared 0.222 0.274 0.157 0.236 0.278 0.156
Panel B: Whole Sample (All Residents)
Intensity 0.159*** 0.172*** 0.138*** 0.0313*** 0.0387*** 0.0228***
(0.0231) (0.0307) (0.0226) (0.00470) (0.00658) (0.00356)
Observations 258,131 135,097 123,034 258,131 135,097 123,034
R-squared 0.185 0.206 0.145 0.201 0.220 0.138
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
2- Treatment group 1988-1990 birth cohorts vs Control group 1983-1985.
3- All regressions control for birth year, the 26 NUTS-2 region, and year fixed e ects as well as
a dummy variable for ongoing education, an interaction of treatment dummy and middle school
enrollment rate in 1996. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights.
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Table 2.5: First-Stage Estimates
Years of Education Middle School Completion
INSTRUMENT All Female Male All Female Male
Treatment Dummy 1.007*** 1.458*** 0.645* 0.254*** 0.141** 0.249***
(0.334) (0.532) (0.328) (0.0416) (0.0579) (0.0434)
Observations 62,116 17,173 44,943 62,116 17,173 44,943
R-squared 0.132 0.080 0.105 0.111 0.066 0.122
Intensity 0.200*** 0.339*** 0.170*** 0.0315*** 0.0352*** 0.0334***
(0.0363) (0.0625) (0.0319) (0.00484) (0.00716) (0.00463)
Observations 62,116 17,173 44,943 62,116 17,173 44,943
R-squared 0.131 0.070 0.107 0.114 0.070 0.126
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
2- Treatment group 1988-1990 birth cohorts vs Control group 1983-1985.
3- All regressions control for age, age square (birth year fixed e ects for the intensity of the reform), tenure
in the firm and its square, a dummy for ongoing education, 26 NUTS-2 region, and year fixed e ects. All
regressions are weighted by the sample weights provided in the data set.
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Table 2.6: Returns to Years of Education-OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: All
Years of Education 0.0507*** 0.109*** 0.0883*** 0.102*** 0.0890***(0.00192) (0.0250) (0.0175) (0.0218) (0.0166)
1st Stage F-stat [9.545] [30.76] [10.29] [28.95]
#Obs. 62,116 62,116 62,116 62,116 62,116
Panel B: Female
Years of Education 0.0640*** 0.143*** 0.0840*** 0.139*** 0.0824***(0.00258) (0.0380) (0.0246) (0.0355) (0.0239)
1st Stage F-stat [9.002] [29.94] [9.108] [29.66]
#Obs. 17,173 17,173 17,173 17,173 17,173
Panel C: Male
Years of Education 0.0444*** 0.0725* 0.0855*** 0.0634* 0.0886***(0.00193) (0.0386) (0.0211) (0.0325) (0.0197)
1st Stage F-stat [4.061] [28.17] [4.794] [26.72]
#Obs. 44,943 44,943 44,943 44,943 44,943
Region E ects YES YES YES YES YES
Year E ects YES YES YES YES YES
Year*Region E ects NO NO NO YES YES
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2- F-statistics of the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1990 birth cohorts vs Control group 1983-1985.
5- All regressions control for age, age square (birth year fixed e ects in columns (3) and (5)),
tenure in the firm and its square, a dummy for ongoing education, 26 NUTS-2 region, and year
fixed e ects. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights provided in the data set.
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Table 2.7: Returns to at Least Middle School Completion-OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: All
Middle School
Completion
0.242*** 0.437*** 0.560*** 0.434*** 0.573***
(0.0145) (0.105) (0.120) (0.101) (0.114)
1st Stage F-stat [38.92] [42.66] [39.84] [42.63]
#Obs. 62,116 62,116 62,116 62,116 62,116
Panel B: Female
Middle School
Completion
0.381*** 1.575*** 0.817*** 1.566*** 0.797***
(0.0219) (0.599) (0.278) (0.594) (0.271)
1st Stage F-stat [6.389] [24.17] [6.233] [23.55]
#Obs. 17,173 17,173 17,173 17,173 17,173
Panel C: Male
Middle School
Completion
0.197*** 0.191* 0.432*** 0.181* 0.454***
(0.0141) (0.112) (0.110) (0.107) (0.102)
1st Stage F-stat [33.81] [52.93] [36.47] [56.20]
#Obs. 44,943 44,943 44,943 44,943 44,943
Region E ects YES YES YES YES YES
Year E ects YES YES YES YES YES
Year*Region E ects NO NO NO YES YES
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2- F-statistics of the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1990 birth cohorts vs Control group 1983-1985.
5- All regressions control for age, age square (birth year fixed e ects in columns (3) and (5)),
tenure in the firm and its square, a dummy for ongoing education, 26 NUTS-2 region, and year
fixed e ects. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights provided in the data set.
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Table 2.8: Returns to Years of Education (Highest Degree attained is High School) -OLS
and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: All
Years of Education 0.0255*** 0.109*** 0.0561* 0.0977*** 0.0600**(0.00150) (0.0378) (0.0313) (0.0333) (0.0304)
1st Stage F-stat [11.04] [15.39] [11.96] [15.58]
#Obs. 48,285 48,285 48,285 48,285 48,285
Panel B: Female
Years of Education 0.0338*** 0.175* 0.0272 0.159* 0.0412(0.00188) (0.0896) (0.0607) (0.0825) (0.0575)
1st Stage F-stat [4.774] [8.341] [4.877] [9.765]
#Obs. 10,806 10,806 10,806 10,806 10,806
Panel C: Male
Years of Education 0.0228*** 0.0982** 0.0544* 0.0844** 0.0606**(0.00168) (0.0425) (0.0292) (0.0365) (0.0273)
1st Stage F-stat [10.30] [17.34] [11.69] [18.46]
#Obs. 37,479 37,479 37,479 37,479 37,479
Region E ects YES YES YES YES YES
Year E ects YES YES YES YES YES
Year*Region E ects NO NO NO YES YES
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2- F-statistics of the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1990 birth cohorts vs Control group 1983-1985.
5- All regressions control for age, age square (birth year fixed e ects in columns (3) and (5)),
tenure in the firm and its square, a dummy for ongoing education, 26 NUTS-2 region, and year
fixed e ects. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights provided in the data set.
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Table 2.9: Returns to at Least Middle School Completion(High-School is the Highest
Degree)-OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: All
Middle School
Completion
0.114*** 0.310*** 0.207* 0.286*** 0.224**
(0.00959) (0.0930) (0.111) (0.0854) (0.107)
1st Stage F-stat [47.11] [39.09] [49.08] [40.02 ]
#Obs. 48,285 48,285 48,285 48,285 48,285
Panel B: Female
Middle School
Completion
0.168*** 0.806** 0.113 0.759** 0.178
(0.0137) (0.375) (0.255) (0.360) (0.252)
1st Stage F-stat [7.755] [18.53] [7.367] [20.18]
#Obs. 10,806 10,806 10,806 10,806 10,806
Panel C: Male
Middle School
Completion
0.0992*** 0.260*** 0.190** 0.228** 0.215**
(0.0102) (0.101) (0.0956) (0.0909) (0.0881)
1st Stage F-stat [45.15] [45.10] [49.69] [49.41]
#Obs. 37,479 37,479 37,479 37,479 37,479
Region E ects YES YES YES YES YES
Year E ects YES YES YES YES YES
Year*Region E ects NO NO NO YES YES
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2- F-statistics of the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1990 birth cohorts vs Control group 1983-1985.
5- All regressions control for age, age square (birth year fixed e ects in columns (3) and (5)),
tenure in the firm and its square, a dummy for ongoing education, 26 NUTS-2 region, and
year fixed e ects. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights provided in the data set.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Education on Health: Evidence from the 1997
Compulsory Schooling Reform in Turkey
3.1 Introduction
The prevalence of the two main public health problems, obesity and cigarette smoking, show
interesting patterns among Turkish men and women. According to OECD health statistics in
2014 based on self-reported height and weight measures 24.5% of Turkish female population
is obese which puts Turkey in second place after the USA among OECD countries while the
prevalence of obesity among Turkish males is less than the OECD average. On the other
hand, smoking is more problematic among Turkish men. OECD statistics show that in 2012,
37% of Turkish men are smokers which is the highest rate among OECD countries while the
smoking rate for females is 10.7% which is one of the lowest rates among OECD countries.
The percentage of obese people is increasing over time. Overall the obesity rate increased
from 12% in 2003 to 19.9% in 2014. However; the smoking rate shows a declining trend.
43.6% of Turkish population who are 15 years old or older consume tobacco daily in 1995,
while this percentage declines to 23.8% in 2012.
It is well documented that there is a strong relation between individuals’ education level
and health. The mechanism behind the association between health and education and the
causality is highly debated in the literature with mixed evidence. Turkey provides an oppor-
tunity to investigate the causality from schooling to health besides the interesting statistics
shown above. The Turkish government took serious measures to increase the formal schooling
by introducing compulsory schooling changes in the last two decades. Compulsory schooling
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increased from 5 to 8 years in 1997 and from 8 to 12 years in 2012. The timing and imple-
mentation of the 1997 Basic Education Law provide a natural experiment to investigate the
e ect of education on labor market and non-market outcomes. The change in 2012 is still
too young to measure its e ect.
We use the 1997 Basic Education Law and the accompanying investments to increase
the number of classrooms/teachers which vary across regions and birth cohorts to study
the relationship between education and health outcomes/behavior. Our health outcomes
are obesity/BMI, smoking behavior, and self-rated health. We also investigate the e ect
of education of women on infants’ well-being. We show that the 1997 reform substantially
increased the education of Turkish people. Using the new class openings in the 6th-8th
grades as an intensity measure of the 1997 reform we find that, on average, one additional
middle-school class increases the probability of completion of 8 years or more of schooling
by 2%-5%. The reform itself and new class openings were more e ective in increasing the
schooling of women than that of men.
We find a significant relationship between health outcomes/health behavior and education
in Turkey, using ordinary least squares. However, instrumenting education by plausibly
exogenous policy changes, we could not find a significant evidence on the causal relationship
between education and the health outcomes we considered.
Section 2 presents the related literature, while we discuss the Turkish education system
and the compulsory schooling change in section 3. The data sets used in this paper are
explained in section 4. The Model and the identification strategy is explained in section 5.
The e ect of the 1997 reform and new class openings on educational attainment is analyzed
in section 6. Then, the e ect of education on several health outcomes is examined in section
7. Finally, section 8 concludes the paper.
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3.2 Literature Review
The relationship between health and education has been empirically well studied for di erent
countries and di erent time periods. These studies include various health outcomes such as
mortality rates, smoking, self-rated health variables, fertility, obesity etc. Higher returns to
education on health have been found for poorer countries (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006).
The mechanisms behind the relationship between schooling and health based on three
models/approaches. Grossman (1972) modeled the production of health based on the seminal
paper of Becker (1965) to study the productive e ciency resulting from formal schooling.
According to this model more schooling allows individuals to produce health outcomes more
e ciently, as individuals with more education accumulate more knowledge. On the other
hand, some critiques of this approach argued that schooling would make individuals better
in the allocation of resources in the production of health (see Grossman, 2006, 2015 for a
comprehensive review). Schooling has a direct e ect on health in a productive e ciency
model while it has an indirect e ect in an allocative e ciency model (Grossman, 2006). The
question of the possibility of the omitted confounding variable was raised by Fuchs (1982). It
is possible that there might be a third variable that a ects both education and health in the
same way, in turn producing a large correlation between these two variables. Fuchs (1982)
points out that those who discount the future at a low or moderate rate would invest more
in education as well as health. Furthermore, there might be a reverse causality such that
individuals with poor health conditions might have lower educational attainment (Grossman,
2006).
The first generation studies focus on the estimation of this relationship by including
covariates such as family background, socioeconomic and individual characteristics, to test
the productive and allocative e ciency models. There were also attempts to include measures
for omitted third variables such as time preference and ability. In the last two decades, the
availability of more data and popularity of the use of the instrumental variables approach
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have attracted more attention on the investigation of the relationship between education and
health (Grossman, 2015). Moreover, recent attempts to improve education in developing
countries and the trends in health outcomes enabled more scholars to study the causality
from education to health in developing countries. For a good review see Grossman (2006,
2015), Cutler and LlerasMuney (2006), and Eide and Showalter (2011).
The compulsory schooling changes are widely used as instruments in an attempt to
circumvent the endogeneity of schooling or omitted third variable problems in the estimation
of a wide range of health outcomes (Grossman, 2006). Health outcomes considered include
mortality, self-rated health, the prevalence of illnesses, fertility, and health risk factors; the
prevalence of obesity and smoking. Also, infant birth outcomes, such as birth weight, infant
mortality, etc. are used to study the relationship between maternal education and infant
health.
Lleras-Muney (2005) uses the compulsory schooling laws and child labor laws between
1915 and 1939 in the US as an instrument for the schooling of individuals in examining
the e ect of education on mortality rates. She points out that if more education results in
better health, those individuals who live in states that increased the compulsory schooling
would be healthier and live longer. She constructs synthetic cohorts from the censuses and
follows these cohorts over time. Lleras-Muney (2005) assigns these cohorts into treatment
and control groups depending upon their birth year which is used to instrument schooling.
She finds a significant e ect of education on the mortality rate and concludes that this e ect
might even be larger than those found in the literature without controlling for endogeneity.
Mazumder (2008) reexamines the e ect of education on mortality and other health-related
outcomes and checks the results of Lleras-Muney (2005) using the same instruments. He tests
the sensitivity of the large impacts found in Lleras-Muney (2005) to the inclusion of state-
specific trends. The results show that the e ect of education on mortality rates in the US
are indeed sensitive to the inclusion of state-specific trends resulting in smaller, insignificant
e ects. He points out that the results in Lleras-Muney (2005) might be driven by some other
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policies related to increasing the nutrition of students in public schools which may overlap
with the compulsory schooling law changes. Adams (2002) examines the self-rated health
and functioning ability of older people. He uses family background variables as proxies for
the unobserved characteristics in the OLS estimations. Furthermore, he uses the quarter of
birth of individuals as an instrument for schooling following Angrist and Kruger (1992). He
tries to deal with the weak instrument problem by using family background information as
additional instruments. He concludes that education causes better health even controlling
for omitted variables and the endogeneity problem.
The e ect of schooling on smoking and obesity is examined by Kenkel, Lillard and Math-
ios (2006). They investigate whether the di erences in smoking rate and the probability of
being overweight could be causally explained by the education level di erences using the
NLYS-79. They use the state policies related to the high-school graduation and GED at-
tainment as instruments for the high school completion as well as controlling for parental
education, state cigarette taxes, and anti-smoking initiatives. Their instruments were quite
strong in terms of the F-test of the first stage. The IV results show that high school com-
pletion reduces the probability of smoking by 23 percent for men and 10 percent for women,
but they are estimated with low precision. However, they find no strong evidence on the
e ect of high school completion or GED attainment on the probability of being obese or
overweight. de Walque (2007) considers the impact of education on the smoking behavior of
individuals. He uses the probability of being inducted in the Vietnam War draft as an in-
strument for schooling pointing out that individuals avoid being drafted by going to college.
The outcomes for his model is current smoking and the cessation of smoking. He finds that
there is a causal negative e ect of education on the probability of being a current smoker.
The more educated people are less likely to smoke, by 6 percent, and in case they smoke,
they are more likely to quit, by 7 percent, in their IV estimations.
Recent papers provide mixed evidence on the relationship between education and health
using non-US data and natural experiments in developed and developing countries. Arendt
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(2005) uses the Danish compulsory schooling reforms enacted in 1958 and 1975 as an in-
strument for schooling. He uses a Danish panel data set of employed people in examining
the e ect of education on self-rated health and BMI. The first stage estimates show that the
reforms increased schooling; however, the instruments are weak. He finds that the e ects
are larger using IV estimation, but these estimates are insignificant.
Clark and Royer (2013) examine the e ect of education on a wide range of health out-
comes such as mortality, self-rated health, smoking behavior, and BMI employing a regression
discontinuity design making use of education reform in the UK in 1947 and 1972 which in-
creased the school leaving age from 14 to 15 and from 15 to 16, respectively. They show that
the reforms had a substantial e ect on increasing educational attainment. However, they
find no significant e ect of education on health outcomes or health behavior. Silles (2009)
provides some evidence on the relationship between higher schooling and better self-rated
health status using the same instruments used in Clark and Royer (2013) but with a di erent
data set.
Kemptner, Jurges and Reinhold (2011) use the compulsory schooling changes in West
Germany between 1949 and 1969 which increased the compulsory schooling from 8 to 9
years. The states implemented these changes in di erent years which creates an exogenous
variation in education and can be used to study the relationship between education and
health. They show that there is a significant e ect of education on long-term illness of
German men but not women. They find that one year education reduces men’s BMI by
0.3 kg/m2, probability of being obese or overweight by 3 percent. However, they could not
detect any evidence on the e ect of education on smoking behavior. On the other hand,
Jurges, Reinhold, and Salm (2011) use the sharp increase in the number of grammar schools
in 1960’s and 1970’s which substantially vary among West-German states as an exogenous
shock in the estimation of the e ect of education on smoking and obesity. They find that the
increase in the number of grammar schools increased the educational attainment of Germans.
Using this exogenous increase in estimating the e ect of education on smoking and obesity,
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they find a large negative e ect on current smoking rates for both men and women, -0.06 and
-0.15, respectively. However, the e ect for men became inconclusive when they considered
only the cohorts which are most a ected by the grammar school increase. They also find
that one additional year of schooling increases men’s probability of being obese (overweight)
by 13 percent (12 percent). Again, considering a narrower range of birth cohorts, they find
insignificant positive e ects of education on the probability of being overweight or obese.
Park and Kang (2008) exploit a rapid increase in the number of high school classrooms
in Korea in the mid-1970’s and the birth order of Korean men as an exogenous source of
variation in educational attainment. This exogenous source of variation is used in estimating
the e ect of education on health and health-related behavior. They find that education has
a positive e ect on health check-up and regular exercising; however, there are no statistically
significant e ects of education on smoking or drinking behavior of Korean men.
The e ect of maternal education on the well-being of children is also widely examined.
It is well documented that the infant’s health is related to the education level of the mothers
which in turn determines the well-being of children as an adult (Grossman, 2006). Currie
and Moretti (2003) first provided evidence that this relationship is indeed causal from the
mothers’ education to infant health outcomes. They use the college availability in the county
of the mothers when they were 17 years of age. They argue that the availability of a college in
the county when a woman is 17 years old is exogenous once the county and year of birth are
controlled for. They find that the college openings increased the educational level of white
women. Exploiting this variation in an IV setting and considering various outcomes related
to the infant’s health, they find that increasing maternal schooling by one year would reduce
the probability of low-birthweight birth by 2 percent and preterm delivery by 1 percent.
Breierova and Duflo (2004) investigate the e ect of mother’s and father’s education on
fertility and child mortality in Indonesia exploiting the primary school construction program
in the 1970’s. The Indonesian government went into a massive primary school expansion
between 1973 and 1978 which lead to a substantial increase in the educational attainment of
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Indonesian people. They specifically tried to test if the mother’s education a ects fertility
decisions and child mortality more than the father’s education. They instrument average
family education or the di erence in the years of education between the wife and husband
with the primary school construction of which the intensity varies across districts over co-
horts. Their IV results indicate that education has a significant e ect on child mortality and
there is no di erence between the mother’s or father’s education. However, they find that
female education is more e ective on the fertility decision.
Chou, Liu, Grossman, and Joyce (2010) estimate the e ect of parental education on
several infant health outcomes such as low birthweight, neonatal deaths, etc. in Taiwan.
They use the compulsory schooling change that took place in 1968 and the variation in the
implementation of the law across regions over cohorts. The compulsory schooling increased
from 6 to 9 years in Taiwan in 1968 and the government built new junior high schools to
meet the expected increase in enrollment caused by the increase in compulsory schooling.
The intensity of school construction varied across regions. This enabled the authors to
instrument the schooling of parents in the estimation of infant health outcomes. They show
that the increased number of junior high schools as a result of compulsory schooling change
increases the years of schooling. Furthermore, they conclude that the parental education
causes better health of infants, especially in terms of birthweight. They find that the increase
in the mother’s (father’s) schooling which is caused by the 1968 reform reduces the number
of low-birthweight births by 4.7 percent (4.2 percent). These e ects are smaller than those
found in their OLS estimates.
The association between individual education and either own health outcomes or well-
being of their children in Turkey has recently attracted some attention. These studies mainly
make use of the compulsory schooling change which increased the compulsory education
from 5 to 8 years in August 1997 in Turkey. Dinc¸er, Kaushal and Grossman (2014) use the
1997 compulsory schooling change and the accompanying variation in teacher recruitments
across regions over birth cohorts in estimating the e ect of the female education on female
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own health and her children’s well-being using the Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys
(TDHS) for the years 2003 and 2008. They measure the intensity of the reform by the number
of teachers (1st-8th grades) as a proportion of the number of primary education school aged
(6-13 years old) children. This intensity measure varies across regions and years for which
the student is 11 years of age. Intensity is interacted with a dummy variable which indicates
whether an individual is a ected by the reform. Furthermore, they control for the pre-reform
trends by including interaction terms of birth cohorts with the middle school enrollment rate
in 1996. They find that the increase in the number of primary school teachers associated with
the compulsory schooling change increased the women’s educational attainment in Turkey.
Their IV results show that there is a significant negative relationship between education and
number of pregnancies and the average number of kids of ever-married women. In fact, they
find that a 10-percent increase in the proportion of women that completed at least 8 years
of schooling is associated with 0.13 less children per woman. They also find weak evidence
on the impact of mother’s education on the child mortality, in fact, it loses its significance
in their preferred estimation. The identification in the paper is based on cohorts that are
a ected by the reform and the intensity of the treatment which is defined as the teacher-child
ratio. They define the first cohort a ected by the law as the 1986 birth cohort. However,
the school starting age is 6 in Turkey (Resmi Gazete, August 7, 1992). Thus, the 1986 birth
cohort is expected to complete 5 years of primary school in June 1997 which is right before
the law change. Hence, this cohort is not a ected by the law. However, a small portion of
the 1986 birth cohort, that deferred entrance to the primary school or repeated any grade in
primary school and consequently could have been in the 5th grade in 1997/1998 and hence,
a ected by the law. There is no way to distinguish between treated individuals in the 1986
cohort from those that are not treated. Thus, inclusion of 1986 cohort in the treated group
might be responsible for the weakness of the results.
Cesur, Dursun and Mocan (2014) estimate the e ect of education on self-rated health,
BMI and smoking behavior of Turkish men and women using the 2008, 2010, and 2012
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waves of the Turkish Health Survey (THS). The relationship between education and health
is examined by instrumenting education using the compulsory schooling law in 1997. They
use a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if an individual is born after 1986 and 0
otherwise. Furthermore, they exclude the 1986 birth cohort because of the fact that some
people born in 1986 were a ected by the reform while some were not. They restrict their
attention to the birth cohorts 1982-1990, which means 4 birth cohorts in each treatment
arm. Their OLS estimates confirm, in most of the cases, the positive e ects of the education
on health outcomes and health behavior. However, the IV estimates show that there is no
significant e ect of education on self-rated health, fruit consumption or smoking for both men
and women. Furthermore, they find that having completed at least middle school increases
men’s BMI by 7.1kg/m2 and the probability of being obese by 35 percent. However, there
is no significant e ect of education on women’s BMI or propensity of being obese. These
implausibly high estimates for men are explained by a possible detrimental e ect of an
increase in personal income and the change in the lifestyle of Turkish men over the last two
decades.
Tansel and Karaoglan (2016) use the same data set as Cesur et al. (2014) in estimating
the e ect of education on health behavior in Turkey. They use some changes in the educa-
tion system which mainly e ects primary school (5-year) education in the early 1960’s by
comparing cohorts who are a ected by the new system with those that are not. They use
individuals older than 25 years old. They construct their treatment group as those born in
or after 1952 and a ected by the educational reforms in the early 1960s. They argue that a
dummy variable indicating whether an individual is born in 1952 or later is a valid instrument
for individuals’ schooling. Moreover, they claim that the health reforms introduced in the
early 1960s have no e ect on individuals’ health behavior. They find that there is no e ect
of education on the probability of smoking and exercising. Their 2SLS results show that one
additional year of schooling increases BMI by 0.26 kg/m2. This is significant only at the 10
percent significance level. However, their identification strategy is based on a comparison
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of very di erent cohorts. The treatment group contains individuals born between 1952 and
1987, while the control group includes all individuals born before 19521.
3.3 The Turkish Education System and the 1997 Basic
Education Reforms
Until the summer of 1997, the education system in Turkey had a 5-year compulsory primary
school, 3-year middle school, 3-year high school, 2- or 4-year college and graduate studies.
The three-party-coalition government took an immediate and unexpected action in chang-
ing the compulsory schooling from 5-year to 8-year primary education. This was done by
combining the 5-year compulsory primary school and the 3-year middle school. The primary
school diploma which used to be awarded upon completion of the 5 years of schooling was
abolished. The middle school diploma which used to be awarded upon completion of the
3 additional years of schooling after primary school was replaced with a primary education
diploma which is awarded upon completion of the 8 years of schooling.
The idea of increasing the compulsory schooling was on the government’s agenda for a
long time but it could not be implemented because of the lack of physical requirements. The
Basic Education Law, which increased the compulsory schooling, was enacted in August 1997
(Law No: 4306) 2 due mainly to political reasons rather than economic incentives with almost
no public discussion on it. Turkey experienced several economic crises in the 1990’s in which
11 di erent government cabinets were formed. This political and economic instability in
the 1990’s is paired with the military intervention in February 1997. The National Security
Council held a lengthy meeting on February 28, 1997, in which the military wing of the
council expressed their concerns about the rise of the religiosity in the country. The military
1As a check of this identification strategy, we used a di erent cut-o  birth year randomly before 1952
which gave a similar or better strength and power in the first stage. This shows that an identification
strategy based on comparison of two very di erent groups may not be valid in the estimation of the e ect
of education on health in Turkey.
2Resmi Gazete, No: 23084; August 18,1997
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wing of the council sent a memorandum to the government requesting the resignation of
the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, who was the leader of the religious Welfare Party
(Refah Partisi). The memorandum also included the armed forces “recommendations” for an
increase in compulsory schooling (Gu¨nay, 2001). Consequently, Necmettin Erbakan resigned
in June 1997 and a new three-party-coalition government was formed on June 30, 1997. This
newly established government took the “recommendations” of the National Security Council
and passed The Basic Education Law on August 16, 19973.
The Basic Education Law required all students in the 5th or lower grades in the 1997/1998
school year to complete 8 years of education in schools which had a universal secular cur-
riculum. There were elective-curricula middle schools (6th-8th grades) including vocational,
technical and religious middle schools besides the secular-curricula middle schools before
1997. The government cut o  religious studies in the 6th-8th grades by abolishing all elective-
curricula middle schools and implementing the Basic Education Law as “8-year continuous
compulsory basic education”.
This unprecedented enactment of the law created a huge need for investments in new
classrooms and teachers to meet the expected increase in the number of students in the 6th
through 8th grades. The Ministry of National Education( MONE) increased the capacity of
primary education by 3 million through the construction of new classrooms and recruitment
of teachers to implement of the reform (Dulger, 2004). A detailed discussion of the Turkish
education System and the Basic education law can be found in Dulger (2004) and Karatas
(2017).
The school entry policy in primary school also deserves a special attention as it is crucial
in the identification of the individuals who are a ected or just missed the reform. The school
starting age is determined by the calendar year rather than the school year. The enrollment
rule is determined by the byLaw published on August 7, 1992 in the O cial Gazette of the
Republic of Turkey, which states that: “All children who completed 72 months at the end of
3See Gunay (2001) for a detailed discussion of the “eighteen recommendations” of the National Security
Council.
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the calendar year shall be enrolled in the 1st grade. Those who are required to be enrolled
but physically underdeveloped can continue pre-school education one more year with the
written consent of the parents.”4 (Resmi Gazete, August 7,1992). The school starting age
was not strictly enforced. The byLaw allows some students to defer their enrollment one
year. There are also early entrants of which birthday is close to the 72-month cut-o  (Cesur
et al., 2014). The national education statistics show that early enrollment consists of a small
portion (around 5%) of each birth cohort (National Education Statistics, 1991-2003).
3.4 Data
The individual-level data sets used in this study are the Turkish Health Survey (THS) for
the years 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. Also, the Turkey Demographic and Health Survey
(TDHS) for the years 2008 and 2013 are used. Both surveys are nationally representative;
however, each has strengths and weakness. We restrict our attention to those born between
1982 and 1991.
The Turkey Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) has been carried out by Hacettepe
University Institute of Population Studies (HUIPS) since 1968. This is done in every five
years and collects data on socio-demographic characteristics of households such as age, ed-
ucation, marital status, region of birth of each member of the household. The main interest
of the survey is on ever-married women aged 15-49 for which very detailed information on
individual characteristics as well as marriage, fertility, migration, health of mothers and their
children are obtained. The TDHS conducted individual interviews with ever-married women
aged 15-49 until 2008. In the TDHS-2013 all women aged 15-49 regardless of their marital
status were individually interviewed. The TDHS has some unique advantages over other
nationally representative surveys. The TDHS provides very detailed information on indi-
viduals’ education, age, birth year, region of birth, region of residence, region of childhood,
and migration history. Moreover, the TDHS reports women’s measured height and weight
4Authors’ translation
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as well as very detailed information on marriage, fertility, use of birth control methods and
their children’s health.
The Turkish Health Survey (THS) is conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute
(TURKSTAT) biennially, since 2008. The THS is a nationally representative survey which
aims at providing health indicators such as infant and child health conditions, adults’ self-
reported health, height and weight, smoking behavior, and utilization of health services
covering all settlements in the territory of Turkey except for the institutionalized popula-
tion. The THS is a self-reported survey, unlike the TDHS. The biggest advantage of the
THS over the TDHS is that it covers all men and women, unlike the TDHS which covers
only women aged 15-49.
We use the 1982-1991 birth cohorts from both surveys. The THS provides the completed
age of the respondents, so we obtained the birth year by subtracting the completed age
from the survey year. The birth year is crucial in our identification as it allows us to assign
individuals into control and treatment groups. Since it is not known whether the respondent
was surveyed before or after his/her birthday, any birth year obtained by the survey year and
completed age includes individuals from two birth cohorts. For example in the 2010 THS
survey, an individual that was born in 1987 and surveyed after his/her birthday would report
the completed age as 23, while another individual who was born in 1986 and surveyed before
his/her birthday will also report the completed age as 23. Thus, a birth cohort obtained
by subtracting completed age from the survey year, which in this example is the 1987 birth
cohort, consists of some of those whose actual birth year is 1986 and others whose actual birth
year is 1987. In contrast, the TDHS provides the actual birth year. But in our analyses, we
use the calculated birth year for both data sets for comparability reasons. We excluded the
1986 and 1987 birth cohorts in our analysis because we were unable to distinguish between
those a ected and those who are not a ected by the law. We will discuss this in more detail
in the next section. Moreover, observations with missing values in our outcome variables and
education variables are excluded in our analyses. Summary statistics of selected variables is
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presented in Table 3.1 for both the THS data (Panel A) and the TDHS data (Panel B).
The implementation of the reform varies across regions and this exogenous variation is
used for instrumenting schooling in our model. Therefore, the information on the region
where an individual had his/her schooling is important. The TDHS provides the region of
birth, region of residence, the region where an individual spent most of his/her time until
the age of 12 (hereafter termed as “the childhood region”). On the other hand, the THS
provides only the region of residence5.
We used regional schooling statistics which is extracted from the National Education
Statistics in order to construct our intensity measure of the reform. National Education
Statistics provide the information on the number of students, number of teachers, number of
classes in each grade and the number of schools in each level of education in the beginning
of each school year disaggregated at the 81 province levels. TURKSTAT releases these data
by the level of education on its website. The statistics for primary school (1-5th grades)
and middle school (6th-8th grades) are provided separately before 1997; however, due to the
1997 Basic Education Law, the statistics for the basic primary education (1st-8th grades)
are given together since 1997. Since our intensity measure is based on the increase in the
number of classes in the 6th-8th grades, we extracted the number of classes for the 6th,
7th, and 8th grades after 1996 to determine the number of new class openings in each region
from the National Education Statistics books for the years 1991-2003. The number of classes
reported by the National Education Statistics are the number of classes at the beginning of
that education year. Thus, the number of classes at the beginning of the 1997-1998 education
year is used as the base number and the increase over this number is assumed to be the new
class openings in each region and used to construct the intensity measure.
5Region names are not provided in the data set but randomized numbers are assigned to the regions in 12
NUTS-1 and 26 NUTS-2 levels. We used the population of each region in each survey year and the sample
proportions of each region in the surveys as well as the number of subregions to determine which number is
assigned for each 12 regions. There were only two regions that didn’t match in each year. After assigning
all other regions, the average years of schooling for these two regions is used to assign the numbers provided
in the survey with the names of the regions. Also, this way of assignment of the regions matched with the
assignment of the regions by the ascending order of the names of the region. However, we couldn’t find a
good way to assign regions in NUTS-2 level.
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Our intensity measure also requires the information on the population of children aged
11-13 by regions for each year. We used the 1990, 2000 Censuses and the 2007 Address
Based Population Registration System6, obtained from TURKSTAT, and inter-census years
are interpolated assuming a constant growth rate of the population.
3.5 The Model and Identification Strategy
3.5.1 The Model
In this section, we analyze the e ect of education on the individuals’ health assuming a
Mincerian type equation:
Hi = —1Si+—2Xi+ui (3.1)
where the health outcome or health behavior, Hi, is determined by schooling, Si, observed
individual characteristics and related factors, Xi, and an unobserved error component ui.
In this model, schooling might have a direct e ect which is defined as productive e ciency
by Grossman(1972) or allocative e ciency. Schooling can be endogenous since an individual
with poor health will have low schooling. Moreover, there might be some omitted variables,
such as ability or time preference that would a ect the individuals’ decisions on both health
and education. Thus, any estimation based on equation (3.1) would su er from endogeneity.
To instrument for schooling, we consider the following equation;
Si = “1Ti+“2Xi+vi (3.2)
where schooling is determined by the excluded variable, Ti, the same variables included in
Xi in equation (3.1), and an unobserved vi. We use the compulsory schooling change in 1997
in Turkey and the new class openings which varies across regions as Ti in the examination
6Address Based Population Registration System began in 2007 and TURKSTAT releases population
statistics on it website.
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of the e ect of education on health outcomes and health behavior.
The health variables we consider in our analysis are self-rated health, having health
problems in the last 6 months, body mass index (BMI), smoking behavior, and infants’
birth weight. BMI is defined as the weight of an individual in kilograms divided by the
square of his/her height in meters. We use BMI as a continuous variable, and we define a
dummy variable for being obese (BMI Ø 30kg/m2), a dummy variable for being overweight
(30kg/m2 > BMI Ø 25kg/m2). Smoking behavior is also defined with several variables;
a dummy variable for whether an individual ever regularly smoked, a dummy variable for
quitting smoking, the number of cigarettes smoked per day.
Schooling is given as years of schooling and completed level of education in the TDHS.
However, only completed level of education is available in the THS. We imputed years of
education in the THS data by the years of schooling required to complete each level of edu-
cation. Thus, for those individuals who completed some years in any level of education but
did not finish that level, are assigned the years of education required for the last completed
education level. For example, a person who left school after the 10th grade, completed mid-
dle school (basic primary education) but not high school. This individual will be assigned
8 years of schooling. Hence, the imputed years of schooling variable will introduce bias in
some degree. In order to circumvent this bias we define another schooling variable, comple-
tion of at least middle school, which is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual
completed at least middle school (8th grade) or not.
3.5.2 The Identification Strategy
The identification strategy is based on the Basic Education Law enacted in 1997 which
is defined in Section 3. The law increased the compulsory schooling from 5 to 8 years of
schooling. Students used to be awarded a primary school diploma upon completion of 5 years
in the pre-1997 period; however, the earliest diploma can only be obtained upon completion
of 8 years of schooling under the new regime. Since this diploma is considered crucial in
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the labor market, the abolishment of the primary school diploma created some incentives to
continue schooling until the end of the 8th year. Moreover, as it is mentioned in Section 3,
the law change was driven by political incentives. The construction of new classrooms and
recruitment of new teachers to accommodate the expected increase which shows variation
across regions based on their pre-reform enrollment rate also provide an exogenous variation
in the implementation of the new compulsory schooling law. We took advantage of these
exogenous variations in education to explain the impact of education on health.
The Basic Education Law (Law No: 4306) was enacted on August 16, 1997 and the
first group a ected by the law were those in the 5th grade in the 1997/1998 school year.
Therefore, the birth year and school starting age play a crucial role in the determination of
those who are a ected and who just missed the reform. Those who started the 1st grade
in 1993 were in the 5th grade in the 1997/1998 school year. Since the byLaw of MONE’s
primary schools issued in 1992 defines the school starting rule as those who finish 72 months
at the end of the calendar year will be enrolled in the 1st grade in the month of September
in that year. In this case, the 1987 birth cohort should have started the 1st grade in 1993
and would be the first cohort a ected by the reform. However, the exception in the byLaw
allows children who are physically underdeveloped to be able to defer enrollment by one
year. Therefore, some children born in 1986 were also a ected by the reform. We define a
dummy variable, Ti, which is 1 for those a ected by the reform and 0 for those who missed
the reform. There is no way to distinguish between the a ected and una ected groups in
the1986 birth cohort because of the reasons mentioned earlier. We, therefore, exclude the
1986 birth cohort in our analyses. Furthermore, since the THS has no birth year variable
and we are forced to obtain it using the survey year and the completed age; the computed
1987 birth cohort represents some people whose actual birth year is 1986 as well as others
whose actual birth year is 1987. Thus, we further exclude the 1987 birth cohort from our
analyses.
79
Instrumenting education by a dummy variable for the law change has been employed by
Lleras-Muney (2005), Angrist and Kruger (1992), Cesur et al. (2014), and Karatas (2017)
to mention a few. However, the identification is based on a comparison of two groups. The
control and treatment groups are assumed to be similar except for their treatment status.
If there are other policy changes or shocks that a ect the treatment and control groups
di erently in their outcome variable, the identification strategy would be jeopardized and
become invalid.
The 1997 reform was universal across the country. However, the intensity of the reform
varied across regions based on the pre-reform enrollment rates, and classroom and teacher
endowments. The Eastern Turkey regions were lagging behind in the enrollment rates in the
6th-8th grades. One of the main objectives of the reform is referred to as the inclusion of
those “hard-to-reach” group of students who live in rural areas and have low socio-economic
background (Dulger, 2004). Thus, measuring the intensity of the reform would provide us
with another source of variation across regions and cohorts.
The Turkish government, in collaboration with international organizations and the pri-
vate sector, took an immediate action in constructing new classrooms, repairing existing
ones and recruiting new teachers to meet the expected increase in the 6th-8th grades. These
investments varied across regions based on the pre-reform endowments of the regions. The
investments in the classroom and teachers would induce more students to attain more school-
ing. Thus, the larger the intensity of the reform, the larger is the e ect of the reform on
educational attainment (Chou et al., 2010). The regional and temporal variation in the in-
vestments is used in the literature as exogenous variation in educational attainment. Currie
and Moretti (2003) use the variation in the availability of colleges in the residence county in
the US, Duflo (2001), and Breierova and Duflo (2004) use primary school construction boom
in Indonesia, Chou et al. (2010) use the middle school construction variation along with com-
pulsory schooling change in Taiwan, Dincer et al. (2014) use the regional variation in the
number of primary-school (1st-8th) teachers to instrument educational attainment in search
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of the e ect of education on various outcomes, such as wages, infant mortality, smoking, and
marriage decisions. Following this literature, Karatas (2017) shows that using variations in
the number of classes in middle school (6th-8th grades) is a strong tool for measuring the
intensity of the reform. It turns out to be a good instrument for education in Turkey using
the Turkish Household Labor Force Surveys (THLFS) over the period 2009-2013.
We use regional and temporal variations in the new class openings to construct an in-
tensity measure for the 1997 reform. First, we show the trends in the number of middle
school classes per 1000 children aged 11-13, which we call class-to-child ratio, for the school
years 1992-2003. Figure 3.1 shows that after 1997 there is a sharp increase in the number
of middle school classes per 1000 children. The average increase in the class-to-child ratio is
around 20% from 1992 to 1997. The rates of increase is three-folds between 1997 and 2003.
This increase varies across regions and the year at which a birth cohort starts the 6th grade.
Table 3.2 shows the disaggregated class-to-child ratio by region and school year. The rate
of increase in the class-to-child ratio were similar across regions in the pre-reform period;
however, it varies between 34% (TR1-Istanbul) and 117% (TRC-Southeast Anatolia) after
the reform. The 12 NUTS-1 regions are grouped as TR-Low and TR-High based on their
class-to-child ratio in 1997. Regions with a class-to-child ratio that is lower than the average
ratio of the whole country (TRA, TRB, TRC) are represented by “TR-Low” and the rest
of the regions are represented by “TR-High”. The average class-to-child ratio for TR-Low
and TR-High are also shown in Figure 3.1. It is shown that the average rate of increase in
the class-to-student ratio is a little bit higher in TR-High regions in the pre-reform period;
however, the average increase in the TR-Low regions is steeper in the post-reform period.
Showing the variations in the number of middle-school classes per 1000 children across
regions and cohorts that is more apparent after 1997, we are confident that the sharp increase
is related to the 1997 reform. Hence, we create an intensity measure, which is the same as
that in Karatas (2017), except, here, we use 12 NUTS1 regions instead of 26 NUTS2 regions,
following Duflo (2001) and Chou et al. (2010). Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 show that there is a
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huge increase after the 1997 reform. Thus, we assume that the new class openings associated
with the 1997 Basic Education Law measures the intensity of the reform across regions and
cohorts and use 1997 as the base year in constructing the intensity measure. Then, the
cumulative new class opening for each year after 1997 is computed as the di erence in the
number of classes in a specific year and the base year 1997. This cumulative number of new
middle school classes is then expressed as per 1000 children aged 11-13 in each 12 NUTS1
regions. This measure is termed the intensity of the reform. Note that intensity of the
reform di ers from class-to-child ratio as the first one considers only the number of new
middle-school class openings associated with the 1997 reform. This intensity of the reform
in each year is matched with the cohort that starts the 6th grade in that year. For example,
the 1988 birth cohort starts the 6th grade in 1999, so they are assigned the intensity measure
of the reform in 1999; and the 1989 birth cohort is assigned the intensity in 2000 and so on.
3.6 The Schooling E ect of the 1997 Reform and New
Class Openings
It is shown that the 1997 Basic Education Law and the middle-school class openings increased
the educational attainment of Turkish men and women significantly in Karatas (2017) using
the THLFS data. Since the THLFS provides information on the region of residence and
whether an individual has been living in the same region throughout his/her life, the e ect
of new class openings on schooling is estimated with a sample of individuals who have not
migrated and educated in the region they live. The estimated e ect might be mitigated if
individuals who are induced to attain more education by new class openings migrates to
another region. Therefore, it is important to know the region that an individual is educated
to gauge the e ect of the new class openings associated with the 1997 reform. However, we
were able to identify only the region of residence in the THS data. On the other hand, the
TDHS reports information on region of birth, region of residence and the region in which the
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individual lived until the age of 12. In this section, we start assessing the e ect of the reform
by defining a dummy variable representing the treatment status of the individual. Then,
we estimate the e ect of the intensity of the reform on educational attainment using the
THS data. Lastly, the TDHS data is used to check the robustness of the intensity measure
making use of the information on the region in which the individual lived until the age of
12. Furthermore, we test whether there is a spillover e ect of the reform and its intensity
on education levels beyond middle school using the actual years of schooling of ever-married
women in the TDHS.
The 1997 Basic Education Law increased the compulsory schooling from 5 to 8 years
with an intention to increase the educational attainment of Turkish people. Thus, we define
a dummy variable, Ti, indicating the status of the treatment by the 1997 reform. The e ect
of the reform then is estimated using the following equation;
Sijt = “1Ti+“2Xijt+µj+⁄t+vijt (3.3)
where Sijt is schooling of individual i in region j at time t. Schooling is represented by
the imputed years of education (for the THS data) or a dummy variable indicating whether
an individual attained 8 years or more of schooling. Ti is a dummy variable which takes a
value of 1 if an individual was born after 1987 (1986 and 1987 birth cohorts are excluded
because of the reasons mentioned above). Xijt includes control variables such as age, female
dummy, etc.. µj represent the 12 NUTS-1 region dummies which are used to control for
the time-invariant region characteristics that might a ect the education of individuals. ⁄t
represents dummy variables for each survey year which captures the time fixed e ects in the
educational attainment. All standard errors are clustered by region and birth year.
Education is recorded as the last completed degree in the THS. We imputed the years
of education assigning the years required to attain a given degree. This may not show the
actual years of education as the treated group might be in school at the time of the survey.
83
For example some people in the treatment group might be in college; however, they will be
assigned to complete only 11 years of schooling which is required to attain a high school
diploma. Thus, the years of education may not be a good indicator for educational attain-
ment. Therefore, we prefer the dummy variable which indicates middle school completion in
investigating the e ect of the reform on educational attainment. Furthermore, the e ect of
the reform is expected to be higher for female as the middle school completion rate was lower
for women than that for men in the pre-reform years. Therefore, we estimated equation (3.3)
for all individuals as well as for females and males separately. The OLS results are shown in
Table 3.3. The first three columns use the years of education while the last three columns
use a dummy variable indicating whether an individual completed at least middle school
(8th grade) in the estimation of equation (3.3).
Table 3.3 shows that the 1997 reform is e ective in increasing the educational attainment
in Turkey. The compulsory education law increased the years of education by 0.80 years.
Also, it is found that females significantly attain less schooling than males7. The columns
2 and 3 show that the 1997 reform increased the years of education for women more than
that for men, 0.90 and 0.75, respectively. The last three columns indicate that the 1997
reform increased at least middle school completion by 17 percent. The e ect is found to be
higher for women than for men, 23 percent, and 11 percent, respectively. Overall, Table 3.3
shows that the 1997 reform was e ective in increasing the educational attainment in Turkey.
These estimates are very similar to those found in Karatas (2017), Cesur et al. (2014), and
Tansel and Karaoglan (2016). However, note that the estimation based on comparisons of
the two groups would be biased if there are other policy changes that would a ect control
and treatment groups di erently in their educational attainment. For that reason, we make
use of the variation in the implementation of the reform that is measured by the variation
in the new middle-school class openings across regions and birth cohorts. Following Duflo
7The coe cient of female dummy as well as other covariates is not reported here for space reasons.
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(2001) and Chou et al. (2010) we estimate the following equation:
Sijkt = “1(Pjk úTi)+“2Xijkt+µj+ ◊k+⁄t+vijkt (3.4)
where Ti is the same dummy variable that is used in equation (3.3) which is 1 for in-
dividuals born after 1987. Note that equations (3.3) and (3.4) di er only in the variable
representing the change in compulsory schooling. Here, Pjk is the intensity measure for
cohort k in region j, which represents the number of new middle school class openings in
region j at the time cohort k starts 6th grade. We controlled for the birth cohort fixed e ects
◊k as well as the controls in equation (3.3).
The OLS estimates for “1 in equation (3.4) are shown in Table 3.4 for the whole sample as
well as for males and females, separately. As in Table 3.3, we present the OLS estimates for
the dependent variables; years of schooling and at least middle school completion. The OLS
estimates in Table 3.4 show that on average, one additional new middle-school class opening
associated with the 1997 reform increases the years of schooling of the treatment group by
0.11 years. The impact is higher for women than men in terms of years of education attained,
0.16 and 0.04, respectively. However, the estimate for men is insignificant. The same pattern
is found when the educational attainment is represented by the middle school completion
dummy. The fourth column of Table 3.4 indicates that one additional new middle-school
class opening per 1000 children, on average, increases the treated group’s probability of
completing at least middle school by 2.5 percent. The OLS results for females and males
in the fifth and sixth columns indicates that the new class openings associated with the
reform was more e ective in increasing the women’s probability of completion of middle
school or higher education by 3.4 percent. The impact of the new class openings on the
men’s probability of completing middle school or higher is 1.3 percent but it is insignificant.
Note that these findings are in line with the findings of Karatas (2017) but here the e ect
is found to be weaker especially for males. This might be a result of the relatively small
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sample size of men, which may be under-represented. Also, the main motivation behind
the use of middle-school class openings as a measure of the intensity of the 1997 reform is
that the higher is the number of available classes the higher the probability of continuing
the education which varies across regions and school year. Recall that the THS provides
information on the region of residence. Thus, the possibility of migration would bias our
estimates. Karatas (2017) shows that using the region of residence as a proxy for the region
in which an individual received his/her education leads to smaller estimates of the e ect of
the intensity on educational attainment. Here, we take advantage of the TDHS to address
these concerns.
The TDHS collects data on basic demographic characteristics of household members with
the main interest being women aged 15-49. The TDHS provides very detailed information
on education, birth year, the region of birth, region of childhood and region of residence,
measured height and weight as well as fertility, use of birth control methods, children health
for a nationally representative sample of ever-married women aged 15-49 in TDHS-2008 and
a sample of all women aged 15-49 in TDHS-2013. The married women were also asked
about their husband’s age, education, region of childhood. The education is recorded as the
completed years of education and the last completed level of education. The women are
asked about their province of birth and the province that they spent most of their time until
the age of 12, which is called the region of childhood. Therefore, we can use the information
on women’s own education as well as their husband’s education, age, and childhood region
to test our results obtained by using the THS to address our concerns in the use of the
intensity of the reform. The data shows that around 22 percent of the sample of individuals
who were born between 1982 and 1991 (the 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts are excluded) reside
in a di erent region from their region of childhood8.
Table 3.5 shows the OLS estimates of “1 in equation (3.4) using the TDHS-2008 and
TDHS-2013 for di erent samples in which we matched the intensity measure based on the
8The mover rate is slightly higher for the control group than for the treated group, 22.2 % and 20.6%,
respectively.
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childhood region of the individuals. Table 3.5 shows that, on average, one additional middle-
school class opening per 1000 children increases the years of schooling of the treatment group
by 0.28 years. The second column of Table 3.5 shows that the new class openings increased
women’s educational attainment by 0.24 years. The third and fourth columns show the OLS
estimates for the ever-married sample. It is found that the impact is higher for husbands
than for wives, 0.26 and 0.34 years, respectively. However, the coe cient for the husbands
is significant at the 10 percent level.
The last four columns of Table 3.5 show the coe cients of the intensity on the probability
of completing at least middle school. As we mentioned before, the middle-school completion
is our preferred schooling measure because the treatment group might still be in school in
the survey year. The coe cient of interest “1 is estimated significantly for all samples. The
fifth column of Table 3.5 shows that, on average, one additional middle-school class opening
associated with the 1997 reform increases the probability of completing at least 8 years of
schooling by 7 percent which is almost triple the size found in Table 3.4. The sixth column
shows that the impact on all women is 7.1 percent. For the ever-married sample, it is found
that the middle-school class openings are more e ective in increasing the treated women’s
probability of completing at least 8 years of schooling with a magnitude of 8.4 percent. The
middle-school class openings also increased the ever-married men’s probability of completing
middle school or higher by 7.2 percent. However, we cannot make inference on the actual
size of the impact on males’ education because of the lack of information on unmarried men.
Table 3.5 reveals that new middle-school class openings per 1000 children associated with
the 1997 reform is e ective in increasing the educational attainment of Turkish people and
the size of the e ect is higher than that found in Table 3.4.
Furthermore, we examine the e ect of the reform and the intensity of the reform on
di erent levels of education following Duflo (2001) and Karatas (2017) using the equations
(3.3) and (3.4) with the TDHS data. We define “m”, for m = 1to17, dummy variables
indicating whether an individual completed at least “m” years of education or not. Then,
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the e ects of the reform (using equation (3.3)) and the intensity of the reform (using equation
(3.4)) are estimated for each dummy variable using linear probability models. The estimated
coe cients, “1, and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 3.2.
The shape of Figure 3.2 shows the education level in which the reform and the intensity of
the reform were e ective. Figure 3.2 (a) shows the estimated e ects of the reform on each
level of education. It indicates that the 1997 reform was e ective in increasing the ever-
married women’s probability of completing middle school (6th-8th grades) with a magnitude
of around 30 percent. There are some spillovers beyond middle school; however, the e ects
become insignificant beyond the 9th grade. Moreover, Figure 3.2 (b) shows the estimated
e ects of the intensity of the reform on each level of education using equation (3.4). Note
that the regional intensity measure is matched to the individual-level data based on the
region of childhood. Figure 3.2 (b) shows that one additional middle-school class opening
per 1000 children in the childhood region increases the ever-married women’s propensity of
completing middle school (6th-8th grades) by around 8 percent. There are no significant
spillover e ects beyond the 8th grade. These findings are similar to that found in Karatas
(2017) except for the insignificant spillovers beyond the middle school. Note that Karatas
(2017) use all women sample, while we use the ever-married women sample here.
Overall, we find that the 1997 reform and the new middle-school class openings at a
di erential rate across regions increased the educational attainment significantly. The impact
is more pronounced on women’s educational attainment than men’s. The reform and the
intensity of the reform were mainly e ective in increasing middle school (6th-8th grades)
education. Also, we find that the use of the region of residence as the region that education is
attained mitigate the size of the e ect. Furthermore, a dummy variable indicating competing
middle school or higher education better represents educational attainment of individuals.
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3.7 The E ect of Education on Health Behavior and
Health Outcomes
Having shown that the 1997 Basic Education Law and the variation in the implementation of
the reform across regions increased the educational attainment, we start analyzing the e ect
of education on self-rated health, smoking, BMI, obesity and being overweight. Note that
the estimates in the previous section serve as our first stage estimates. We also examine the
e ect of maternal education on the well-being of infants which is measured by the birthweight
of babies. The estimated model is the following:
Hijkt = —1Sijkt+—2Xijkt+µj+ ◊k+⁄t+uijkt (3.5)
where Hijkt is a health outcome or a health behavior for individual i in region j who
is in birth cohort k and observed in survey year t. This is a function of schooling Sijkt,
individual characteristics Xijkt. Region fixed e ects, cohort fixed e ects and survey year
fixed e ects are represented by –j , ◊k , and ⁄t, respectively. The coe cient of interest —1
is estimated by OLS and instrumental variables (IV) and the estimates of —1 are presented
for each health outcome or health behavior considered separately in Tables 3.6-3.12. The
schooling variable used in our estimates is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual
completed middle school or higher. We also present estimates using the years of schooling,
even though they are weak in terms of the first stage F-statistics. The IV estimates, for each
dependent variable considered, presented for instruments, Ti (treatment dummy) and PjkTi
(intensity of the program) for middle-school completion.
3.7.1 BMI, Obesity and Being Overweight
The first health outcome is related to weight problems. The weight problems for men and
women show some interesting patterns in Turkey. According to the OECD Health Statistics
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2014, the obesity rate for women ranked 2nd place among OECD countries, while, the obesity
rate for men is below the OECD average. Figure 3.3 (a) shows the proportion of obese and
overweight men and female by birth cohort using THS data. The figure indicates that the
prevalence of being obese and overweight is lower among younger cohorts for men and women.
The rate of obesity is higher for females than for males. However, the rate of being overweight
is more pronounced among male cohorts than among female cohorts. Furthermore, Turkish
women have lower educational attainment than Turkish men do. Would the educational
attainment discrepancy be responsible for the discrepancy in the obesity rates among Turkish
women and men?
Table 3.6 shows OLS and 2SLS results for equation (3.5) with the natural logarithm of
BMI, being obese, and being overweight as the dependent variable using the THS data for the
whole sample (Panel A) as well as for women (Panel B) and men (Panel C). The schooling
variable is having completed at least middle school. All standard errors are clustered by
birth cohort and region. The first column of Table 3.6 shows the OLS results for log of
BMI. It is found that having at least middle school education decreases the body mass index
by 2 percent for the whole sample. Disaggregation of the sample shows that middle school
completion decreases the BMI of women by 4 percent but increases the BMI of men by 0.3
percent. However, the estimated coe cient for males is not statistically significant. The
e ect of education on BMI might not be linear, therefore, we defined dummy variables for
being obese or not ( BMI Ø 30kg/m2) and being overweight ( 30kg/m2 >BMI Ø 25kg/m2)
and the. Columns (4) and (7) show the OLS results for the dependent variables being obese
and being overweight, respectively. We find that having at least middle school education
decreases the probability of being obese and being overweight for the whole sample by 2
percent for each of the dependent variables. It is also found that education is more e ective
in decreasing the propensity of being obese or overweight for women than for men. Women
with at least 8 years of schooling are 5 percent less likely to be obese and 4 percent less likely
to be overweight relative to those women who have less than 8 years of schooling. The e ect
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of middle school completion increases Turkish men’s probability of being obese or overweight
by 1 percent. However, the estimated e ects are insignificant for men.
Having shown the negative e ect of educational attainment on weight problems for
Turkey, which is also found in other studies (see Cesur et al., 2014; and Tansel and Karaoglan,
2016) and the di erential e ects on female and male samples, we present our 2SLS results.
We use two di erent instruments, which we defined earlier as a dummy variable for being
treated (IV-1), and an intensity measure of the 1997 reform (IV-2). Columns (2), (5), and
(8) show the 2SLS results of equation (3.5) instrumenting the middle school completion by
the treatment dummy, while columns (3), (6), and (9) show the 2SLS results instrumenting
schooling variable by intensity of the 1997 reform. The F-statistics of the excluded instru-
ments in the first stage (shown in brackets) are greater than 10 indicating that for the whole
sample both instruments are not weak. This follows the rule of thumb suggested by Staiger
and Stock (1997). On the other hand, the intensity measure of the 1997 reform is found to
be weak for female sample. For the men sample, both instruments become weak. Cesur et
al. (2014) find that the treatment dummy is not a weak instrument for male sample. This
discrepancy might be driven the fact that we exclude the 1987 birth cohort, unlike Cesur et
al. (2014). As has been discussed, the 1987 birth cohort might include some people that are
not a ected by the law. Moreover, Karatas (2017) shows that the intensity of the reform is
a strong instrument for schooling using a large sample of men and women who are educated
in their region of residence. Recall that we are forced to use the region of residence as a
proxy for the region of education. We showed that this procedure introduces some bias in
our first stage estimates. Therefore, the relatively smaller sample size and the use of region
of residence might be the driving factors behind the weakness of our instrument.
The 2SLS results in the second column of Table 3.6 show that instrumenting middle school
completion by the treatment dummy there is a positive e ect of education on BMI with a
magnitude of 9 percent for the whole sample, but it is only significant at the 10%level. The
e ects are found to be positive for male and female samples, but none of them are significant.
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Moreover, the third column shows that instrumenting the schooling by the intensity of reform,
there is a 5 percent reduction in the BMI of the whole sample. However, it is not significant.
Moreover, there are no significant e ect of education on BMI for males and females when
we instrument the education variable with the intensity of the 1997 reform. Furthermore,
we find that there is a positive e ect of middle school completion on the probability of being
obese for the whole sample as well as for the female sample and a negative e ect for the
male sample using both instruments. However, none of the 2SLS estimates for being obese
are significant. Lastly, we could not find any significant e ect of having at least 8 years of
schooling on the probability of being overweight.
Alternatively, we replicate Table 3.6 using imputed years of education as schooling vari-
able instead of the dummy variable indicating the middle school completion. The OLS and
2SLS results shown in Table 3.7. The first column of Table 3.7 shows that one additional
year of education decreases the BMI by 0.2 percent for the whole sample. Also, there is a
significant negative e ect of education on BMI of women with a magnitude of 1 percent.
However, one additional year of education increases men’s BMI by 0.2 percent. Moreover,
columns 4 and 7 indicate that one additional year of schooling is associated with 1 percent
decrease in the women’s probability of being obese or overweight. However, the more school-
ing increases the men’s probability of being overweight by 1 percent. Furthermore, 2SLS
results using either the treatment dummy or the intensity of the reforms as an instrument for
the years of schooling shows similar patterns as those found in Table 3.6. The instruments
are found to be weak except for the treatment dummy in the whole sample.
Overall, Table 3.6 and 3.7 show that there is a significantly negative relationship between
education and the weight problems of individuals. However, addressing the endogeneity prob-
lem by instrumenting the schooling variable we found no significant causal e ect exception
of a weak positive e ect on BMI for the whole sample. The instruments we used might have
some problems, such that using a treatment dummy variable as an instrument might not dis-
tinguish the other policies that could have a ected treatment and control groups di erently
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in their outcome variable. On the other hand, using the variation in the implementation of
the reform across regions and cohorts as an instrument can better detect the causal e ect
of education on weight problems. However, the limitations of the data forced us to use the
region of residence as the region of education which mitigates the e ect of intensity of the
reform on education and might be responsible for the lack of the evidence for the causal
e ect of education on weight problems.
We take advantage of the TDHS data to address the concerns about the use of the
intensity of the reform as an instrument, since it has information on women’s childhood
region which can be a better representative for the region of education. Moreover, the
TDHS provides measured height and weight of women, unlike self-reported height and weight
information in the THS. Table 3.8 shows the OLS and 2SLS results for only ever-married
women using the dummy variable for middle school completion in Panel A and using years
of education in Panel B. We find that the OLS results are still significant for BMI and
obesity but insignificant for being overweight. The size of the e ects are larger than those
found in Table 3.6 and same as those found in Table 3.7. Using the childhood region as the
region of education shows that the intensity of the 1997 reform has higher F-statistics for the
excluded instruments in the first stage than the treatment dummy. Using treatment dummy
as an instrument for the middle school completion, we find that there are small negative and
insignificant e ects. However, when we use intensity of the reform as an instrument, the
e ects are positive but insignificant.
Overall, we find no causal e ect of education on BMI, obesity, and being overweight
based on the estimated e ects in Table 3.6, Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 except for one case
where the treatment dummy is used as an instrument for the whole sample. These findings
are in line with most of the literature (e.g. Kenkel et al., 2006; Arendt, 2005; Clark and
Royer, 2013). Our 2SLS results for men somewhat contrast with Cesur et al. (2014). They
find a large positive e ect of education on the men’s probability of being obese. This might
be a result of the inclusion of the 1987 birth cohort in their study. Moreover, Cutler and
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Lleras-Muney (2010) show that the e ect of education on obesity is greater at the higher
levels of education, particularly beyond 12 years of schooling. As has been shown in Figure
3.2, the reform and the intensity of the reform increased the average years of education in
Turkey by mainly increasing completing middle school education (6th-8th grades). Also,
our results show the local average treatment e ects of the treated group rather than the
average treatment e ect. Thus, our findings indicate that there is no significant causal e ect
of education on weight problems on the middle school margin in Turkey. This does not rule
out the possibility of an e ect of high school or college education on BMI/obesity.
3.7.2 Smoking
As we mentioned earlier, the high smoking rate among men in Turkey is also another public
health problem. The smoking rate di ers for men and women in Turkey. Turkey is the first
ranked among OECD countries in terms of men’s smoking rate, while one of the lowest in
terms of women’s smoking rate. Figure 3.3 (b) shows the percentage of people who have
been ever smoked regularly as well as the percentage of those who quitted smoking for males
and females by birth cohorts using the THS data. Figure 3.3 (b) shows the prevalence of
smoking is higher among males than females. The smoking rate is lower among younger
cohorts of men and women. The probability of cessation of smoking is somewhat similar for
men and women. If education has a causal e ect on smoking, we expect to find a negative
e ect of education on starting smoking and the number of cigarettes smoked, and a positive
e ect on quitting.
Table 3.9 shows OLS and 2SLS results on the probability of having been a regular smoker,
the probability of cessation of smoking conditional on ever smoked regularly and the number
of cigarettes smoked daily. All standard errors are clustered by region and birth cohort.
The THS does not ask questions related to smoking in the 2008 survey. Thus, the results in
Table 3.9 are obtained by using the 2010, 2012, and 2014 THS surveys. Column (1) of Table
3.9 shows that at least middle school completion increases the probability of having been a
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regular smoker by 0.3 percent, but the coe cient is insignificant. Disaggregation by gender
shows that women with at least 8 years of schooling are 3 percent more likely to smoke
regularly relative to those women with less than 8 years of schooling.This is significant at
the 5% level. However, there is no significant e ect for men. The probability of quitting
smoking conditional on having smoked regularly increases for those who attain at least 8
years of education relative to those who had less than 8 years of schooling for the whole
sample as well as for men by 5 percent. There is no significant e ect of education on
quitting behavior of women. We also investigated the e ect of middle school completion
on the number of cigarettes smoked daily conditional on smoking every day. Column (7)
shows that the completion of middle school or higher leads to a decrease in the number of
cigarettes consumed per day by 1.26 for the whole sample and by 1.84 for males compared
to those who completed 5 years of primary school or no schooling. There is an insignificant
small negative e ect for women.
The OLS estimation coe cients are in line with expectations except for the positive e ect
on the probability of having been a regular smoker for women. However, these estimates
do not show the causal relationship between education and smoking behavior. Thus, we
employed the instrumental variables approach using the treatment dummy in columns (2),
(5), and (8) and the intensity of the 1997 reform, in columns (3), (6), and (9). In most
cases, the first stage F-statistics show that the intensity of the reform is a weak instrument
while the treatment dummy is strong. This might be due to the concerns about the region of
residence that we used as a proxy for the region of education for the intensity of the reform
and the small sample sizes. However, we find no significant causal e ect of education on
smoking behavior based on the 2SLS results in Table 3.9. These findings are in line with
that found in Cesur et al. (2014).
Furthermore, we replicated Table 3.9 using the imputed years of education as schooling
variable. The corresponding OLS and 2SLS results are presented in Table 3.10. Both
instruments are found to be weak in all cases. The 2SLS results show that there is no causal
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e ect of years of schooling on smoking behavior using either instruments.
While we find some relationship between smoking behavior and schooling, we could not
find any causal e ect of education on smoking behavior in Turkey. These results might be
driven by the fact that the sample is quite young. However, Global Adult Tobacco Survey
(2014) shows that around 80 percent of those who smoke regularly start smoking before the
age of 20. Therefore, if there is any e ect of education on the decision to smoke we could
have been able to detect it at least in the first three columns of Table 3.9 and Table 3.10.
Note that these findings are in line with those studies in which the instruments are based
on the interventions in the lower levels of education (e.g. Clark and Royer, 2013; Park and
Kang, 2008; Kemptner et al., 2011). On the other hand, de Walque (2007) finds a significant
causal of university education on smoking behavior using the Vietnam War draft as an
instrument. Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) show that the favorable e ect of education on
smoking behavior is more pronounced at the higher levels of education than the lower levels
of education. The instruments we used are based on an intervention in middle school level
and the compliers are mainly those who finish 8 years of schooling. This might be the driving
factor behind the lack of evidence on the causal e ect of education on smoking behavior.
3.7.3 Self-rated Health
The THS includes a self-rated health question in which individuals are asked to assess their
general health status. The respondents grade their overall health as very poor, poor, fair,
good, and excellent. Self-rated health is considered as a good indicator for mortality and
morbidity (Idler and Benyamini, 1997) or a measure for general health status (Arendt, 2005).
We define a dummy variable, “Good Health” for self-rated health which takes a value of 1
if an individual assesses his/her health as good or excellent, and 0 otherwise. The THS,
also asks whether the individual has had any health problems in the last 6 months or not.
We use these two variables to examine if there is any causal relationship between self-rated
health and education.
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Table 3.11 reports the OLS and 2SLS results of equation (3.5) with the dependent vari-
ables “good health” and “have any health problems in the last 6 months”. The OLS results
show that there is a significant positive relationship between self-rated health and the com-
pletion of at least 8 years of schooling with an estimated coe cient of 10 percent. The e ect
is slightly higher for men than women. However, instrumenting middle school completion by
the treatment dummy or intensity of the reform leads to no significant causal relationship
between education and self-rated health. We also find that those with middle-school and
higher education are 5 percent less likely to have any health problems in the last 6 months
relative to those with less than middle-school education based on the OLS estimation results.
It does not di er much among gender groups. Again, IV estimation results show that there
is no causal e ect of education on having any health problems in the last 6 months.
3.7.4 Well-being of Infants
It is also well documented that the maternal education and infants’ birth outcomes are closely
related (e.g. Currie and Moretti, 2003; Chou et al., 2010). We take advantage of the detailed
information on mothers’ characteristics and birth outcomes in the TDHS data for the years
2008 and 2013, and analyze the e ect of maternal education on infant birth-weight. Table
3.12 shows the OLS and 2SLS results of the e ect of mothers’ education, at least middle
school completion in Panel A, and years of education in Panel B, on the log of infants’ weight
at birth. We also test whether the e ect di ers for the birth-weight of the first child of a
mother. Moreover, we define a dummy variable for low birthweight which takes a value of
1 if the birth-weight is lower than 2.5kg and 0 otherwise. The OLS estimation result in
column (1) shows that mothers’ completion of middle school or higher schools increases the
birth weight of infants by 2 percent. However, it is insignificant. Moreover, we find that
one additional year of mothers’ schooling increases the birthweight by 0.4 percent in the
first column of Panel B. We also checked if the e ect is di erent for the mother’s first birth
considering a sample in which only first births are considered. Column (4) shows that the
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estimated coe cient are almost same for all births and the first birth. Lastly, column (7)
shows that the mother’s completion of at least middle school lowers the probability of giving
birth to a low-weight infant by 2 percent related to the mothers with less than middle school
education, but it is insignificant. On the other hand, using years of education as schooling
variable, we find that one additional year of mothers’ schooling is associated with a 1-percent
reduction in the probability of giving birth to a low-birthweight infant.
We examined if these infant birth outcomes are causal from education by employing
instrumental variables. In Panel A, the first-stage F-statistics for the treatment dummy is
over 10 which shows it is not a weak instrument, while the intensity of the reform is a weak
instrument. This might be driven the fact that the relatively smaller sample size. However,
none of the estimated coe cients are found to be significant regardless of the instrument or
the sample used. Also, using years of education as schooling variable in Panel B, we find
that both instruments are weak and none of the 2SLS estimates are significant.
Overall, even though the OLS estimation results suggest that infants’ birth weight is
improved by the increase in the years of maternal education, the instrumental variable results
show that there is no significant evidence on the causality between maternal education and
infant birth-weight outcome.
3.8 Conclusion
The e ect of educational attainment on own-health behavior and outcomes as well as ma-
ternal education on infant birth weight are examined using the unique natural experiment
in Turkey in which compulsory schooling increased from 5 to 8 years in 1997. The timing
and implementation of the reform created an exogenous shock on individuals’ educational
attainment. The variation in the implementation across regions and birth cohorts enabled
us to examine the causal relationship between education and health outcomes employing an
instrumental variable approach.
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We first examined the e ect of the reform on educational attainment in Turkey by defin-
ing a treatment dummy for those who are a ected by the reform. Our findings corroborate
previous findings in the literature that find that the reform increased the educational at-
tainment significantly. We further define another instrument, intensity of the 1997 reform,
which takes account for the regional and cohort variations in the new middle-school class
openings per 1000 middle-school-aged children. We found that one additional middle-school
class opening associated with the 1997 reform increases the years of education by 0.18 years
and the rate of completion at least middle school by around 5 percent, on average. The
e ects are more pronounced for Turkish women than for Turkish men. Taking advantage of
the detailed information on the region of childhood, birth, and residence in the TDHS data,
we showed that use of the region of residence as a proxy for region in which an individual
attained his/her middle-school education mitigates the e ect of middle-school class openings
related to the 1997 reform.
Further, we analyzed the e ect of education on various health measures, including BMI,
obesity, smoking behavior, self-rated health and the impact of maternal education on the
birth weight outcome of infants. The OLS estimations for weight problems corroborate
the findings in the literature for the whole sample as well as women showing there is a
negative relationship between education and BMI, obesity, or being overweight. There is
no statistically significant e ect of education on weight problems of Turkish men. Using an
instrumental variables approach, we find some weak evidence that middle school completion
increases the BMI, calculated from self-reported height and weight, for the whole sample
instrumenting education by the treatment dummy. However, we find no evidence using the
intensity of the reform as an instrument. We checked this findings with measured height and
weight for women in the TDHS data and found no evidence for casual relationship between
education and weight problems.
The causal relationship between education and smoking behavior is also examined. The
OLS results show that the middle school completion increases the probability of having
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been a regular smoker for females. This is contrary to expectations. On the other hand,
we find that at least middle school completion is associated with a higher probability of
quitting smoking and lowers the number of cigarettes smoked per day conditional on being
a current smoker. Again, addressing the endogeneity of education by instrumenting at least
middle school completion, we find no evidence on the causal e ect of education on smoking
behavior. Furthermore, considering self-rated health and having any health problem in
the last 6 months, we found that at least 8 years of schooling is associated with a higher
probability of reporting good health and lower probability of having any health problem in
last 6 months compared to those who have less than 8 years of schooling. However, there is
no causal e ect detected using the instrumental variables method.
Lastly, we considered the infant birth weight and search for its possible causal relationship
with maternal education. We showed that at least middle school completion is associated
with higher birth weight and lower probability of giving birth to a low-birth-weight baby
compared to those women who had less than middle-school education. However, we found no
evidence on the causal e ect of maternal education on birth weight outcomes of infants once
we instrument middle school completion by either the treatment dummy or the intensity
measure of the 1997 reform.
Overall, we found no evidence on the causal e ect of education on health outcomes. It
should be noted that our estimates represent the local average treatment e ect on the treated
birth cohorts. Our identification strategy is based on an intervention to the schooling in
middle school level. We showed that the reform and the intensity of the reform increased the
average education in Turkey by increasing years of education in 6th-8th grades. Therefore,
our estimates indicate that there is no causal e ect of education in middle school level.
However, there might be e ect of schooling in high school and college levels. Future research
can shed light on these conjectures using the 2012 reform which increased the compulsory
schooling from 8 to 12 years.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Middle School Classes per 1000 Children by School Year
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National Education Statistics 1992-2003.
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Figure 3.2: The E ect of the Instruments on the Probability of Completing at Least ‘m’
Years of Schooling-(The TDHS Data )
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Figure 3.3: Obesity/Overweight and Smoking Behavior by Gender and Cohort
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Notes: (a) Authors’ calculation based on the THS for the years 2008-2014. (b) Authors’ calculation based
on the THS for the years 2010-2014. “Ever Smoked” includes those who had been smoked regularly.
“Quitter” includes those who had smoked regularly and quitted smoking.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Control Treated
VARIABLES # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: The Turkish Health Survey (THS)
Age 5,814 27.90 2.404 5,100 21.73 2.521
Female* 5,814 0.561 0.496 5,100 0.552 0.497
Years of Education 5,814 8.941 4.222 5,100 9.602 3.270
At Least Middle School* 5,814 0.605 0.489 5,100 0.877 0.328
BMI 5,509 24.30 4.052 4,760 22.84 3.803
Obese* 5,509 0.083 0.276 4,760 0.049 0.215
Overweight* 5,509 0.299 0.458 4,760 0.185 0.388
Ever Smoked Regularly* 4,634 0.395 0.489 3,897 0.298 0.457
Quit Smoking* 1,832 0.151 0.358 1,160 0.098 0.298
Number of Daily Cigarettes 1,434 13.08 9.629 973 12.93 9.576
Good Health* 5,812 0.815 0.389 5,100 0.859 0.348
Health Problem in the last 6 Months* 5,810 0.226 0.418 5,093 0.182 0.386
Panel B: The Turkey Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS)-Female
Age 2,151 27.38 2.711 1,454 22.55 2.177
Years of Education 2,151 6.784 4.309 1,454 8.402 4.452
At Least Middle School* 2,151 0.375 0.484 1,454 0.697 0.460
BMI 1,916 26.04 4.909 1,299 24.41 4.684
Obese* 1,916 0.195 0.396 1,299 0.120 0.325
Overweight* 1,916 0.336 0.473 1,299 0.256 0.436
Notes: 1- Treated: 1988-1991 birth cohorts, Control : 1982-1985 birth cohorts. * Dichotomous variables.
2- Varibales related to smoking are based on the 2010, 2012, and 2014 THS.
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Table 3.2: Number of Middle School Classes (6th-8th) per 1000 Children Aged 11-13 by
NUTS-1 Region and School Years
NUTS1 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
TR1 15.53 16.59 17.29 17.63 17.77 18.58 19.85 21.80 23.82 24.29 24.73 25.06
TR2 21.20 22.34 23.17 23.75 24.16 25.48 27.01 29.85 32.70 33.18 34.66 35.68
TR3 16.13 17.15 18.15 18.68 19.12 20.41 23.16 25.99 28.82 29.84 33.10 34.34
TR4 16.90 18.38 19.44 20.32 20.55 21.90 23.80 25.49 28.20 29.50 31.34 34.19
TR5 17.61 18.31 19.09 19.61 19.93 20.68 22.56 24.14 26.37 26.48 29.24 31.17
TR6 13.48 14.41 15.20 15.79 16.38 17.34 19.86 22.47 25.00 26.16 28.12 30.18
TR7 14.56 15.29 15.91 16.33 16.81 17.68 19.96 22.72 26.04 27.97 30.56 31.49
TR8 13.76 14.62 15.51 15.70 16.74 17.68 20.89 23.85 27.25 29.08 32.45 34.06
TR9 14.93 15.76 16.27 16.57 17.05 17.70 19.99 21.75 24.36 26.42 29.11 30.07
TRA 10.41 10.76 10.93 11.31 11.39 12.27 14.25 15.89 18.30 18.65 22.36 26.02
TRB 11.23 11.47 11.48 11.21 11.49 12.03 13.39 14.27 16.58 18.20 20.92 22.29
TRC 8.11 8.59 8.70 8.94 8.91 9.56 11.36 12.75 14.72 16.72 18.74 20.78
Turkey 14.24 15.07 15.71 16.09 16.44 17.34 19.41 21.47 23.97 25.13 27.35 28.91
TR-Low 9.92 10.27 10.37 10.48 10.60 11.28 13.00 14.30 16.53 17.86 20.67 23.03
TR-High 16.01 16.98 17.78 18.26 18.72 19.72 21.90 24.23 26.95 28.10 30.37 31.80
Notes: 1- The “Turkey” row shows the number of middle classes per 1000 children for the whole country.
2- “TR-Low” row shows the average number of middle school classes for those regions whose average was lower than for
the whole country.
3- “TR-High” row shows the average number of middle school classes for those regions whose average was higher than
for the whole country.
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Table 3.3: The E ect of the 1997 Reform on Education-The THS Data-OLS
Years of Education Middle School Completion
VARIABLES All Female Male All Female Male
Treatment Dummy 0.799*** 0.902*** 0.747** 0.166*** 0.230*** 0.106***
(0.210) (0.313) (0.312) (0.0237) (0.0362) (0.0328)
Observations 10,914 6,076 4,838 10,914 6,076 4,838
R-squared 0.101 0.114 0.054 0.170 0.184 0.112
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
2- Treatment group 1988-1991 birth cohorts vs Control group 1982-1985.
3- All regressions control for age, age square, 12 NUTS-1 region, year fixed e ects as well as an
interaction of treatment dummy and middle school enrollment rate in 1996. All regressions are weighted
by the sample weights.
Table 3.4: The E ect of the Intensity of the 1997 Reform on Education-The THS
Data-OLS
Years of Education Middle School Completion
VARIABLES All Female Male All Female Male
Intensity 0.108** 0.157** 0.0383 0.0251*** 0.0335*** 0.0134
(0.0497) (0.0713) (0.0782) (0.00579) (0.00916) (0.00891)
# of Obs. 10,914 6,076 4,838 10,914 6,076 4,838
R-squared 0.101 0.115 0.056 0.168 0.182 0.114
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
2- Treatment group 1988-1991 birth cohorts vs Control group 1982-1985.
3- All regressions control for birth year, 12 NUTS-1 region, year fixed e ects as well as an interac-
tion of treatment dummy and middle school enrollment rate in 1996. All regressions are weighted
by the sample weights.
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Table 3.5: The E ect of the Intensity of the 1997 Reform on Education-The TDHS
data-OLS
Years of Education Middle School Completion
All Ever-married All Ever-married
VARIABLES All Female Female Male All Female Female Male
Intensity 0.281** 0.241** 0.265** 0.343* 0.0709*** 0.0711*** 0.0837*** 0.0721***
(0.112) (0.120) (0.130) (0.174) (0.0113) (0.0131) (0.0182) (0.0210)
# of Obs. 5,309 3,556 2,938 1,753 5,309 3,556 2,938 1,753
R-squared 0.177 0.234 0.191 0.057 0.194 0.252 0.207 0.072
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2- Treatment group 1988-1991 birth cohorts vs Control group 1982-1985.
3- All regressions control for birth year, the 12 NUTS-1 of childhood region, and year fixed e ects as well as an
interaction of treatment dummy and middle school enrollment rate in 1996. All regressions are weighted by the
sample weights.
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Table 3.6: The E ect of at Least Middle School Completion on BMI/Obesity (OLS and
2SLS )
Dep.var: log(BMI) Dep.Var: Obese Dep.Var: Overweight
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: Whole Sample
Middle School
Completion
-0.02*** 0.09* -0.05 -0.02*** 0.03 0.13 -0.02** 0.06 -0.12
(0.00) (0.05) (0.11) (0.01) (0.05) (0.16) (0.01) (0.14) (0.33)
1st Stage F-stat [52.94] [10.36] [52.94] [10.36] [52.94] [10.36]
# of Obs. 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269
Panel B: Female
Middle School
Completion
-0.04*** 0.05 0.06 -0.04*** 0.06 0.45 -0.05*** -0.23 -0.23
(0.01) (0.06) (0.13) (0.01) (0.10) (0.28) (0.01) (0.14) (0.31)
1st Stage F-stat [46.77] [8.524] [46.77] [8.524] [46.77] [8.524]
# of Obs. 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590
Panel C: Male
Middle School
Completion
0.003 0.17 -0.45 0.01 -0.03 -0.95 0.01 0.72 -0.11
(0.01) (0.11) (0.72) (0.01) (0.18) (1.47) (0.02) (0.46) (1.33)
1st Stage F-stat [9.639] [0.640] [9.639] [0.640] [9.639] [0.640]
# of Obs. 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
2- F-statistics for the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity of the 1997 reform is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1991 birth cohorts vs Control group 1982-1985.
5- All regressions control for, marital status, age and age square (birth year fixed e ect in columns (3), (6), and
(9)), 12 NUTS-1 of region, year fixed e ects as well as an interaction of treatment dummy and middle school
enrollment rate in 1996. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights.
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Table 3.7: The E ect of Years of Education on BMI/Obesity (OLS and 2SLS )
Dep.var: log(BMI) Dep.Var: Obese Dep.Var: Overweight
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: Whole Sample
Years of Education -0.002*** 0.02* -0.02 -0.003*** 0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.01 -0.04(0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.03) (0.12)
1st Stage F-stat [12.97] [1.167] [12.97] [1.167] [12.97] [1.167]
# of Obs. 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269 10,269
Panel B: Female
Years of Education -0.01*** 0.01 0.02 -0.01*** 0.02 0.13 -0.01*** -0.07 -0.06(0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.13) (0.00) (0.05) (0.10)
1st Stage F-stat [5.992] [1.470] [5.992] [1.470] [5.992] [1.470]
# of Obs. 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590 5,590
Panel C: Male
Years of Education 0.002*** 0.02 0.31 -0.00 -0.003 0.65 0.01*** 0.10 0.07(0.00) (0.02) (2.24) (0.00) (0.03) (4.65) (0.00) (0.06) (1.15)
1st Stage F-stat [5.357] [0.019] [5.357] [0.019] [5.357] [0.019]
# of Obs. 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679 4,679
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2- F-statistics for the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity of the 1997 reform is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1991 birth cohorts vs Control group 1982-1985.
5- All regressions control for, marital status, age and age square (birth year fixed e ect in columns (3), (6), and
(9)), 12 NUTS-1 of region, year fixed e ects as well as an interaction of treatment dummy and middle school
enrollment rate in 1996. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights.
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Table 3.8: The E ect of Schooling on Measured BMI/Obesity (OLS and 2SLS ) - The
Ever-Married Female TDHS data
Dep.var: log(BMI) Dep.Var: Obese Dep.Var: Overweight
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: Middle School Completion
Middle School
Completion
-0.06*** -0.00 0.09 -0.09*** 0.00 0.10 -0.00 -0.09 0.26
(0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.16) (0.18) (0.02) (0.17) (0.18)
1st Stage F-stat [17.88] [19.76] [17.88] [19.76] [17.88] [19.76]
# of Obs. 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695
Panel B: Years of Education
Years of Education -0.01*** -0.00 0.02 -0.01*** 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.07(0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06)
1st Stage F-stat [3.833] [5.069] [3.833] [ 5.069] [3.833] [5.069]
# of Obs. 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695 2,695
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
2- F-statistics for the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity of the 1997 reform is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1991 birth cohorts vs Control group 1982-1985.
5- BMI is based on measured heights and weights of ever-married women in the TDHS.
6- All regressions control for age and age square (birth year fixed e ect in columns (3), (6), and (9)), 12
NUTS-1 of the childhood region (where an individual spent most of his/her time until the age of
12), and year fixed e ects as well as an interaction of treatment dummy and middle school enrollment rate
in 1996. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights.
113
Table 3.9: The E ect of at Least Middle School Completion on Smoking Behavior (OLS
and 2SLS )
Dep.var: Ever Smoke Regular Dep.Var: Quit Smoking Dep.Var:Num.of Cigarette
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: Whole Sample
Middle School
Completion
0.003 0.19 0.59 0.05*** -0.05 0.70 -1.26** -15.99 20.91
(0.01) (0.18) (0.57) (0.01) (0.35) (0.71) (0.55) (10.60) (29.73)
1st Stage F-stat [39.95] [5.904] [9.816] [2.046] [13.70] [1.457]
# of Obs. 8,531 8,531 8,531 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,407 2,407 2,407
Panel B: Female
Middle School
Completion
0.03** 0.14 0.52 0.04 -0.29 0.27 -0.08 1.41 -2.95
(0.01) (0.14) (0.38) (0.03) (0.85) (0.47) (0.66) (14.82) (11.99)
1st Stage F-stat [33.51] [5.209] [1.680] [4.205] [1.297] [2.273]
# of Obs. 4,769 4,769 4,769 944 944 944 675 675 675
Panel C: Male
Middle School
Completion
-0.04 0.27 0.87 0.05*** 0.13 1.79 -1.84*** -21.17 56.32
(0.02) (0.54) (2.31) (0.01) (0.35) (4.56) (0.70) (14.86) (137.09)
1st Stage F-stat [7.089] [0.538] [4.631] [0.146] [6.653] [0.200]
# of Obs. 3,762 3,762 3,762 2,048 2,048 2,048 1,732 1,732 1,732
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2- F-statistics for the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity of the 1997 reform is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1991 birth cohorts vs Control group 1982-1985.
5- All regressions control for, marital status, age and age square (birth year fixed e ect in columns (3), (6), and (9)),
12 NUTS-1 of region, year fixed e ects as well as an interaction of treatment dummy and middle school enrollment
rate in 1996. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights.
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Table 3.10: The E ect of Years of Education on Smoking Behavior (OLS and 2SLS )
Dep.var: Ever Smoke Regular Dep.Var: Quit Smoking Dep.Var:Num.of Cigarette
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: Whole Sample
Years of Education -0.01*** 0.05 0.27 0.01*** -0.03 -19.56 -0.19*** -5.39 -28.68(0.00) (0.05) (0.49) (0.00) (0.23) (3,495.05) (0.06) (6.04) (291.40)
1st Stage F-stat [5.732] [0.401] [0.218] [0.001] [1.047] [0.01]
# of Obs. 8,531 8,531 8,531 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,407 2,407 2,407
Panel B: Female
Years of Education 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.01* -0.86 0.11 -0.07 2.11 -3.18(0.00) (0.04) (0.20) (0.00) (21.66) (0.29) (0.08) (33.54) (26.71)
1st Stage F-stat [4.372] [0.77] [0.002] [0.24] [0.06] [0.02]
# of Obs. 4,769 4,769 4,769 944 944 944 675 675 675
Panel C: Male
Years of Education -0.02*** 0.07 -0.21 0.01*** 0.07 -0.32 -0.25*** -5.82 -10.25(0.00) (0.16) (0.67) (0.00) (0.21) (1.29) (0.08) (7.17) (37.72)
1st Stage F-stat [1.040] [0.162] [0.226] [0.07] [1.013] [0.09]
# of Obs. 3,762 3,762 3,762 2,048 2,048 2,048 1,732 1,732 1,732
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2- F-statistics for the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity of the 1997 reform is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1991 birth cohorts vs Control group 1982-1985.
5- All regressions control for, marital status, age and age square (birth year fixed e ect in columns (3), (6), and (9)),
12 NUTS-1 of region, year fixed e ects as well as an interaction of treatment dummy and middle school enrollment rate
in 1996. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights.
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Table 3.11: The E ect of at least Middle School Completion on Self-Reported Health (OLS
and 2SLS )
Dep.var: Good Health Dep.Var: Health Problem
at the last 6 Months
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: Whole Sample
Middle School
Completion
0.10*** -0.13 0.09 -0.05*** -0.11 0.02
(0.01) (0.15) (0.22) (0.01) (0.13) (0.22)
1st Stage F-stat [52.14] [16.33] [53.19] [16.41]
# of Obs. 10,912 10,912 10,912 10,903 10,903 10,903
Panel B: Female
Middle School
Completion
0.09*** -0.06 0.21 -0.05*** -0.18 0.08
(0.01) (0.14) (0.24) (0.01) (0.14) (0.25)
1st Stage F-stat [42.22] [11.53] [42.29] [12.03]
# of Obs. 6,075 6,075 6,075 6,071 6,071 6,071
Panel C: Male
Middle School
Completion
0.10*** -0.25 -0.25 -0.06*** 0.06 -0.10
(0.02) (0.27) (0.55) (0.02) (0.32) (0.71)
1st Stage F-stat [10.50] [2.013] [12.24] [1.974]
# of Obs. 4,837 4,837 4,837 4,832 4,832 4,832
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
2- F-statistics for the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity of the 1997 reform is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1991 birth cohorts vs Control group 1982-1985.
5- All regressions control for, marital status, age and age square (birth year fixed e ect in columns (3) and
(6)), 12 NUTS-1 of region, year fixed e ects as well as an interaction of treatment dummy and middle school
enrollment rate in 1996. All regressions are weighted by the sample weights.
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Table 3.12: The E ect of Maternal Education on Infant Birth Weight (OLS and 2SLS )
BirthWeight(Log) 1st Child BirthWeight(Log) Low BirthWeight
VARIABLES OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2 OLS IV-1 IV-2
Panel A: Middle School Completion
Middle School
Completion
0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.10 -0.19 -0.02 0.02 -0.10
(0.01) (0.12) (0.16) (0.01) (0.14) (0.20) (0.02) (0.16) (0.22)
1st Stage F-stat [13.57] [8.570] [5.751] [5.273] [13.57] [8.570]
# of Obs. 2,360 2,360 2,360 1,115 1,115 1,115 2,360 2,360 2,360
Panel B: Years of Education
Years of
Education
0.004*** 0.01 -0.02 0.003* 0.05 -0.04 -0.01*** 0.01 -0.03
(0.00) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.08) (0.06) (0.00) (0.05) (0.07)
1st Stage F-stat [3.491] [1.625] [0.594] [1.411] [3.491] [1.625]
# of Obs. 2,360 2,360 2,360 1,115 1,115 1,115 2,360 2,360 2,360
Notes: 1- Standard errors clustered by region and birth cohort are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2- F-statistics for the excluded instruments in the first stage are in brackets.
3- IV-1: Treatment dummy is the instrument; IV-2: Intensity of the 1997 reform is the instrument.
4- Treatment group 1988-1991 birth cohorts vs Control group 1982-1985.
5- All regressions control for age and age square (birth year fixed e ect in columns (3), (6), and (9)), 12 NUTS-1 of
the childhood region (where an individual spent most of her time until the age of 12), and year fixed e ects
as well as an interaction of treatment dummy and middle school enrollment rate in 1996. All regressions are weighted
by the sample weights.
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Chapter 4
The Turkish Spatial Wage Curve
4.1 Introduction
The wage curve is an empirical phenomenon featuring the negative relationship between re-
gional unemployment rate and real wage level. This relationship has been first discovered by
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990; 1994) using microeconomic data for over a dozen countries
including the UK and the US. The strength of this relationship was found to be interest-
ingly similar around -0.10 across countries and time periods, therefore, it is considered as
an “empirical law of economics” (Card, 1995). This uniformity of the wage elasticity with
respect to regional unemployment attracted many other researchers in search of the wage
curve for other countries. Nijkamp and Poot (2005) confirm the existence of wage curve
by using meta-analysis on 208 wage curve estimates, but with a lower elasticity after bias
corrected around -0.07. Moreover, Blanchflower and Oswald (2005) summarize the wage
curve estimates from over 40 countries and re-estimate the wage curve of the US with the
contemporary data and conclude that long-term elasticity of wage with respect to regional
unemployment is -0.10.
In the wage curve estimates, regional permanent e ects are controlled for including re-
gion fixed e ects. However, ignoring interdependence of regions, may result in bias in the
wage curve estimates. Studies addressing spatial e ects and spillover e ects of dependent
and/or independent variables have emerged in the wage curve literature in the last decade
(e.g. Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot, 2006; Baltagi and Rokicki, 2014; Baltagi, Baskaya, and
Gul, 2015). Moreover, Card (1995) points out the possible bias arisen from the use of overall
118
unemployment rate instead of group-specific unemployment rates in the wage curve esti-
mations of various worker groups. However, a few studies provide the wage curve estimates
using group-specific unemployment rates for gender, age, or race groups (e.g. Boushey, 2002;
Konyali, 2012; Baltagi and Rokicki, 2014), a more relevant disaggregation in the labor force,
skill groups, has not been used.
The existing wage curve literature on Turkey find evidence on the existence of the Turkish
wage curve for various groups of workers. The overall unemployment elasticity of real wages
is found to be in line with international findings, around -0.10 (e.g. Ilkkaracan and Selim,
2003; Baltagi, Baskaya, and Hulagu 2012, 2013). Ilkkarcan and Selim (2003) provide the
first evidence for the Turkish wage curve, but fail to control for regional e ects because of the
data limitation. Baltagi et al. (2012) is the first economy-wide study, on the Turkish wage
curve which controls for regional di erences and endogeneity of unemployment rate, using
data for 26 NUTS-2 regions over the period 2005-2008. The wage curve for males shows
similarity across studies in Turkey. However, a significant wage curve for the female workers
have been found only in those studies that exclude agriculture sector (e.g. Baltagi et al.,
2012, 2013; and Baltagi et al., 2015). Interestingly, whenever female wage curve is significant,
it is more elastic than the male wage curve, except Baltagi et al. (2015). Moreover, Konyali
(2012) considers group-specific unemployment rates in her study and finds a weak evidence
on a wage curve for males with the male-unemployment rate. The above studies use data
on a boom period of the Turkish economy, such that only one part of the business cycle has
been considered in these analyses, except for Ilkkaracan, Levent, and Polat (2013) which use
only one year of the boom period. Furthermore, Baltagi et al. (2015) use a longer period of
data that can capture the whole business cycle, investigating the di erences in spatial wage
curves of the formal and informal workers. They use regional non-agricultural unemployment
rates instead of the overall unemployment rate. Therefore, these estimates may not show
the whole picture of the Turkish wage curve.
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This study explores the spatial e ects in the wage curve estimations in Turkey providing
a broader picture than the existing studies. Here, the Turkish wage curve is estimated for
a longer period, 2004-2013. The spatial spillover e ect is investigated following Baltagi and
Rokicki (2014) for 26 NUTS-2 regions with the overall regional unemployment rate and
group-specific unemployment rates. Baltagi et al. (2012, 2013) and Baltagi et al. (2015)
exclude the agriculture sector and use non-agricultural unemployment rate, while Ilkkaracan
et al. (2013) exclude the public workers from their analysis. Unlike previous studies on the
Turkish wage curve, we have not excluded those groups. Therefore we examine the economy-
wide existence and strength of the Turkish wage curve. We also estimated disaggregated wage
curves for several sub-samples.
This study corroborates the Turkish wage curve evidence with unemployment elasticity
of real wages of -0.071 when endogeneity problem is addressed. We find that unemployment
elasticity of real wages is slightly higher for Turkish men than women. This contrast with
the previous studies on Turkey, except for Baltagi et al. (2015), but in line with most of the
studies on the other countries. Moreover, the workers aged 15-24, least- skilled workers, less-
experienced workers, and informal workers have higher elasticities than the workers aged 25
years and above, skilled workers, more experienced workers, and formal workers, respectively.
There is a strong evidence on spatial e ects of unemployment rate of contiguous regions on
wage level, which is larger, in absolute value, than the e ect of own-regional unemployment
rate. The FE-2SLS results show that own region elasticity is -0.056 while spatial spillover
unemployment elasticity is -0.087. We show that these results hold for various groups of
workers defined in terms of gender, age, skill, experience, and formality status. Robustness
check for the spatial weight matrix shows that the use of full Euclidean distance matrix
averages out the e ect of positive correlation between neighboring regions.
Furthermore, using group-specific unemployment rates in the estimation of wage curves
for various groups, we find that unemployment elasticity of pay for the female workers
become smaller and lose its significance. However, the unemployment elasticity for the
120
male workers changes slightly. Moreover, the estimations of the wage curve for workers
aged 15-24, and workers aged 25 years and above show that the use of the group-specific
regional unemployment rates, rather than overall regional unemployment rate, increases the
magnitude of unemployment elasticity for workers aged 15-24, while decreases the magnitude
of unemployment elasticity for workers aged 25 years and above, in absolute value. More
interestingly, disaggregating based on skill level of workers, we show that the most responsive
group to the overall unemployment is the low-skilled workers with an elasticity of -0.099,
whereas the most responsive group to the group-specific unemployment rates is medium-
skilled workers, with elasticity of -0.094. In addition, we estimate a spatial model with group-
specific unemployment rates. We find that the spatial spillovers unemployment elasticities
of pay are higher, in absolute value, than unemployment elasticities for all groups except
for the female workers and high-skilled workers. Wages of medium-skilled workers are more
responsive to the group-specific unemployment rate of both own and contiguous regions,
than that of the low-skilled workers. Similarly, both the unemployment elasticity of pay
and spatial spillovers are higher for the workers aged 15-24 than workers aged 25 years and
above.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on the interna-
tional wage curve and Turkish wage curve. The model and data is presented in section 3.
The empirical results for Turkish wage curve are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5
concludes the paper.
4.2 Literature on The Wage Curve
4.2.1 International Wage Curve
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) has established the so-called wage curve featuring the nega-
tive relationship between wage level and local unemployment rate based on micro-level data
for the US and the UK controlling for the permanent features of the local markets by in-
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cluding regional fixed e ects. Their use of cross section data and focus on the relationship
between wage level and regional or industry unemployment challenged the Phillips curve
in which a relationship between wage inflation and the unemployment rate has been estab-
lished using macroeconomic data. Furthermore, Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) extended
the estimations of wage curve for 16 countries. Interestingly, the estimation results came out
around -0.10, which is considered an “empirical law of economics” (Card, 1995). In other
words, real wages would be depressed by 10 percent if the unemployment rate is doubled
in a region. Nijkamp and Poot (2005) corroborate the existence of a wage curve as an in-
ternational phenomenon by conducting a meta-analysis with a sample of 208 wage curve
estimations available in the literature by then. However, they discuss that the bias-corrected
unemployment elasticity of real wage is around -0.07. Moreover, Blanchflower and Oswald
(2005) summarize the wage curve studies across the world and re-evaluate the US wage curve
with modern data. They conclude that the long-run wage elasticity with respect to regional
unemployment rate is -0.10.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) tried to find some theoretical background for their em-
pirical findings and came up with three alternative explanations: contract model, union
bargaining model, and e ciency wage model. Among these, contract model has been shown
irrelevant by Card (1995). The union bargaining model, featuring the loss in the bargaining
power of unions in a slack labor market causes a decrease in individual wages, would not
be valid for those countries with low rate of unionization. The last and widely accepted
explanation is e ciency wage model, in which regional unemployment rate acts as a threat
to the workers not to shirk. In other words, in a tight labor market, employers pay more
than the equilibrium wages to avoid the monitoring cost. On the other hand, when the
unemployment rate is high in a region, workers find it risky to shirk and being dismissed
since it is harder to find a job in a slack market. Therefore, employers have an incentive
and opportunity to lower the wage at the times of high regional unemployment (Longhi et
al.,2006). In addition, Campbell and Orszag (1998) discuss the labor turnover cost model in
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which firms pay a premium to avoid expenses associated with the recruitment and training
of new workers in a tight labor market. This may not be needed in slack labor market,
as high regional unemployment rate makes it costly to quit the job for workers. Morrison,
Papps, and Poot (2006) further, extend this model incorporating by the possibility of mi-
gration between regions. Moreover, Sato (2000) provides a search model as an explanation
for the wage curve in which labor force is mobile between regions, cities are assumed to be
in a mono-centered structure, and regions di er in their productivity levels, such that high
productive regions have higher wages and lower unemployment.
A number of issues related to the estimation and explanations of the wage curve have
been pointed out by Card (1995) in his review paper. Most of the wage curve estimations
use individual wages regressed on the regional unemployment rate and individual character-
istics. Therefore, the relevant degrees of freedom for the estimation of the unemployment
elasticity of real wage is the number of regions times the number of years used in the sample,
not the number of individuals in the sample. Card (1995) warns that it might not be a
serious problem for those countries that have 200-500 region-year observation, but it may
lead serious downward bias in standard errors and misleading inference for those countries
with a low number of regions and time periods. Moreover, the error term in the model spec-
ification will be correlated for people from the same local labor market. It was attempted to
be taken care of by averaging dependent variable as well as individual characteristics over
individuals in each region-year cell in Blanchflower and Oswald (1990). Furthermore, the
regression- adjusted averages that control for individual observable characteristics can be
used as an alternative way as suggested by Card (1995). Nijkamp and Poot (2005) report
that 27.4% of the wage curve estimations, until then, uses averages of individual wages and
other characteristics.
The responsiveness of the wages to the regional unemployment rate shows di erences
across groups defined according to the worker characteristics or sector of the work. As
Longhi et al. (2006) point out; if the wage curve results from e ciency wage or labor
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turnover models, then it is expected that those workers who have less bargaining power such
as young, less experienced, less educated, informal, temporary workers would have a higher
unemployment elasticity of real wages. These expected results are found in most of the wage
curve studies (e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994; Card 1995; Baltagi and Blien, 1998;
Baltagi, Baskaya and Hulagu, 2012). However, male wage curve has been found to be more
elastic for the US, the UK, and Australia than female wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald,
1994; Card, 1995), the opposite of this relationship has been shown for Germany ( Baltagi
and Blien,1998; Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf, 2000) for Turkey (Baltagi, Baskaya, and Hulagu,
2012,2013). Although the above-mentioned studies disaggregate the samples, they fail to
disaggregate the regional unemployment rate accordingly. It should be noted that workers
are more likely compete each other within the groups they are in. As mentioned before, the
regional unemployment rate may be considered as a threat to the workers not to shirk or
quit. Therefore, it may be the case that various groups of workers respond di erently to the
overall regional unemployment variations than their group-specific regional unemployment
variations (Card, 1995).
These problems have been addressed in the literature using disaggregated unemployment
rates for various groups defined by gender, age, experience. Boushey (2002) estimated wage
curves for women versus men and black versus white using the group-specific unemployment
rates. She further investigates if the di erences in elasticities for di erent groups are due
to the di erent relationship between group-specific unemployment rate and overall regional
unemployment rate. She finds that group-specific wage curves do not mask the relationship
between group-specific unemployment rate and overall regional unemployment rate. She
shows that wage curve di ers across groups such that wage curve is more elastic for black
workers than for white workers. Moreover, she shows that wage curve di ers across business
cycle and space. Konyali (2012) uses group-specific unemployment rates for male versus
female and young versus old workers in Turkey. She finds a weak evidence only for the male
wage curve when male-regional unemployment is used. Furthermore, Baltagi and Rokicki
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(2014) explore the variation in the slope of wage curve based on gender groups for Poland.
They show that Polish wage curve is sensitive to the group-specific unemployment rate and
men have a statistically significant wage curve, unlike women. A more relevant disaggregation
in the unemployment rate would be according to the skill level of workers, as it is more likely
that workers compete for jobs among the workers with similar skills, but it has not been as
yet explored.
Another problem about the wage curve estimates is endogeneity problem due to the
simultaneity of the regional unemployment rate. Although Blanchflower and Oswald (1990)
were aware of the endogeneity bias as they pointed out that failing to address this problem
may lead upward bias in unemployment elasticity of wage and make it hard to get a negative
elasticity, they failed to find a good instrument for the local unemployment rate. Baltagi
and Blien (1998) use lagged values of explanatory variables as additional instruments and
estimate the model with fixed e ects 2SLS (FE-2SLS). Using German data for 1981-1990
they show that unemployment elasticity is sensitive to the endogeneity. They were not able
to find a negative relationship with conventional fixed e ects estimates, but once they use
lagged values of explanatory variables as additional instruments, their findings are in line
with the wage curve estimates from other countries. Baltagi, Blien and Wolf (2000) find
evidence for wage curve for East Germany for the period 1993-1998 when unemployment is
treated as endogenous and using first di erence 2SLS. Furthermore, Baltagi, Baskaya and
Hulagu (2012, 2013) and Baltagi et al. (2015) treated unemployment as endogenous and use
FE-2SLS in their wage curve studies for Turkey and they find an evidence for Turkish wage
curve that is around -0.10.
4.2.2 Spatial Wage Curve
The above literature assumes independence of regions in the wage curve estimations, such
that wage in one region is only determined by the employment conditions within that re-
gion. However, the regions may be interrelated due to the labor mobility or contiguous
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e ects of employment conditions between regions. Moreover, regions used in wage curve
studies are generally defined as administrative regions which do not necessarily represent
the true functional labor markets. Therefore, a spatial correlation among the primary units
of the wage curve is expected. Hence, neglecting the spatial correlation might be resulted in
misspecification of wage equation and introduce a bias in estimation. There is a small strand
of literature considers these issues by testing the spatial dependence and/or accounting for
spatial e ects (e.g. Buettner, 1999; Longhi et al. 2006; Baltagi and Rokicki, 2014) .
The e ciency wage and labor turnover costs explanations of the wage curve assume that
if unemployment is high in a local labor market, employers have an incentive and opportunity
to lower the wages (Longhi et al.,2006). However, if the unemployment rate is low in the
adjacent labor markets, and cost of mobility between regions is low, the employers may not
be able to lower the wages (Fingleton and Palombi, 2013). On the other hand, Longhi et al.
(2006) and Morrison et al. (2006) provide another explanation, monopsonistic competition,
for wage curve due to Bhaskar and To (1999). In this model, there is a free entry into the
market but firms are constrained by a lump-sum start-up cost and heterogeneous workers
face commuting and migration costs which vary depending upon the location of the job,
such that individual firm has a monopsony power over wage setting. Longhi et al. (2006)
point out that if the wage curve results from worker heterogeneity and monopsony power
of individual employer, the elasticity of labor supply, and in turn, wage curve will depend
on the employment conditions of adjacent labor markets and the cost of mobility between
labor markets. Therefore, ignoring the interaction between adjacent economies and spatial
spillover e ects may lead misspecification of the wage equation and overestimation of the
own-region unemployment elasticity of real wages.
There are mainly three di erent ways of controlling for the spatial e ects depending on
the source of correlation. The spatial correlation can be due to the common permanent
characteristics of regions which are usually taken into account including region fixed e ects
in conventional wage curve studies. On the other hand, if some regions exposed to some
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common shocks, the spatial correlation occurs in the error terms which is known as spatial
autocorrelation residuals (SAR). Buettner (1999) [20] tests for the spatial autocorrelation
in German data but could not find evidence in favor of this hypothesis. There might be a
spatial correlation between wages, such that the wage level in proximate regions may have a
direct e ect on the level of wage in one region. This can be controlled for by including spa-
tially lagged dependent variable in explanatory variables. Buettner (1999) finds a significant
e ect of spatially lagged wages in the German context. Fingleton and Palombi (2013) point
out a commonly recognized phenomenon in labor economics such that a region with high
unemployment rate is usually found to be surrounded by regions with a high unemployment
rate or vice versa. This may imply the spatial spillovers of the regional unemployment rate.
Therefore, the unemployment rate of adjacent regions may have a direct e ect on the wage
level, so the omission of this may bias the estimates of unemployment elasticity of pay. The
inclusion of a spatially weighted unemployment rate is the easiest and most common way to
take account of the spatial e ects in the wage curve estimations (e.g. Buettner, 1999; Longhi
et al. 2006; Baltagi and Rokicki, 2014).
Most of the empirical spatial wage curve studies focus on the German data. However,
there are some evidence in favor of the spatial spillovers in a couple of other countries.
Buettner (1999) tests for spatial correlation in error terms, wages and unemployment rate
using German data for 327 regions over the period 1987-1994. He could not find evidence for
SAR but showed that the contiguity in wages and unemployment rate matters in the wage
curve estimation such that, failing to take into account the spatial correlation leads a bias in
the estimation of unemployment elasticity of pay. Furthermore, Longhi et al. (2006) confirm
the wage curve and spatial e ects in using data for 327 regions of West Germany for the
period 1990-1997. They assume that the wage curve resulted from the worker heterogeneity
and monopsonistic competition in local labor markets. They employ region-year averages
of data and include spatially lagged log unemployment rate, unlike the use of inverse of
the unemployment rate of adjacent regions as in Buettner (1999), as well as controlling for
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accessibility of the region and agglomeration e ect. The wage curve for Western Germany has
been confirmed along with the evidence on the spatial spillovers of regional unemployment
rates. Furthermore, they conclude that wages in highly agglomerated regions are higher
and the unemployment elasticity of pay is higher in more isolated regions. Moreover, these
findings have been echoed by Morrison et al. (2006) using New Zealand data and measuring
the regional accessibility by travel time between regions. They conclude that the interaction
between regions has a significant e ect on the strength of wage curve and various groups
have di erent unemployment elasticity.
Elhorst, Blien, and Wolf (2007) investigate the potential endogeneity of regional unem-
ployment rates in combination with time-specific e ects. They compare di erent panel date
methods for the 114 regions of East Germany over the period 1993-1999. They found that
the most appropriate method is spatial first di erence 2SLS and corroborates the wage curve
for East Germany is -0.039 and conclude that the regional unemployment rate is not strictly
exogenous in space. Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf (2012) explore the spatial aspects of the wage
curve in a dynamic model, using 326 West Germany districts over the period 1980-2004. The
paper follows two-step estimation technique proposed by Bell, Nickell, and Quintini (2002) in
which composition e ects controlled for in the first step. Subsequently, the compositionally
corrected regional wages is used as dependent variable and its one-year lagged values used
as independent variable along with regional unemployment rate, spatially lagged unemploy-
ment rate, and region and time fixed e ects in the second step. They account for spillover
e ects between regions, the e ect of agglomeration, and the e ects of regional monopsony in
wage curve estimations. Their findings confirm the existence of wage curve in West Germany
even though it is relatively small. However, the strength of the wage curve is stronger for
those who have lower bargaining power in labor market, such as female, younger, foreigners.
The lagged wages are found significant while spatial spillovers of the local unemployment
rates are insignificant. The absence of the spatial spillover e ects is explained by the lack of
foresight of the local agents in Germany.
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Fingleton and Palombi (2013) provide some evidence for the spatial e ects in the UK
wage curve using 408 British local administrative units for the period 1998-2010. They test
wage curve against two competing theories; Urban Economics and New Economic Geography.
However, they could not find evidence in favor of one theory over the other. They were able
to conclude that wage curve holds in the neighborhood of -0.10. More importantly, their
findings show that local wages are a ected most by the unemployment rate of regions within
commuting distance. Deller (2011) examines the spatial heterogeneity in the US wage curve
exploiting the county level data for the year 2006. The OLS estimations confirm the existence
of unemployment elasticity of pay which is around -0.05, while using geographically weighted
regression (GWR) enable him to conclude that there is spatial heterogeneity in wage curve
estimations in the US.
Ramos, Nicodemo, and Sanroma (2015) estimate a dynamic spatial wage curve for Spain
using individual data for 50 NUTS-3 regions over the period 2000-2010 following the esti-
mation methods used in Baltagi, Blien, and Wolf (2012). They show that spatial lags of
unemployment and wages matter and should be controlled for in wage curve estimations.
Their findings confirm the dynamic wage curve with relatively small but significant short-run
elasticity of -0.02 which becomes -0.10 in the long-run. Falk and Leoni (2011) provide some
evidence on spatial wage curve for Austria based on 99 administrative districts for the year
2001. They show that ignoring spatially lagged wages in wage curve estimations leads to
bias in unemployment elasticity of pay. The direct e ect of unemployment is found as -0.03
while the total e ect is about -0.05. Also, the unemployment elasticity of pay is found to be
-0.04 when the spatial correlation is ignored.
Baltagi and Rokicki (2014) reexamine the Polish wage curve considering the spatial
spillovers between 16 NUTS-2 level Polish regions using individual data for the period 1999-
2010. The spatial spillovers are taken into account by including spatially weighted regional
unemployment rates along with another independent variable. Furthermore, the study em-
ploys group-specific regional unemployment rates, to test the responsiveness of the wages of
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various groups to the own-group unemployment rate. Also, endogeneity of unemployment
rates is accounted for with instrumenting the regional unemployment rates by their one-year
lagged values in an FE-2SLS model. They confirm the existence of Polish wage curve with an
unemployment elasticity around -0.06 and it is more elastic for men. The inclusion of spatial
spillover e ects leads to a decrease, in the estimation of own-region elasticity from -0.06 to
-0.05, while the e ect of the unemployment rate of adjacent regions is found around -0.11.
Moreover, using gender-specific unemployment rates result in a decrease of both own-region
elasticity and spatial spillover for men, and lose of significance in estimates for women.
Finally, Baltagi, Baskaya and Gul (2015) revisited the di erences between wage curves
of formal and informal worker considering the spatial-spillover e ect of the regional unem-
ployment rates using 26 NUTS-2 level Turkish regions over the period 2005-2013. They use
non-agricultural unemployment rates as a measure of regional unemployment rates. They
construct spatial weight matrices using inverse distance and expansion in the four-lane high-
ways in Turkey as a proxy to the quality of roads between regions. Their results show that
wages of workers are responsive to both local and neighboring regions’ unemployment rates
with elasticities -0.11 and -0.09 for all workers, respectively. They show the wages of infor-
mal workers changes in response to the local and neighboring regions’ unemployment rates
more than the wages of formal workers do. They find that local wage elasticity of informal
workers is around -0.17, while the e ect of the unemployment rate of adjacent regions for
informal workers is around -0.085. Furthermore, they show that the di erence between the
spatial-spillover e ect of unemployment rates of formal and informal workers is higher for
younger, less experienced and less educated workers.
4.2.3 The Turkish Wage Curve
Ilkkaracan and Selim (2003) is the first study on wage curve in Turkey. They find a wage
curve for men but not for women using Labor Force Participation and Wage Structure Survey
for 1994. This study based on a cross-section data over 7 regions, so that the regional
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di erences are not controlled for. Moreover, the actual degrees of freedom for the parameter
of interest, the logarithm of the unemployment rate, becomes even negative with other
control variables, which may lead unreliable results, as indicated by Card (1995).
Baltagi et al. (2012) show that there is a wage curve for Turkey with unemployment
elasticity of pay -0.099 using micro-level data for the period 2005-2008 over 26 NUTS-2 level
regions, controlling for the endogeneity of the regional unemployment with FE-2SLS. They
also interestingly show that women have a more elastic wage curve than men do. Their
further disaggregation indicates that wages of more vulnerable groups such as, young, less-
educated and less-experienced are more responsive to the regional unemployment variations.
Furthermore, Baltagi et al. (2013) investigate the di erences in the wage curves between
formal and informal workers using THLFS for years 2005-2009. They confirm the wage
curve of Turkey as -0.10 and women are more sensitive to the unemployment rate once
endogeneity problem is addressed by using the FE-2SLS method and instrumenting regional
unemployment rate by the lagged unemployment rate. They show that informal workers are
more responsive to the regional variations of the unemployment rate. This finding also holds
for disaggregated groups based on age and gender.
Konyali (2012) finds weak evidence on the existence of wage curve in Turkey for the
period 2007-2009 using Living Condition Survey. She finds evidence for the wage curve for
men when the group-specific unemployment rate is used. However, she finds no evidence for
a wage curve for women in Turkey, regardless of the use of aggregate unemployment rate
or group-specific unemployment rate. The drawback of the study is the use of 12 NUTS-1
regions over three-year observation. As it has been pointed out in Card (1995) the actual
degrees of freedom for the unemployment variable is number of regions times number of years,
in this case only 36, which may cause a significant problem as the estimates only significant at
the 10% level. On the other hand, Ilkkaracan et al. (2013) compare the wage curve estimates
based on various definitions of unemployment using THLFS for the period 2005-2010. They
find an unemployment elasticity of pay of -0.05 for private workers. They show that wages
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of male workers are more sensitive to the regional unemployment than that of women, using
unemployment rates of 26 NUTS-2 level regions, disaggregated with three level of education.
None of the above wage curve studies for the Turkish case addresses the spatial e ects with
overall regional unemployment rates and regional group-specific unemployment rates.
4.3 Data and Model
4.3.1 Data
In this study, we exploit the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey (THLFS) data collected
and released by Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). The THLFS is a micro level
annual survey on the whole nation in which around 500.000 individuals are surveyed on
their demographic and work-related characteristics. This rich data set has been conducted
since 1988 and has had two major changes in 2000 and 2004. Therefore we used the data for
the period 2004-2013.
Demographic characteristics of all individuals surveyed are available in the THLFS; the
employment status and related information are observed for those who are 15 years old or
above. Furthermore, income information is available only for regular and casual workers.
Thus, we exclude individuals younger than 15 years old and employers, self-employed, and
unpaid family workers. Also, individuals who started to work in the month of the survey
or did not provide their wage information are excluded. Moreover, those individuals with
missing information on employment, wage, and demographic characteristics are dropped
from the sample. After exclusion of those observations, we are left with 821,166 observations
of which 192,721 are female. Wages are reported as monthly income after deduction of taxes,
compulsory social security and other life insurance premiums.
In our estimations, we used natural logarithm of hourly real wages, calculated by us-
ing monthly wages and usual working hours. All wages are expressed in 2003 liras using
the consumer price index (CPI) which is available in NUTS-2 level regions in TURKSTAT.
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Unemployment rates data is obtained also from TURKSTAT. Regional aggregate unem-
ployment rates, as well as disaggregated unemployment rates by gender, age group, and
education level, are available publicly in TURKSTAT’s webpage. Moreover, shape files for
the NUTS-2 regions that are used to create spatial weights are extracted from the shape files
available in EUROSTAT for all European countries in all NUTS levels. Summary statistics
of our sample for the variables used in our estimations are presented in Table 4.1.
As we are interested in investigating the spatial spillover e ects of the unemployment
rate on individual wages over 26 NUTS-2 regions of Turkey and the e ect of disaggregated
unemployment rate for various groups, Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the spatial distribution
of unemployment rates for the year 2008. Although we use the overall unemployment rate in
our estimation, we also provide estimations using the non-agricultural unemployment rate
in order to compare our results with earlier wage curve estimates for Turkey (e.g. Baltagi
et.al. 2012, 2013). Figure 4.1 shows, the spatial variation of the unemployment rate across
26 NUTS-2 level regions of Turkey.
The spatial spillovers seem to be more pronounced in the male unemployment rate than
female unemployment rate, while the female workers experience a wider range of unemploy-
ment rate than male workers. Also, the unemployment rate for younger workers, who are
between 15 and 24 years old, is higher and span in a wider range, while the spatial spillover
of the unemployment rate is more apparent for older, who are 25 years old or above. Further-
more, as Card (1995) points out, the responsiveness of wages to the group-specific unemploy-
ment rate may be more relevant to the skill levels. TURKSTAT provide unemployment rates
for four di erent education levels, which enable us to map the group-specific unemployment
rates in Turkey. Figure 4.2 shows the spatial variation of group-specific unemployment rates
for levels of schooling in the year 2008. It seems that the patterns of the spatial spillovers
of the unemployment rate vary across skill levels
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4.3.2 The Model
We start our analysis with the conventional wage curve equation in which logarithm of
individual real wages are regressed on the logarithm of the regional unemployment rate
and other individual characteristics as well as regional and time fixed e ects. Following
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) and Card (1995) the model we use in our analysis can be
written as;
lnwijt = —lnUjt+X Õijt +µj+⁄t+uijt (4.1)
where lnwijt is the natural logarithm of individual real hourly wages and lnUjt is the re-
gional unemployment rate. Individual characteristics are included in the vectorXijt. Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1990, 1994) use equation (4.1) to estimate unemployment elasticity of
pay, —, using the OLS assuming the unemployment rate is predetermined. They find that
the elasticity is robust across countries and time periods as well as various group disaggre-
gation. However, later studies point out that the unemployment elasticity of pay di ers for
di erent groups of workers using aggregate unemployment rates (e.g. Card, 1995, Baltagi et
al., 2012). The unemployment elasticity of pay may show di erences depending on whether
the unemployment rate is measured as overall regional unemployment or the regional group-
specific unemployment. It is more likely that a worker competes with other workers within
groups, such that unemployment rate of skilled workers may not be a threat for unskilled
workers (Card, 1995). Therefore, we compare the wage curve for di erent type of workers
using overall unemployment rates and the group-specific unemployment rates.
The data used in the wage curve literature is either individual data or regional averages.
It is also realized that the relevant degrees of freedom is not the number of individuals used
in the analyses, but the number of regions times the number of periods. Thus, the use of
individual data may cause serious bias in the standard errors and misleading inference if the
number of regions and time periods are small (see Card, 1995). However, it may not be a
serious problem for countries with 200-500 region-year cell observations. We follow Baltagi et
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al. (2012), and use individual level data, as the THLFS is available in 26 NUTS-2 level regions
over ten years period. Another problem with the estimation of responsiveness of individual
wages to the regional unemployment rate is the simultaneity bias due to the endogenous
regional unemployment rate. Although this problem has been realized by Blanchflower and
Oswald (1990), they fail to find a good instrument. Baltagi and Blien (1998) show that the
wage curve estimates are sensitive to the endogeneity. They use lagged unemployment rate
as an instrument for the unemployment rate in a fixed e ect 2SLS (FE-2SLS) setting. This
procedure has been followed by many other wage curve studies including Turkish case (e.g.
Baltagi et al. 2012, 2013; Baltagi and Rokicki, 2014). We also address the endogeneity of
local unemployment rate instrumenting with its one-year lagged values.
If the wage curve results in the workers’ heterogeneity and monopsonistic competition,
the responsiveness of the wage curve depends on the spatial spillover of local employment
conditions (Longhi et al., 2006). Also, the e ciency wage and labor turnover cost models
suggest that the regional unemployment rate is being used as a threat to workers in order to
convince them not to shirk or quit (Fingleton and Palombi, 2013). The power of this threat
is likely to be influenced by the unemployment rate in proximate regions. Thus, ignoring the
e ect of the unemployment rate of surrounding regions may introduce a bias. The spatial
spillovers of the unemployment rate can be taken account by including spatially weighted
unemployment rate. Following Longhi et al. (2006), and Baltagi and Rokicki (2014), we use
the following equation to estimate spatial spillovers of unemployment rate in Turkey;
lnwijt = —lnUjt+“( kWjklnUjt)+X Õijt +µj+⁄t+uijt (4.2)
where all variables are the same as described above for equation (4.1), except, here we
include spatially weighted local unemployment rates. The weight matrix, W , describes the
connections among regions which is based on the contiguity of regions. That is, each row
of W assigns the neighbor regions with 1 and 0 otherwise. Then each row is normalized.
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In other words, the average of the unemployment rate of contiguous regions is included as
another explanatory variable in our wage equation. We defined two other spatial weight
matrices to check the robustness of our specification. First, we checked our results against
the spatial weight matrix of which each element is the inverse Eucledian distance between
the corresponding regions. This matrix is also row normalized. Longhi et al. (2006) discuss
that the use of full distance matrix may not be ideal because the regions further away
may average out the positive dependence between the neighboring regions. Therefore, we
check our results with a hybrid weight matrix suggested by Longhi et al. (2006) in which
distance between non-contiguous regions are assumed to be infinite. In other words, the
inverse Eucledian distance between contiguous regions are kept in the matrix while entries
for the non-contiguous regions are assumed to be zero, then the matrix is row normalized.
Furthermore, we address the endogeneity of own-region unemployment and regional spatial
spillovers by instrumenting them with their one year lagged values in a FE-2SLS setting
following Baltagi and Rokicki (2014).
4.4 Results
4.4.1 The Turkish Wage Curve Revisited
We present the standard wage curve results in Table 4.2 in which only the estimates of
unemployment elasticity of pay, —, has been shown for the sake of saving space. The de-
pendent variable is the real individual wages and the variable of interest is the regional
unemployment rate which is available for 26 NUTS-2 level regions of Turkey. As it has been
mentioned in the previous sections, the existing wage curve estimates for Turkey based on
some subsamples of the Turkish labor force, and time periods are relatively short. On the
other hand, our data covers a 10-year period so that we can have a clear picture of the
Turkish wage curve. Table 4.2 shows estimation for all workers as well as some subgroups
using o cial unemployment rates for the whole population, except for column 2 in which we
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use non-agricultural unemployment rate. Using regional and time fixed e ects, the results
show that overall unemployment elasticity is -0.048 for all workers. In the second column,
we exclude workers in the agriculture sector and use non-agricultural unemployment rate in
the wage curve estimation. It results that using non-agricultural unemployment rate leads
a higher elasticity, -0.067. This estimation also enabled us to compare our results with the
earlier wage curve estimates for Turkey, Baltagi et al. (2012, 2013). It is found that using
a longer period results in a higher elasticity. The o cial unemployment rate for the whole
population is used for the estimates of disaggregated samples. Disaggregation by gender
shows that the wage curve of male workers, -0.054, is more elastic than that of female work-
ers, -0.031. This result is in line with that found in other countries, in general. However,
the previous studies on the Turkish wage curve either find a higher unemployment elastic-
ity for women (e.g. Baltagi et al., 2012, 2013) or no statistically significant unemployment
elasticity (e.g. Ilkkaracan and Selim, 2003; Konyali, 2012).The first two studies use regional
non-agricultural unemployment rates while the last two use regional unemployment rates.
We tested our results for di erent time periods, i.e. period 2005-2008 and 2005-2009 to be
able to investigate the discrepancy between our results and the previous studies. Unem-
ployment elasticity of pay for the comparison periods with unemployment rates as well as
with non-agricultural unemployment rates are presented in the Appendix, Table 4.A1. It
results in Panel A of Table 4.A1 that there is no evidence for a wage curve in the peri-
ods 2005-2008 and 2005-2009, except for one case, the male workers in 2005-2009 sample,
when the overall unemployment rate is used which is similar to Ilkkaracan et al. (2013) and
Konyali (2012). Furthermore, Panel B of Table 4.A1 shows the same comparison but with
the non-agricultural unemployment rate. We were able to replicate the results from Baltagi
et al. (2012, 2013), such that the wage curve for women is more elastic than for men in the
periods, 2005-2008 and 2005-2009. However, a reverse relationship pops-out for the period
2004-2013, that is, women have an elasticity of -0.044 and men of -0.074. This comparison
may indicate that women labor force participation is getting stronger in the Turkish labor
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market and Turkish women get more stick to their job.
Estimates for the formal and informal workers are in line with Baltagi et al. (2012)
which show that informal workers’ wages are more a ected from variations in the regional
unemployment rate. Also, we disaggregate our sample as workers in the public and private
sector. The results confirm the expectations that workers in public sector would not be
a ected from the variation of the regional unemployment rate due to the nationwide bar-
gaining process. However, the wage curve phenomenon is more about the private sector. It
is also found that less educated/low-skilled workers have more elastic wage curve than more
educated/high-skilled do. Appendix Table 4.A2 shows unemployment elasticities for various
disaggregated samples. It is found that younger, temporary, and less experienced workers
have more elastic wage curves than, older, permanent, and more experienced workers do,
respectively. Furthermore, the unemployment elasticity of pay is higher for those who work
in small firms than those work in medium-sized or large firms.
Table 4.2, shows the FE-2SLS estimation results, in which contemporary regional unem-
ployment rates are instrumented by one-year lagged regional unemployment rate to address
the endogeneity problem. We find that unemployment elasticity of real wages for all work-
ers is -0.071 when the regional unemployment rate is used, and endogeneity of the regional
unemployment rate is taken account. The FE-2SLS results for the non-agriculture sectors
with non-agricultural regional unemployment rate show that the unemployment elasticity is
-0.107, which is very similar to Baltagi et al. (2012, 2013). This indicates that the wage
curve for the non-agricultural sector is robust to the di erent time periods. FE-2SLS results
also show that men are more responsive to the regional unemployment rate than women are;
-0.73, -0.063, respectively. Formality status has an e ect on the responsiveness of the wages
to the regional unemployment rate variations, such that wage curve of informal workers is
more elastic than formal workers; -0.09 and -0.046, respectively. Although the fixed e ect
results for the formal and informal workers are quite similar to the fixed e ect estimates of
Baltagi et al. (2013), our FE-2SLS estimates are smaller in absolute value, especially for the
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informal workers. Results show that there is no wage curve for the workers in the public sec-
tor, whereas workers in the private sector have an unemployment elasticity of pay of -0.098.
Controlling for the endogeneity of the regional unemployment rate, we find that workers with
less than high school education have the most elastic wage curve among education groups
and the elasticity is decreasing with education level. Appendix Table 4.A2 shows that, al-
though the magnitudes of the elasticity change when we take account for the endogeneity,
the general pattern remains same such that more fragile groups; less experienced, temporary,
younger and workers in small firms, have a higher unemployment elasticity of pay than that
of the corresponding groups.
We present the unemployment elasticities of real wages for the various groups of male and
female workers separately in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, and appendix tables Table 4.A3 and
Table 4.A4. Table 4.3 shows the unemployment elasticities of pay for the male worker groups.
We find statistically significant wage curves for all groups of male workers with fixed e ects
estimation, while the FE-2SLS leads to insignificant elasticities for the male workers in the
public sector. The FE-2SLS results show that formal and informal men have almost same
elasticities, -0.053, -0.054, respectively. These findings contrast with Baltagi et al. (2013).
The highest elasticity among the education/skill level groups of men is found to be -0.094
for those who have less than high school education. Moreover, the high school graduates
and college graduates have about the same elasticity. Furthermore, Appendix Table 4.A3
shows that younger, less experienced, temporary male workers and those who work in the
small firms have higher elasticities than their counterparts.
Table 4.4 shows that there are no significant elasticities for female workers who are formal
workers and college graduate with fixed e ects estimation. FE-2SLS estimation shows that
informal female workers have the highest unemployment elasticity of real wages, -0.22, among
all groups. Women working in the public sector have a significant positive unemployment
elasticity, 0.09, while women working in the private sector have an elasticity of -0.131. We
were able to find statistically significant wage curve for only those women who have less
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than high school education and high school graduates among education/skill groups, such
that the first group has a higher elasticity of -0.17 while the second group has an elasticity
of -0.085. Appendix Table 4.A4 shows that women who are middle-aged (25-44), have
high tenure in the firm, and work in the large firms have no significant wage curve in the
fixed e ects estimation. However, the unemployment elasticity for the middle-aged (25-44)
women becomes statistically significant in the FE-2SLS estimation while estimates for women
working in medium-sized firms lose its significance. According to the age groups of the women
workers, the middle-aged (25-44) women is the least responsive group with an elasticity of
-0.049 with respect to the regional unemployment rates, whereas young women (aged 15-
24) is the most responsive age group with an elasticity of -0.085. Moreover, women in the
temporary jobs have a higher elasticity, -0.136, than their counterparts in the permanent
jobs, -0.048. Women with low tenure have an unemployment elasticity of pay of -0.089 and
only women in the small firms have a wage curve with an elasticity of -0.172.
4.4.2 The Turkish Spatial Wage Curve
The wage curve estimations including spatially weighted unemployment rate are presented
in Table 4.5-Table 4.9. We report only the unemployment elasticity of pay, —, and the spatial
spillover the unemployment elasticity of real wages, “, in equation (4.2).
Table 4.5 shows the estimation results of equation (4.2) with the spatial weight matrix
defined as row-normalized contiguity of regions matrix. Results show that while the fixed
e ect estimates of the unemployment elasticities become slightly small in absolute value, and
the spatially weighted unemployment rate has a significant direct e ect on the individual
wages. We find that the unemployment elasticity of wage is -0.046 for all workers, while
spillover unemployment elasticity of proximate regions is -0.027. On the other hand, we
take account for the endogeneity of the regional unemployment rate and spatially weighted
unemployment rate by employing the FE-2SLS instrumenting one-year lagged values of un-
employment variables. The FE-2SLS results show that the unemployment elasticity of pay
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of own region is -0.056, and the spatial spillover unemployment elasticity of contiguous re-
gions is -0.087. These results indicate that the unemployment rate of contiguous regions
has a significant direct e ect on individual wages, even higher than the own-region unem-
ployment rate e ect. Comparison of the unemployment elasticity of real wages in Table 4.2
and Table 4.5, suggests that ignoring spatially weighted unemployment rate introduces a
downward bias, such that inclusion of the spatially weighted unemployment rate lowers the
unemployment elasticity in absolute term. There is a statistically significant spatial spillover
e ect in the fixed e ect estimates for all groups except for the formal workers, who work
in the private sector, and who have more than high school education. However, with the
FE-2SLS model, we find statistically significant spatial spillovers for all groups. Elastici-
ties for the further disaggregated worker groups are presented in Appendix Table 4.A5. We
find statistically significant unemployment elasticities for all groups and spatial spillovers for
all groups except for workers who work in the large firms ignoring the endogeneity of the
regional unemployment rate.
The results above hold for the non-agriculture sample with greater magnitudes; the FE-
2SLS results show that the non-agricultural unemployment elasticity is -0.084 while the spa-
tial spillover of non-agricultural unemployment rate of contiguous regions is -0.162. Thus,
for the non-agricultural sector, individual wages are almost twice as responsive to the sur-
rounding regions’ unemployment rate as own region unemployment rate. The unemployment
elasticity of pay for own-region unemployment rate for men and women are very close, -0.051
and -0.058, respectively. On the other hand, wages of women are more responsive to the
spatial spillovers of unemployment rate than that of men, -0.118, -0.081, respectively. These
results are similar to Baltagi and Rokicki (2014) for the Polish case.
Own-region unemployment elasticity of pay and spatial spillover unemployment elasticity
of pay for informal workers is higher than that for formal workers. Moreover, informal
workers are more responsive to the unemployment rate of neighboring regions than that of
own-region, -0.099, -0.065, respectively. We could not find evidence for the public sector wage
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curve. However, the spatial spillover of unemployment rate is found to be significant. On the
other hand, for the fixed e ects estimation, we could not find a significant spatial spillover
e ect for private sector workers. Controlling for the endogeneity in the FE-2SLS, we find
workers in the public sector are a ected positively by own-region unemployment rate with
elasticity of 0.040 while the responsiveness to the surrounding regions’ unemployment rate
is -0.086. Furthermore, unemployment elasticity of pay for workers in the private sector is -
0.087, and the spatial spillover is -0.079. Public vs private sector disaggregation reveals some
interesting results. First, workers in the public sector are responsive to the unemployment
rate in the neighboring regions, which may indicate that the wages in the public sector are
a ected by aggregate unemployment rate rather than the regional unemployment rate. This
result is in line with the Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), but contrast with Baltagi and
Rokicki (2014). Second, we find that the wages in the private sector are more sensitive
to the unemployment rate of own-region than that of surrounding regions. Whenever we
find significant spatial spillovers for various groups, unemployment elasticity of pay for own-
region was smaller, in absolute value, than the spatial spillovers, except for private sector.
This may indicate that the unemployment rates in the proximate regions have a direct e ect
on individual wages in the private sector. However it is less than the unemployment rate
e ect of own-region. The FE-2SLS estimates for the skill groups show that the highest
unemployment elasticity of real wages and the spatial spillover e ects, in absolute value,
are experienced by workers who have less than high school education that are considered
as the low-skilled workers. The low-skilled workers are the most sensitive skill group to the
local unemployment rate and the surrounding regions’ unemployment rates with elasticities
of -0.075, -0.132, respectively. Both elasticities getting lower by skill level. Unemployment
elasticity of real wages is insignificant for the high-skilled workers while the spatial spillover
e ect is significant, -0.067. In other words, high-skilled workers are more sensitive to the
employment conditions of proximate regions than that of their own region.
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Furthermore, in Appendix Table 4.A5, among the age groups, young workers (aged 15-24)
are the most sensitive group to the unemployment rate variation in their own-local market
and in surrounding labor markets. Workers with low tenure have higher unemployment
elasticity of earnings and spatial spillover e ects. Workers in the small firms have higher
unemployment elasticity of pay and spatial spillover elasticity, in absolute value, than the
workers in medium- or large-sized firms with the fixed e ects estimation. On the other hand,
the FE-2SLS estimations show that workers in small firms have unemployment elasticity of
-0.096 and spatial spillover elasticity of -0.106. Moreover, the workers in the medium-size
firms have the smallest, in absolute terms, unemployment elasticity, -0.028, but the highest
spatial spillover elasticity, - 0.163. There is no significant spillover e ect for those who work in
the large firms but we find an unemployment elasticity of -0.041. These results show that the
workers in the large firms are only a ected by own region employment conditions. However,
the workers in the medium-size firms are the most a ected group by the unemployment rate
in the neighboring regions. We find that temporary workers have the highest spatial spillover
elasticity of -0.221, among all groups, while there is no significant unemployment elasticity
for this group of workers.
We present unemployment elasticities and spatial spillover elasticities for the disaggre-
gated groups of male workers in Table 4.6 and Appendix Table 4.A6. The spatial spillovers
for the male workers are found to be insignificant for most of the cases in the fixed e ects
estimation, but the FE-2SLS results show that spatial spillovers of the unemployment rate
has a significant direct e ect on individual wages of males. Men work in temporary jobs
have the highest spatial spillover elasticity, -0.218. However, the unemployment elasticity of
pay is insignificant. Also, the FE-2SLS results show that the informal male workers have no
significant unemployment elasticity, but have a high spatial spillover of -0.155. However, the
formal male workers are more responsive to own-region unemployment rate than contiguous
regions’ unemployment rate. Men with more than high school education have no significant
spatial spillover e ects, when the endogeneity problem has been addressed. Moreover, we
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could not find significant spatial spillover unemployment elasticity of pay for men who work
in the large firms.
Table 4.7 shows unemployment elasticities of pay and spatial spillovers for the female
worker groups. We find that the women wages are more responsive to the unemployment
rate variations in proximate regions than in their own region. The FE-2SLS results show
that the formal women workers have the only significant spillover e ect, -0.081. However, the
informal women have a significant unemployment elasticity of pay, -0.212. That is, formal
women are more responsive to the employment conditions in surrounding regions, whereas
informal workers are more responsive to own-region employment conditions. Also, we find
that women with more than high school education have a significant positive elasticity for
own region unemployment, but significant negative spatial spillover elasticities of -0.158.
Furthermore, Appendix Table 4.A7 presents the unemployment elasticity and spatial
spillovers for the disaggregated female workers. The table shows that younger female workers
get more a ected by unemployment in the contiguous regions, whereas the unemployment
elasticity is higher for older workers. We find statistically significant spatial spillovers for
women who work in the medium-size firms, -0.247. However, there is no significant spillovers
for women work in the small or large firms. The highest spatial spillover among all female
groups is found for women who work in temporary jobs, -0.384.
4.4.3 Robustness Check for the Spatial Weight
We check our result against two other spatial weight matrices. First, we use a spatial weight
matrix based on the inverse distance between regions, described in section 4.3, and present
results in Table 4.8. Longhi et al. (2006) points out that using full inverse distances between
regions may average out the positive spatial dependence between the contiguous regions. We
compare results in Table 4.8 with those in Table 4.5. We find very similar results for the
unemployment elasticities of pay with these two di erent spatial matrices in the fixed e ects
estimation. However, the spatial spillover e ects become positive or insignificant, except for
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women, public workers, high school graduates. The spatial spillovers are found to be higher
for all these groups than their counterpart in Table 4.5. Furthermore, the FE-2SLS estimates
of the spatial spillovers are negative and smaller than own-region unemployment elasticities.
However, they are statistically insignificant in most of the cases.
Second, having found spatial spillovers does not matter if we use full inverse distance
spatial weight matrix, we check our results against a hybrid spatial weight matrix following
Longhi et al. (2006) that is described in subsection 4.3.1. The estimates are presented in
Table 4.9 and compared with Table 4.5. We find that the unemployment elasticity is -0.053
and the spatial spillovers is -0.096 for all workers with the hybrid spatial weight matrix
which are slightly higher than those found using the contiguity matrix. The results are
hardly changed in Tables 4.9 comparing Table 4.5.
Based on our di erent weight specifications, we can conclude that spatial spillovers of
unemployment rate in the contiguous regions matter, even in a greater magnitude than own-
region unemployment rate. However, using distance of one region to the rest of the regions,
wipes out this e ect as it has been mentioned in Longhi et al. (2006).
4.4.4 Unemployment Elasticities with Group-Specific Regional Un-
employment Rates
While most of the wage curve studies present disaggregated wage curves for various groups,
only a handful of them use disaggregated unemployment rates following Card’s (1995) sug-
gestion. The group-specific regional unemployment rates are available for disaggregated
groups based on gender, education, and age in the TURKSTAT’s website. We make use of
these disaggregated unemployment rates and estimate the wage curves for various group of
workers.
Table 4.10 shows the wage curve estimates along with estimates based on group-specific
regional unemployment rates of various groups; gender, skill, and age groups. The results
show that the unemployment elasticity for women become smaller in absolute value, in the
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fixed e ects estimation when using regional women unemployment rates, -0.021 comparing
wage curve estimates in Table 4.2. Moreover, while unemployment elasticity for women with
the overall unemployment rate is found to be -0.063 with the FE-2SLS estimation, using
the regional female unemployment rate leads to a smaller and insignificant unemployment
elasticity. On the other hand, using regional male unemployment rate instead of the overall
unemployment, lowers the elasticities for men, in absolute value, -0.068, -0.073, respectively.
Next, we present for the first time, wage curve estimates for workers disaggregated by
three skill levels with overall regional unemployment rates and group-specific regional un-
employment rates. We can compare Table 4.10 with Table 4.2 to see how unemployment
elasticities change with the use of overall unemployment rate and group-specific unemploy-
ment rates for disaggregated samples. In Table 4.2, where the overall unemployment rate is
used, the fixed e ects and FE-2SLS estimation results show that workers with less than high
school education/low-skilled is the most responsive group to the overall regional unemploy-
ment rate variations.However, the workers with more than high school education is the least
responsive group. Controlling for the endogeneity of unemployment, the elasticities become
higher for all of the three skill levels.
The results obtained using group-specific unemployment rate reveals some di erent con-
clusions than those obtained using overall regional unemployment rate in Table 4.10. Using
the skill-specific unemployment rates in the fixed e ect estimation, we find that the low-
skilled workers have a higher elasticity than high-skill workers but a lower elasticity than
medium-skilled workers, -0.043, -0.027, -0.054, respectively. Furthermore, the FE-2SLS re-
sults show that elasticities become larger for all groups. However, the low-skilled workers
experience the lowest unemployment elasticity of -0.054. On the other hand, the high-skilled
workers are less responsive to the group-specific unemployment rate variations than medium-
skilled workers are, -0.076, -0.094, respectively.
TURKSTAT also releases the unemployment rates based on age groups, considering
di erences in the labor market behavior of the young workers (aged 15-24) and older workers
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(aged 25+). The last two columns of Table 4.10 show unemployment elasticities for these two
groups. We find, in Appendix Table 4.A2, that unemployment elasticity for young workers
is higher than that for old workers when we use the overall unemployment rate, -0.096, -
0.065, respectively. However, in Table 4.10, using age-specific unemployment rates shows
that the young workers are even more sensitive to the group-specific unemployment rate,
whereas older workers are less sensitive. The FE-2SLS results show that young workers have
an elasticity of -0.131 while unemployment elasticity for older workers is -0.052.
Furthermore, Table 4.11 shows the estimates of the unemployment elasticity of pay and
spatial spillover unemployment elasticity with the group-specific unemployment rates. Using
group-specific unemployment rate in the fixed e ect estimation results in small changes in
the magnitude of the unemployment elasticity of the female and male workers. However,
the spatial spillovers for female workers is almost as half as that found using the overall
unemployment rate, -0.046. There is no significant spatial spillovers e ect for the male
workers. On the other hand, there are no wage curve or spatial spillovers for women in
the FE-2SLS estimation, whereas the male workers have significant unemployment rate and
spillovers unemployment elasticity, -0.056, -0.061, respectively.
There are no spatial spillovers for skill groups except for the medium-skilled group, -0.033,
in the fixed e ects estimation. On the other hand, wages of the medium-skilled workers are
the most responsive wages to own-region group-specific unemployment rates.The FE-2SLS
results show that there is no evidence for the unemployment elasticity or spatial spillovers
for the high-skilled workers once group-specific unemployment rate is used. On the contrary,
we find a strong evidence for the unemployment elasticities and spatial e ects for the low-
skilled and medium-skilled workers. We find that medium-skilled workers are more sensitive
to the regional unemployment of medium-skilled workers in their own local market and the
surrounding labor markets with elasticities of -0.070 and -0.112, respectively. Similarly, the
low-skilled workers are less sensitive to the unemployment rate of own-region than that of
contiguous regions with elasticities, -0.039, -0.093, respectively.
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Lastly, there was no evidence for the spatial spillovers e ects for young workers (15-
24) with the fixed e ects estimation using the overall unemployment rate in Table 4.A5.
However, we find a significant spatial spillovers, -0.056, for this group using group-specific
unemployment rate. The fixed e ects and FE-2SLS results show that the wages of the
young workers are responsive to the own-region unemployment rate and contiguous regions’
unemployment rate with elasticities of -0.091, -0.138, respectively. Those are higher than
that found for the old workers, -0.041, -0.071, respectively.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we reexamined the Turkish wage curve considering the endogeneity problem,
spatial dependence and e ect of group-specific regional unemployment rates. The data
used in this study comes from the THLFS of TURKSTAT over 26 NUTS-2 regions for the
period 2004-2013. Using lagged value of unemployment rate as an instrument for the current
unemployment rate in the FE-2SLS estimation, we find that unemployment elasticity of pay
is -0.071 for all workers in Turkey.
Furthermore, disaggregated wage curves show that the male workers have a more elastic
wage curve than female workers with elasticities of -0.073, -0.063, respectively. We further
compare the male and female wage curves for di erent periods and confirm that women
wages were more responsive to the regional unemployment rate. However, this relationship
has been reversed in the recent years. This finding is reasonable, as the female employment
has been increasing and women get more stick to their job in the last decade in Turkey.
Moreover, the highest unemployment elasticity of real wages is found for the workers who
work in small firms as, -0.116.
The e ect of the spatial dependence of local labor markets on the wage curve estimates is
addressed by introducing a spatially weighted regional unemployment rate as an additional
explanatory variable. Treating regional unemployment as predetermined and estimating
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wage curve with the fixed e ects, shows that there is a spatial spillover unemployment
elasticity, -0.027, but own-region unemployment elasticity changes slightly higher, -0.046,
for all workers. On the other hand, instrumenting the unemployment rate and spatially
weighted unemployment rates with their one-year-lagged values, in the FE-2SLS estimation,
we find that own-region unemployment elasticity of real wage is -0.056, and spatial spillover
unemployment elasticity of pay is -0.087 for all workers. This shows that individual wages are
more sensitive to the employment conditions in the contiguous regions than their own region.
This indicates that ignoring spatial spillovers of unemployment rates would bias the wage
curve estimates. We find that female wages are more sensitive to the unemployment rate of
contiguous regions than male wages, -0.118, -0.081, respectively. However, women are less
a ected by own-region unemployment rate than men, -0.051, - 0.058, respectively. Another
important finding is that we find that workers in the public sector have a positive relationship
with their own-region unemployment, while there is a significantly negative spatial spillover
unemployment elasticity, -0.086. The estimations for various groups of workers show that
the highest unemployment elasticity of pay is found for workers who work in the small firms,
-0.096, and the highest spatial spillover unemployment elasticity of pay is found for those
who work in temporary jobs, -0.221. Checking for di erent spatial weight matrix, we confirm
the Longhi et al. (2006) such that using full Euclidean distances among regions averages out
the positive spatial dependence, such that no significant spatial spillover e ects have been
found.
Lastly, we reconsider responsiveness of wages of various groups to their group-specific
regional unemployment rates rather than the overall regional unemployment rates. We find
that the use of group-specific unemployment rate has very subtle changes in the men’s wage
curve. However, the unemployment elasticity of pay for women become very small and
insignificant. Moreover, for the first time we tested wage curves for skill-specific unem-
ployment rates and find that the medium-skilled workers have the highest unemployment
elasticity, while low-skilled workers have the lowest elasticity which is a di erent conclusion
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than that found using overall regional unemployment rate. Furthermore, we estimate the
wage curve with group-specific unemployment and spatially weighted group-specific unem-
ployment rates. Moreover, we find negative elasticities for own region and contiguous regions
for both female and male workers. However, instrumenting the unemployment rates with
their one-year lagged values, the unemployment elasticity and spatial spillovers for females
lose their significance. We find that the medium-skilled workers are more sensitive to both
own-region and contiguous regions’ unemployment rate variations than their low and high-
skilled counterparts. Also, young workers are more responsive to the unemployment in their
own region and proximate regions than old workers.
Overall, we estimated the spatial wage equation in Turkey. We find strong evidence
on the direct e ect of unemployment rates of contiguous regions as well as own-region.
These findings may be an evidence for the e ciency wage curve, labor turnover cost, or
monopsonistic competition hypotheses of the wage curve.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Spatial Distribution of Overall and Group-Specific Unemployment Rates (UE)
in the year 2008.
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Source: TURKSTAT. (a) Spatial distribution of overall UE. (b) Spatial distribution of UE in which
agriculture sector is excluded. (c) and (d) Spatial distributions of male and female-specific UE,
respectively. (e) and (f) Spatial distributions of for youth (15-24 years old) UE, and UE of workers aged 25
and older, respectively
153
Figure 4.2: Spatial Distribution of Skill-Specific Unemployment Rates (UE) in the year
2008.
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Source: TURKSTAT. (a)Spatial distribution of unskilled (no schooling) UE. (b) Spatial distribution of
low-skilled (less than high-school education) UE. (c) Spatial distribution of medium-skilled (high school
graduates) UE. (d) Spatial distribution of high-skilled (college graduates) UE.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 821,166 34.63 10.39
Having Social Security 821,166 0.755 0.430
Permanency of the job 821,166 0.902 0.297
Hours worked in a week 821,166 51.08 13.53
Urban 821,166 0.820 0.384
Overall Unemployment(%) 821,166 10.54 3.479
Female 821,166 0.235 0.424
Married 821,166 0.704 0.457
Years of Education 821,166 9.127 4.197
Education Levels
Illiterate 821,166 0.0148 0.121
No Schooling 821,166 0.0409 0.198
Primary School 821,166 0.306 0.461
Middle School 821,166 0.166 0.372
High School 821,166 0.128 0.334
Vocational High School 821,166 0.130 0.337
College 821,166 0.228 0.420
Part-time Job 821,166 0.0309 0.173
Hourly Wage 821,166 2.732 2.872
Tenure in the Current Job 821,166 6.698 7.629
Firm Size
Firm ( less than 10 Workers) 821,166 0.340 0.474
Firm ( 1-24 Workers) 821,166 0.120 0.325
Firm ( 25-49 Workers) 821,166 0.178 0.383
Firm ( more than 49 Workers) 821,166 0.362 0.481
Private Sector 821,166 0.737 0.440
Disaggregated Unemployment Rates (%)
Non-agricultural UE 821,166 13.17 3.522
High-Skilled UE 821,166 10.42 2.691
Medium-Skilled UE (%) 821,166 12.96 3.667
Low-Skilled UE 821,166 10.24 4.057
Unskilled UE 821,166 7.991 6.382
Male UE 821,166 9.960 3.329
Female UE 821,166 11.91 5.129
15-24 Aged UE 821,166 19.92 5.389
25+ Aged UE 821,166 8.533 3.103
Source: Authors calculation from TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Surveys (2004-
2013).Unskilled refers to those who have no schooling; low-skilled refers to those have less
than high school education; medium-skilled refers to those have high school education; and,
high-skilled refers to those have more than high school education.
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Table 4.2: Unemployment Elasticity of Pay (—)
Formality Sector Skill Groups
VARIABLES All All-NAUE Female Male Formal Informal Public Private Low Medium High
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.048*** -0.067*** -0.031*** -0.054*** -0.033*** -0.057*** 0.000 -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.042*** -0.013*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
# of Obs. 821,166 795,563 192,721 628,445 619,730 201,436 215,627 605,539 409,278 212,287 187,437
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.62 0.32 0.54 0.51 0.42 0.54 0.49
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.071*** -0.107** -0.063*** -0.073*** -0.046*** -0.090*** 0.021** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.052*** -0.022*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
# of Obs. 752,634 729,761 178,531 574,103 572,798 179,836 195,253 557,381 371,572 194,271 176,084
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.63 0.33 0.57 0.51 0.42 0.55 0.51
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at
the firm and its square, and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it
required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as well
as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects All regressions are weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS.Low-skilled
refers to those have less than high school education; medium-skilled refers to those have high school education; and, high-skilled refers
to those have more than high school education.
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Table 4.3: Male Unemployment Elasticity of Pay (—)
Formality Sector Skill Groups
VARIABLES All All-NAUE Formal Informal Public Private Low Medium High
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.054*** -0.074*** -0.039*** -0.063*** -0.014** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.043*** -0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
# of Obs. 628,445 611,422 475,492 152,953 157,865 470,580 340,666 163,734 117,408
R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.34 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.53 0.48
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.073*** -0.111*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.005 -0.092*** -0.094*** -0.044*** -0.047***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
# of Obs. 574,103 558,883 438,114 135,989 141,700 432,403 308,668 149,621 110,063
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.34 0.55 0.50 0.44 0.55 0.50
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at
the firm and its square, and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance
to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry
categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects All regressions are weighted by the sampling weight provided in
THLFS.Low-skilled refers to those have less than high school education; medium-skilled refers to those have high school education;
and, high-skilled refers to those have more than high school education.
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Table 4.4: Female Unemployment Elasticity of Pay (—)
Formality Sector Skill Groups
VARIABLES All All-NAUE Formal Informal Public Private Low Medium High
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.031*** -0.044*** -0.010 -0.079*** 0.046*** -0.063*** -0.083*** -0.040*** 0.016
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
# of Obs. 192,721 184,141 144,238 48,483 57,762 134,959 68,612 48,553 70,029
R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.35 0.60 0.56 0.36 0.55 0.51
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.063*** -0.086*** -0.019 -0.226*** 0.092*** -0.131*** -0.170*** -0.085*** 0.025
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.036) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.025) (0.020)
# of Obs. 178,531 170,878 134,684 43,847 53,553 124,978 62,904 44,650 66,021
R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.35 0.63 0.56 0.35 0.55 0.53
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square,
tenure at the firm and its square, and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and
if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and
10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects All regressions are weighted by the sampling
weight provided in THLFS.Low-skilled refers to those have less than high school education; medium-skilled refers to those have
high school education; and, high-skilled refers to those have more than high school education.
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Table 4.5: Unemployment Elasticity of Pay with Spatial Spillover E ects- Contiguity
Weighted (— and “)
Formality Sector Skill Groups
VARIABLES All All-NAUE Female Male Formal Informal Public Private Low Medium High
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.046*** -0.065*** -0.027*** -0.053*** -0.033*** -0.055*** 0.004 -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.040*** -0.014**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
“ -0.027*** -0.063*** -0.083*** -0.014** -0.002 -0.030** -0.040*** -0.013 - -0.052*** -0.029** 0.013
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014)
# of Obs. 821,166 795,563 192,721 628,445 619,730 201,436 215,627 605,539 409,278 212,287 187,437
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.62 0.32 0.54 0.51 0.42 0.54 0.49
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.056*** -0.084*** -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.040*** -0.065*** 0.040*** -0.087*** -0.075*** -0.039*** -0.012
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
“ -0.087*** -0.162*** -0.118*** -0.081*** -0.041*** -0.099*** -0.086*** -0.079*** -0.132*** -0.079*** -0.067**
(0.015) (0.022) (0.030) (0.017) (0.015) (0.038) (0.023) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030)
# of Obs. 752,634 729,761 178,531 574,103 572,798 179,836 195,253 557,381 371,572 194,271 176,084
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.63 0.33 0.57 0.51 0.42 0.55 0.51
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at the firm and its square,
and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra
job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects All regressions
are weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS.Low-skilled refers to those have less than high school education; medium-skilled refers to those have
high school education; and, high-skilled refers to those have more than high school education.
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Table 4.6: Male Unemployment Elasticity of Pay with Spatial Spillovers- Contiguity
Weighted (— and “)
Formality Sector Skill Groups
VARIABLES All All-NAUE Formal Informal Public Private Low Medium High
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.053*** -0.073*** -0.039*** -0.063*** -0.009 -0.069*** -0.065*** -0.042*** -0.029***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
“ -0.014** -0.050*** 0.002 -0.003 -0.049*** 0.007 -0.033*** -0.017 0.009
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017)
# of Obs. 628,445 611,422 475,492 152,953 157,865 470,580 340,666 163,734 117,408
R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.34 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.53 0.48
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.058*** -0.086*** -0.048*** -0.011 0.016 -0.079*** -0.066*** -0.029* -0.044**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.024) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019)
“ -0.081*** -0.163*** -0.030* -0.155*** -0.084*** -0.077*** -0.138*** -0.078*** -0.022
(0.017) (0.025) (0.018) (0.043) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024) (0.030) (0.039)
# of Obs. 574,103 558,883 438,114 135,989 141,700 432,403 308,668 149,621 110,063
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.34 0.55 0.50 0.44 0.55 0.50
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at
the firm and its square, and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it
required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as
well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects All regressions are weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS.Low-
skilled refers to those have less than high school education; medium-skilled refers to those have high school education; and, high-skilled
refers to those have more than high school education.
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Table 4.7: Female Unemployment Elasticity of Pay with Spatial Spillovers- Contiguity
Weighted (— and “)
Formality Sector Skill Groups
VARIABLES All All-NAUE Formal Informal Public Private Low Medium High
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.027*** -0.039*** -0.009 -0.074*** 0.048*** -0.060*** -0.080*** -0.035*** 0.015
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
“ -0.083*** -0.115*** -0.021 -0.159*** -0.020 -0.093*** -0.152*** -0.078*** 0.013
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.033) (0.019) (0.018) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
# of Obs. 192,721 184,141 144,238 48,483 57,762 134,959 68,612 48,553 70,029
R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.35 0.60 0.56 0.36 0.55 0.51
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.051*** -0.071*** -0.012 -0.212*** 0.106*** -0.124*** -0.160*** -0.077*** 0.044**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.040) (0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022)
“ -0.118*** -0.137*** -0.081*** -0.095 -0.085** -0.093** -0.109** -0.080 -0.158***
(0.030) (0.042) (0.029) (0.078) (0.041) (0.038) (0.053) (0.050) (0.047)
# of Obs. 178,531 170,878 134,684 43,847 53,553 124,978 62,904 44,650 66,021
R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.35 0.63 0.56 0.35 0.55 0.53
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at
the firm and its square, and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance
to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry
categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects All regressions are weighted by the sampling weight provided in
THLFS.Low-skilled refers to those have less than high school education; medium-skilled refers to those have high school education;
and, high-skilled refers to those have more than high school education.
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Table 4.8: Unemployment Elasticity of Pay with Spatial Spillovers- Full Inverse Distance
Weighted (— and “)
Formality Sector Skill Groups
VARIABLES All All-NAUE Female Male Formal Informal Public Private Low Medium High
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.048*** -0.067*** -0.032*** -0.054*** -0.033*** -0.057*** 0.001 -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.042*** -0.013*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
“ 0.041** 0.015 -0.155*** 0.058*** 0.041* 0.095*** -0.091*** 0.181*** 0.028 -0.079** 0.129***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.048) (0.021) (0.022) (0.036) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.034) (0.041)
# of Obs. 821,166 795,563 192,721 628,445 619,730 201,436 215,627 605,539 409,278 212,287 187,437
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.62 0.32 0.54 0.51 0.42 0.54 0.49
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.071*** -0.109*** -0.064*** -0.073*** -0.046*** -0.094*** 0.030*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.049*** -0.021
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
“ -0.015 -0.063 -0.049 -0.044 -0.095* 0.162 -0.300*** 0.210*** 0.102 -0.237*** -0.103
(0.047) (0.064) (0.113) (0.052) (0.051) (0.099) (0.063) (0.063) (0.069) (0.082) (0.097)
# of Obs. 752,634 729,761 178,531 574,103 572,798 179,836 195,253 557,381 371,572 194,271 176,084
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.63 0.33 0.57 0.51 0.42 0.55 0.51
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at the firm and its square,
and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra
job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects All regressions
are weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS.Low-skilled refers to those have less than high school education; medium-skilled refers to those
have high school education; and, high-skilled refers to those have more than high school education.
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Table 4.9: Unemployment Elasticity of Pay with Spatial Spillovers- Contiguous Inverse
Distance (Hybrid) Weighted (— and “)
Formality Sector Skill Groups
VARIABLES All All-NAUE Female Male Formal Informal Public Private Low Medium High
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.046*** -0.065*** -0.026*** -0.053*** -0.033*** -0.054*** 0.004 -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.039*** -0.014**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
“ -0.030*** -0.058*** -0.076*** -0.020*** -0.003 -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.018** -0.058*** -0.034*** 0.015
(0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
# of Obs. 821,166 795,563 192,721 628,445 619,730 201,436 215,627 605,539 409,278 212,287 187,437
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.62 0.32 0.54 0.51 0.42 0.54 0.49
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.053*** -0.086*** -0.050*** -0.054*** -0.039*** -0.058*** 0.042*** -0.084*** -0.071*** -0.036** -0.012
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.021) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
“ -0.096*** -0.153*** -0.114*** -0.094*** -0.048*** -0.119*** -0.090*** -0.092*** -0.146*** -0.090*** -0.063**
(0.015) (0.022) (0.030) (0.017) (0.015) (0.036) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.030)
# of Obs. 752,634 729,761 178,531 574,103 572,798 179,836 195,253 557,381 371,572 194,271 176,084
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.63 0.33 0.57 0.51 0.42 0.55 0.51
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at the firm and its square,
and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra
job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects All regressions
are weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS.Low-skilled refers to those have less than high school education; medium-skilled refers to those
have high school education; and, high-skilled refers to those have more than high school education.
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Table 4.10: Group-specific Unemployment Elasticity of Pay (— and “)
Skill Group Age Group
VARIABLES All Female Male LHS HS MHS 15-24 25+
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.048*** -0.020*** -0.051*** -0.043*** -0.054*** -0.027*** -0.083*** -0.039***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003)
# of Obs. 821,166 192,721 628,445 409,278 212,287 187,437 147,016 674,150
R-squared 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.42 0.54 0.49 0.50 0.62
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.071*** -0.024 -0.068*** -0.054*** -0.094*** -0.076** -0.131*** -0.052***
(0.007) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.034) (0.018) (0.007)
# of Obs. 752,634 178,531 574,103 371,572 194,271 176,084 133,543 619,091
R-squared 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.42 0.55 0.51 0.50 0.63
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square,
tenure at the firm and its square, and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and
if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation
and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects All regressions are weighted by the
sampling weight provided in THLFS.Low-skilled refers to those have less than high school education; medium-skilled
refers to those have high school education; and, high-skilled refers to those have more than high school education.
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Table 4.11: Group-specific Unemployment Elasticity of Pay with Spatial Contiguity Weight
(— and “)
Skill Group Age Group
VARIABLES All Female Male LHS HS MHS 15-24 25+
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.046*** -0.023*** -0.051*** -0.042*** -0.051*** -0.027*** -0.077*** -0.037***
(0.003) 0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003)
“ -0.027*** -0.046*** 0.006 -0.011 -0.033** -0.002 -0.056*** -0.028***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.006)
# of Obs. 821,166 192,721 628,445 409,278 212,287 187,437 147,016 674,150
R-squared 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.42 0.54 0.49 0.50 0.62
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.056*** -0.023 -0.056*** -0.039*** -0.070*** -0.188 -0.091*** -0.041***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.135) (0.024) (0.008)
“ -0.087*** -0.012 -0.061*** -0.093*** -0.112*** 0.352 -0.138*** -0.071***
(0.015) (0.036) (0.019) (0.019) (0.039) (0.346) (0.045) (0.015)
# of Obs. 752,634 178,531 574,103 371,572 194,271 176,084 133,543 619,091
R-squared 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.42 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.63
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square,
tenure at the firm and its square, and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and
if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation
and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects All regressions are weighted by the
sampling weight provided in THLFS.Low-skilled refers to those have less than high school education; medium-skilled refers
to those have high school education; and, high-skilled refers to those have more than high school education.
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Appendix Tables
Table 4.A1: Comparison of Di erent Time Periods for Overall Unemployment Elasticity of
Pay (— )
Years 2004-2013 Years 2005-2008 Years 2005-2009
VARIABLES All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male
Panel A: Overall Unemployment Rate
— (FE) -0.048*** -0.031*** -0.054*** 0.012 0.006 0.011 -0.010 -0.007 -0.014*
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008)
# of Obs. 821,166 192,721 628,445 302,225 67,189 235,036 380,047 85,322 294,725
R-squared 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.62 0.67 0.61 0.63 0.67 0.61
— (FE-2SLS) -0.071*** -0.063*** -0.073*** -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.014 -0.029 -0.012
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.018) (0.044) (0.020) (0.015) (0.034) (0.017)
# of Obs 752,634 178,531 574,103 302,225 67,189 235,036 380,047 85,322 294,725
R-squared 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.62 0.67 0.61 0.63 0.67 0.61
Panel B: Non-agricultural Unemployment Rate
— (FE) -0.067*** -0.044*** -0.074*** -0.022** -0.048** -0.019* -0.042*** -0.051*** -0.043***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.022) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009)
# of Obs. 795,563 184,141 611,422 292,086 63,663 228,423 367,726 81,055 286,671
R-squared 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.62 0.67 0.61
— (FE-2SLS) -0.107*** -0.086*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.221*** -0.089*** -0.125*** -0.186*** -0.110***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.009) (0.022) (0.054) (0.024) (0.019) (0.040) (0.021)
# of Obs. 729,761 170,878 558,883 292,086 63,663 228,423 367,726 81,055 286,671
R-squared 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.62 0.67 0.61
Notes:Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at
the firm and its square, and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to
it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories
as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects. All regressions are weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS.
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Table 4.A2: Unemployment Elasticity of Pay —
Age Groups Tenure Firm Size Permanency
VARIABLES 15-24 25-44 45+ 25+ Low High Small Medium Large Temporary Permanent
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.076*** -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.042*** -0.062*** -0.026*** -0.064*** -0.049*** -0.025*** -0.070*** -0.044***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003)
# of Obs. 147,016 522,448 151,702 674,150 527,443 293,723 279,483 244,507 297,176 80,409 740,757
R-squared 0.50 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.55 0.65 0.43 0.65 0.63 0.33 0.65
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.096*** -0.069*** -0.043*** -0.065*** -0.091*** -0.045*** -0.116*** -0.057*** -0.039*** -0.086*** -0.070***
(0.016) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.024) (0.007)
# of Obs. 133,543 478,588 140,503 619,091 487,886 264,748 254,260 225,994 272,380 74,607 678,027
R-squared 0.50 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.56 0.66 0.44 0.65 0.64 0.33 0.66
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at the firm and its square, and
dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job,
part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects. All regressions are
weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS. Low(high) tenure refers those workers who have less(more) than the average year of tenure in the current
job. Small, Medium, and Large Firm refers those workers who work in a firm which has less than 10 workers, between 10-49 workers, and more than 49 workers,
respectively.
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Table 4.A3: Male Unemployment Elasticity of Pay (—)
Age Groups Tenure Firm Size Permanency
VARIABLES 15-24 25-44 45+ 25+ Low High Small Medium Large Temporary Permanent
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.077*** -0.055*** -0.034*** -0.051*** -0.068*** -0.035*** -0.073*** -0.054*** -0.029*** -0.072*** -0.052***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004)
# of Obs. 101,148 399,914 127,383 527,297 390,530 237,915 222,047 180,000 226,398 62,300 566,145
R-squared 0.49 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.53 0.64 0.44 0.62 0.61 0.31 0.64
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.102*** -0.074*** -0.038** -0.068*** -0.091*** -0.056*** -0.110*** -0.064*** -0.043*** -0.082*** -0.076***
(0.020) (0.009) (0.018) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) (0.008)
# of Obs. 91,844 364,614 117,645 482,259 360,501 213,602 201,348 165,966 206,789 57,834 516,269
R-squared 0.49 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.54 0.65 0.44 0.63 0.63 0.31 0.65
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at the firm and its square, and
dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job,
part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects. All regressions are
weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS. Low(high) tenure refers those workers who have less(more) than the average year of tenure in the current
job. Small, Medium, and Large Firm refers those workers who work in a firm which has less than 10 workers, between 10-49 workers, and more than 49 workers,
respectively.
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Table 4.A4: Female Unemployment Elasticity of Pay (—)
Age Groups Tenure Firm Size Permanency
VARIABLES 15-24 25-44 45+ 25+ Low High Small Medium Large Temporary Permanent
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.080*** -0.008 -0.060** -0.015 -0.049*** 0.015 -0.063*** -0.030*** -0.011 -0.083*** -0.017**
(0.015) (0.009) (0.028) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.030) (0.008)
# of Obs. 45,868 122,534 24,319 146,853 136,913 55,808 57,436 64,507 70,778 18,109 174,612
R-squared 0.54 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.61 0.69 0.50 0.72 0.68 0.39 0.69
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.085*** -0.049*** -0.077* -0.053*** -0.089*** 0.008 -0.172*** -0.028 -0.022 -0.136** -0.048***
(0.030) (0.017) (0.041) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.030) (0.022) (0.021) (0.063) (0.014)
# of Obs. 41,699 113,974 22,858 136,832 127,385 51,146 52,912 60,028 65,591 16,773 161,758
R-squared 0.54 0.68 0.73 0.69 0.61 0.69 0.50 0.72 0.70 0.38 0.70
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at the firm and its square,
and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban,
extra job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects. All
regressions are weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS. Low(high) tenure refers those workers who have less(more) than the average year
of tenure in the current job. Small, Medium, and Large Firm refers those workers who work in a firm which has less than 10 workers, between 10-49
workers, and more than 49 workers, respectively.
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Table 4.A5: Unemployment Elasticity of Pay with Spatial Spillovers-Contiguity Weighted
for Disaggregated Samples (— and “)
Age Groups Tenure Firm Size Permanency
VARIABLES 15-24 25-44 45+ 25+ Low High Small Medium Large Temporary Permanent
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.076*** -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.040*** -0.061*** -0.022*** -0.061*** -0.047*** -0.024*** -0.067*** -0.041***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003)
“ -0.004 -0.025*** -0.076*** -0.036*** -0.024*** -0.043*** -0.048*** -0.021* -0.015 -0.049** -0.034***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.022) (0.006)
# of Obs. 147,016 522,448 151,702 674,150 527,443 293,723 279,483 244,507 297,176 80,409 740,757
R-squared 0.50 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.55 0.65 0.43 0.65 0.63 0.33 0.65
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.067*** -0.055*** -0.031* -0.051*** -0.072*** -0.037*** -0.096*** -0.028** -0.041*** -0.024 -0.059***
(0.020) (0.009) (0.018) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.032) (0.008)
“ -0.143*** -0.080*** -0.074** -0.081*** -0.119*** -0.043* -0.106*** -0.163*** 0.008 -0.221*** -0.070***
(0.038) (0.018) (0.037) (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022) (0.056) (0.015)
# of Obs. 133,543 478,588 140,503 619,091 487,886 264,748 254,260 225,994 272,380 74,607 678,027
R-squared 0.50 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.56 0.66 0.44 0.65 0.64 0.32 0.66
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at the firm and its square, and
dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job,
part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects. All regressions are
weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS. Low(high) tenure refers those workers who have less(more) than the average year of tenure in the current
job. Small, Medium, and Large Firm refers those workers who work in a firm which has less than 10 workers, between 10-49 workers, and more than 49 workers,
respectively.
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Table 4.A6: Male Unemployment Elasticity of Pay with Spatial Spillover E ects-
Contiguity Weighted (— and “)
Age Groups Tenure Firm Size Permanency
VARIABLES 15-24 25-44 45+ 25+ Low High Small Medium Large Temporary Permanent
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.078*** -0.054*** -0.029*** -0.049*** -0.068*** -0.031*** -0.070*** -0.053*** -0.029*** -0.070*** -0.050***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004)
“ 0.024 -0.011 -0.084*** -0.027*** -0.005 -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.011 -0.008 -0.025 -0.028***
(0.017) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.023) (0.007)
# of Obs. 101,148 399,914 127,383 527,297 390,530 237,915 222,047 180,000 226,398 62,300 566,145
R-squared 0.49 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.53 0.64 0.44 0.62 0.61 0.31 0.64
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.081*** -0.061*** -0.017 -0.053*** -0.071*** -0.047*** -0.081*** -0.040*** -0.047*** -0.015 -0.064***
(0.024) (0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.036) (0.009)
“ -0.101** -0.070*** -0.117*** -0.082*** -0.109*** -0.044* -0.141*** -0.133*** 0.024 -0.218*** -0.070***
(0.046) (0.021) (0.041) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.026) (0.062) (0.018)
# of Obs. 91,844 364,614 117,645 482,259 360,501 213,602 201,348 165,966 206,789 57,834 516,269
R-squared 0.49 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.54 0.65 0.44 0.63 0.63 0.31 0.65
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at the firm and its square, and
dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra job,
part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects. All regressions are
weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS. Low(high) tenure refers those workers who have less(more) than the average year of tenure in the current
job. Small, Medium, and Large Firm refers those workers who work in a firm which has less than 10 workers, between 10-49 workers, and more than 49 workers,
respectively.
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Table 4.A7: Female Unemployment Elasticity of Pay with Spatial Spillover E ects-
Contiguity Weighted (— and “)
Age Groups Tenure Firm Size Permanency
VARIABLES 15-24 25-44 45+ 25+ Low High Small Medium Large Temporary Permanent
Panel A: Fixed E ects
— -0.075*** -0.005 -0.060** -0.011 -0.045*** 0.018 -0.059*** -0.027** -0.009 -0.083*** -0.013*
(0.015) (0.009) (0.028) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.030) (0.008)
“ -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.004 -0.077*** -0.088*** -0.055** -0.135*** -0.051** -0.049** -0.141** -0.060***
(0.026) (0.017) (0.054) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.029) (0.021) (0.022) (0.059) (0.014)
# of Obs. 45,868 122,534 24,319 146,853 136,913 55,808 57,436 64,507 70,778 18,109 174,612
R-squared 0.54 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.61 0.69 0.50 0.72 0.68 0.39 0.69
Panel B: FE-2SLS
— -0.051 -0.037** -0.088** -0.045*** -0.073*** 0.013 -0.166*** 0.009 -0.018 -0.083 -0.041***
(0.034) (0.018) (0.042) (0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031) (0.024) (0.022) (0.068) (0.014)
“ -0.220*** -0.124*** 0.147* -0.092*** -0.142*** -0.052 -0.074 -0.247*** -0.048 -0.384*** -0.071**
(0.065) (0.036) (0.085) (0.033) (0.037) (0.046) (0.062) (0.050) (0.042) (0.128) (0.029)
# of Obs. 41,699 113,974 22,858 136,832 127,385 51,146 52,912 60,028 65,591 16,773 161,758
R-squared 0.54 0.68 0.73 0.69 0.61 0.69 0.50 0.72 0.70 0.38 0.70
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include age, age square, tenure at the firm and its square,
and dummy variables for gender, marital status, 6 education level, ongoing education and if attendance to it required, formality, permanency, urban, extra
job, part-time, private sector, 4 firm size, 9 occupation and 10 industry categories as well as time and region (26 NUTS2 level) fixed e ects. All regressions
are weighted by the sampling weight provided in THLFS. Low(high) tenure refers those workers who have less(more) than the average year of tenure in
the current job. Small, Medium, and Large Firm refers those workers who work in a firm which has less than 10 workers, between 10-49 workers, and more
than 49 workers, respectively.
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